Global

Highlights Coordinated Hawkishness: Central bankers are in the process of taking back the easier monetary policy that followed the deflationary 2014/15 oil shock. Bond yields still have more upside to catch up to the solid pace of global growth and diminishing economic slack. Maintain a below-benchmark stance on overall portfolio duration. ECB Taper Tantrum: The recent European bond sell-off is following a similar pattern to both the 2013 Fed Taper Tantrum and the 2015 Bund Tantrum, suggesting a potential target of 1% on the benchmark 10-year German Bund yield by year-end. Stay underweight Euro Area government bonds. Canada: With the Canadian economy looking very strong, and with the Bank of Canada signaling a desire to begin normalizing monetary policy, the current underperformance of Canadian government bonds will continue. We are maintaining our tactical bearish positions on Canadian bonds, and are also adding a new strategic underweight position (2 out of 5) in our model bond portfolio. Feature A Regime Shift, Not A Regime Change Interest rate risk has returned with a vengeance in global fixed income markets over the past couple of weeks. A string of relatively hawkish policymaker comments has triggered a quick and sharp bond sell-off, as investors reprice the odds of what is looking now like a coordinated recalibration of global monetary policies. Longer-dated bonds have gotten pummeled as yield curves have bear-steepened in most countries, with 30-year government bond prices falling between -5% and -7% in a matter of days (Chart of the Week). With global growth looking very strong at the moment, policymakers are being forced to respond by looking to unwind some of the easing that took place after the crash in oil prices in 2014/15. With that deflation scare now firmly in the rearview mirror, central bankers are having to signal a move away from the emergency stimulus from 2015. The rapid yield responses seen so far suggest that the communication of that subtle policy shift - becoming "less dovish" rather than "more hawkish" - must be handled delicately, or else financial markets may riot and possibly short-circuit the current economic upturn. This yield surge has done very little to dampen investor enthusiasm for risk assets, so far. Equity prices and corporate credit spreads, both in the developed world and emerging markets (EM), have only moved modestly despite the large move in government bond yields (Chart 2). This suggests that the latter was most mispriced compared to the current solid pace of global economic growth. Chart of the WeekA Painful Repricing Chart 2Risk Assets Remain Unfazed With the benefit of hindsight, it now appears that the decline in global bond yields in the spring was an outsized response to a few below-consensus data prints on U.S. economic growth and inflation. Importantly, the numbers in the U.S. are starting to improve again, as indicated by the strong jump in the ISM indices and employment (+220k) in June. Many of our most reliable leading indicators and models are all pointing to further acceleration in U.S. growth in the next few quarters (Chart 3). The U.S. inflation data continues to disappoint, both in terms of price indices and wage growth. Growth in Average Hourly Earnings has drifted lower since the most recent peak, while core PCE inflation is only 1.4%. The latest commentary from the Fed, including the minutes from the June FOMC meeting released last week, suggests that this downdraft in inflation should prove to be temporary and stronger growth should lead to faster inflation. We would agree with that assessment. The U.S. unemployment rate at 4.4% remains below most measures of full employment, while other reliable indicators of labor market tightness, such as the spread between the "jobs plentiful" and "jobs hard to get" components of the U.S. consumer confidence report, are also pointing to an eventual reacceleration of wages (Chart 4, top panel). Meanwhile, the Cleveland Fed Median CPI is hovering around 2.5%, well above the current 5-year/5-year forward cost of inflation compensation embedded in U.S. TIPS prices of 1.83% (middle panel). Furthermore, the Phillips Curve based core PCE inflation model developed by our colleagues at U.S. Bond Strategy is signaling a rebound of core PCE inflation back above 1.9% by year-end, in a scenario of no change in the unemployment rate or U.S. dollar from current levels (bottom panel). Chart 3U.S. Growth Will Rebound Chart 4U.S. Inflation Will Rise Our base case scenario for the Fed is that additional tightening will come in 2017. First through an announcement on starting the process of reducing the Fed's balance sheet, through "tapering" the reinvestment of proceeds from maturing bonds held by the Fed, at the September FOMC meeting. After that, the next rate hike will not be until December. This will allow the Fed to see more inflation prints to confirm its own expectation that inflation will soon rebound before delivering more policy tightening. Of course, if the next couple of inflation releases surprise to the upside, then perhaps a rate hike is possible at the September meeting alongside the announcement on the Fed's balance sheet (which is basically a done deal, at this point). For now, we see the Fed staying cautious, especially given the increasing number of FOMC members who are becoming concerned with the lack of U.S. inflation, according to the June minutes. As for the other major developed economy central banks, this "old-school" cyclical upturn is boosting both capacity utilization and pipeline inflation (Chart 5). Combined with the other measures that have been showing diminished economic slack, like unemployment rates and output gaps, this will give policymakers confidence in their own medium-term growth and inflation forecasts. This will also embolden central bankers to remove some policy accommodation. Our own Central Bank Monitors are indicating a need for tighter monetary policy in every major developed economy except Japan. That is confirmed by Taylor Rule estimates for interest rates. In Chart 6, we present simple Taylor Rule projections for the policy rate in the U.S., Euro Area, U.K., Japan, Canada and Australia. The formula takes potential GDP growth (OECD estimates) and then adds current realized inflation, ½ of the deviation of inflation from the central bank target and ½ of the output gap.1 We also show projections for the Taylor Rule over the next two years, using individual central bank forecasts for inflation and IMF projections for potential growth and the output gap. We then compare those Taylor Rule forecasts with the rate expectations priced into Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curves. Chart 5An "Old-School" Cyclical Upturn Chart 6Rates Too Low, According To The Taylor Rule The first point to note is that policy rates are below the Taylor Rule "equilibrium" level everywhere except Japan, where the 0% interest rate looks appropriate given the lack of actual inflation. Secondly, the Taylor Rule rates are projected to rise in the U.S., Euro Area, Japan and Canada, while remaining around current levels in the U.K. and Australia. Thirdly, the projected rates using Taylor Rule estimates are well above the current path of rates discounted in OIS curves. We do not expect central banks to deliver anywhere near the amount of tightening suggested by these simple Taylor Rules over the next couple of years. Policymakers will likely tolerate some degree of higher realized inflation to ensure that inflation expectations can return to, and sustainably stay at, central bank target levels. This means keeping interest rates below equilibrium levels for as long as possible. However, if central banks believe their own current inflation forecasts (which we have used in our Taylor Rule estimates), then policy rates do have room to move higher without becoming restrictive (i.e. above the Taylor Rule estimates). The markets clearly disagree with these Taylor Rule projections, with much lower OIS rates expected in the next few years. The markets may turn out to be correct. At the moment, however, the gap between the Taylor Rule rate forecasts and market pricing is too large, which suggests there is additional scope for bond yields to rise. Even if central banks ignore their own forecasts of higher inflation and keep rates on hold, this will put upward pressure on bond yields via higher inflation expectations. In other words, the path of least resistance for bond yields is up - at least until there is a major financial market event, like a big pullback in equity prices or widening of corporate bond spreads. Yet until there is evidence that global growth is rolling over and decelerating, a "risk-off" event like that is unlikely. Investors should maintain below-benchmark duration exposure, and overweight allocations of corporate debt to government bonds, in the next 3-6 months. Watch the path of leading economic indicators before looking to reverse those positions. Bottom Line: Central bankers are in the process of taking back the easier monetary policy that followed the deflationary 2014/15 oil shock. Bond yields still have more upside to catch up to the solid pace of global growth and diminishing economic slack. If It Walks Like A Tantrum And Talks Like A Tantrum ... The spike in Euro Area bond yields since June 26th has raised concerns that another bond "tantrum" is unfolding, similar to U.S. Treasury sell-off in 2013 and the German Bund sell-off in 2015. In both cases, bond yields jumped rapidly as investors repriced the outlook for central bank policy. The recent comments from the European Central Bank (ECB) are signaling that a change in its asset purchase program, which is set to end on December 31st, is highly likely and were the trigger for the backup in European yields. We have already shown in previous reports how the benchmark 10-year German Bund yield has been following the same directional path as the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield in the months leading up to the 2013 Taper Tantrum.2 We benchmarked the two markets for the peak in our Months-to-Hike indicator for the timing of the first rate hike priced into OIS curves. In Chart 7, we show the same comparison for the various slopes of yield curves for U.S. Treasuries and German government bonds. Again, the German curve is following the Fed Taper Tantrum experience, which implies more bear-steepening pressure on yields over the rest of 2017. In Chart 8, we show a similar "cycle-on-cycle" comparison of German bonds today compared to the spring of 2015 during the Bund Tantrum episode. That sell-off took place over a much shorter time horizon than the U.S. Taper Tantrum, with the entire sell-off condensed to just over a month. The current backup in German yields looks to be following a similar pattern to the Bund Tantrum, suggesting that this move could take the benchmark 10-year yield back to 1% before it is done. Chart 7Taper Tantrum 2.0?... Chart 8...or Bund Tantrum 2.0? There are major differences between today and the 2015 episode - European economic growth is much faster, the output gap is narrower, and realized inflation is higher than it was two years ago (bottom two panels). The 2015 Tantrum was triggered by two events: a rise in European inflation back above 0% that led to a (misguided) belief among investors that the ECB, which had just started its asset purchase program, would quickly look to exit that program; a massive unwind of long positions in core European bond markets, made worse as speculators who were betting on a reversal of the initial jump in Bund yields got stopped out as yields continued to climb. Roll the tape to 2017, and the growth and inflation backdrop is much different. Now, the ECB is indeed talking openly about exiting/tapering its asset purchase program, supported by a solid European growth backdrop. There is likely less speculative positioning in European markets given the painful experience of the Bund Tantrum. However, with the ECB now owning significant shares of European bonds after two years of steady buying, the potential for a jump in yields driven by less-liquid markets may still be there. Net-net, the current Bund sell-off has additional upside when compared to the previous Tantrums, suggesting the Bund yield could rise to 1% before this move is done. Watch the performance of European equities and the euro for signs that the pain trade in Bunds could stall before 1%. If equities break lower or the Euro breaks higher (or both), the ECB commentary about the timing of a taper could take a more dovish turn. This is not our base case, though. Bottom Line: The recent European bond sell-off is following a similar pattern to both the 2013 Fed Taper Tantrum and the 2015 Bund Tantrum, suggesting a potential target of 1% on the benchmark 10-year German Bund yield by year-end. Stay underweight European government bonds. Move To An Underweight Stance On Canada This week, the Bank of Canada (BoC) meets to determine the next move for Canadian monetary policy. For the first time since 2010, that move will likely be a rate hike. The Canadian economy is booming, and the strength is starting to bump up against capacity constraints. The strong performance of real GDP growth in Q1 (+3%) looks to be followed up by a similar growth rate in Q2. The BoC's latest 2017 Business Outlook Survey made for great summer reading, as expectations for sales, capital spending and employment all remained quite strong (Chart 9). Firms were reporting that an increasing share of capital spending intentions were for the purposes of increasing capacity to accommodate stronger demand, a sign that Canadian businesses are becoming more optimistic that the economic upturn is sustainable. Hiring intentions hit the highest level ever recorded in the Survey, with firms also reporting an increase in employment to meet up with stronger demand. Current Canadian inflation rates remain subdued, but a pickup in output prices is expected over the next 12 months according to the Business Outlook Survey (bottom panel). A net positive number of respondents reported capacity constraints and labor shortages for the first time in the three years that those questions have been asked as part of the Survey. The BoC's growth forecasts are clearly too low and will likely be revised upward at this week's policy meeting, when a new Monetary Policy Report will be presented. This will likely be the reason for a rate hike to either be delivered this week, or strongly hinted at for the next policy meeting. Given the recent comments from BoC Governor Stephen Poloz and other BoC officials discussing the improving health of the economy and the need to "take back" the 50bps of rate cuts in 2015 as oil prices were collapsing, a rate hike is the more likely outcome this week. Already, the markets have moved to price in a more hawkish BoC, with a full 75bps of hikes expected over the next 12 months. This has helped out bearish Canadian rates trades in our Tactical Overlay Portfolio (see Page 15 and Chart 10), which were positions that benefitted from a stronger Canadian economy and more hawkish BoC. With Canadian policy rates still well below equilibrium (see our Taylor Rule estimates shown earlier), and with leading economic indicators still pointing towards accelerating Canadian economic growth in the coming quarters, the case for the BoC to leave rates at these current depressed levels is not a strong one. Chart 9A Robust Canadian##BR##Growth Upturn Chart 10Sticking With Our Winning##BR##Tactical Canadian Trades We see the recent underperformance of Canadian government bonds as the start of a more prolonged trend, thus we are opening up a new strategic position in our model bond portfolio: cutting our Canada country allocation to underweight (2 out of 5). As Canada is only a small part of our benchmark index (only 1%), we are increasing our U.S. exposure as an offset to our lower Canadian weighting. This will not change our below-benchmark allocation to U.S. Treasuries, while making our new position a more explicit bet on additional widening of the Canada-U.S. bond spread. Chart 11Canada Rates Strategy Summary:##BR##Move To Underweight If the economy improves enough to continue absorbing economic slack and put upward pressure on inflation, both realized and expected, then the potential for higher Canadian yields and a flatter Canadian curve - as the BoC becomes even more hawkish - will also increase (Chart 11). One huge caveat to this trade is the state of the Canadian housing market. Even a small move in policy interest rates could have a huge impact on the demand for Canadian housing and the health of Canadian household finances. A recent private-sector survey showed that 70% of Canadian homeowners could not manage even a 10% rise in their interest payments.3 Given the extreme valuations in the Canadian housing market, and some of the recent macro-prudential measures taken to deter speculation in the booming Vancouver and Toronto markets, there is potential for a larger housing downturn after a few BoC rate hikes. This will not prevent the BoC from normalizing rates, but if the housing market responds poorly and there is a spillover into concerns about the state of Canadian banks, then any backup in Canadian bond yields will be short-lived. This is a risk and not our base case over the next year, however. Bottom Line: With the Canadian economy looking very strong, and with the Bank of Canada signaling a desire to begin normalizing monetary policy, the current underperformance of Canadian government bonds will continue. We are maintaining our tactical bearish positions on Canadian bonds, and are also adding a new strategic underweight position (2 out of 5) in our model bond portfolio. Tactical Trade Update We have been recommending a position in our Tactical Overlay Table since March to position for additional Fed rate hikes, shorting the January 2018 fed funds futures contract. That contract is now priced for the fed funds rate to increase 15bps between now and the end of the year. Given that even an optimistic economic scenario would likely only result in one more 25bp increase in the funds rate by year-end, there is no longer much potential for further gains in this trade. We are closing the position this week, taking a tiny profit of +1bp. Chart 12Roll Our Short Fed Funds##BR##Futures Trade To July 2018 Looking further out, we now see an attractive new opportunity to short the July 2018 fed funds futures contract. That contract is currently priced for only 32bps of rate hikes between now and next June (Chart 12), and would therefore turn a profit in the event of two or more rate hikes during that timeframe. We are opening the new trade today, shorting the July 2018 contract. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 We show the inflation gap as the difference between realized inflation and the inflation target, using the actual inflation rate that the central bank is targeting. This could be headline inflation, as in the U.S. and Euro Area, or core inflation, as in Japan. 2 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Central Banks Are Now Playing Catch-Up", dated July 4 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 3 http://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/the-debt-truth-unexpected-expenses-could-spell-big-trouble-for-millennial-homeowners-623825354.html Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index

Highlights EM equity breadth has moved into negative territory, DM-based excess liquidity measures are set to roll-over, and China-based liquidity measures are also weak. Individually, each of these factors are not enough to raise alarm bells, but together they point to a period of heightened risks for EM assets and commodity currencies. AUD/CAD and NZD/JPY are set to suffer in this environment. EUR/USD will rise to 1.15-1.16, but unlike in 2015, it should not receive much of a fillip from EM volatility. Feature Chart I-1Technical Risk In EM An interesting development has unfolded in emerging markets. While the pause in the EM rally has hit investors' radar screens, the more puzzling event concerns breadth. Not only has the advanced/decline line rolled over, but more worrisomely, it has recently moved into negative territory. Historically, when more stocks are declining rather than advancing, EM equities tend to experience sharp selloffs (Chart I-1). This development is important when put into a global context. EM stocks and related assets like commodity currencies have been buoyed by plentiful global liquidity conditions. However, global liquidity is set to deteriorate. A rocky second half may emerge in EM assets. Global Liquidity Is Slowing Following in the Federal Reserve's footsteps, DM central banks are moving away from monetary accommodation. Last week, European Central Bank President Mario Draghi made a speech that was interpreted as representing an abandonment of the ECB's dovish bias. With the anticipation that its bond-buying program will be tapered early in 2018 and reports that the ECB is having problems buying its quota of German and Finnish bonds, global bonds suffered, with Bund and T-Note yields moving up 33 and 23 basis points since June 27, respectively. The ECB is not the only central bank to have changed its tack. The Bank of Canada's communications have been crystal clear that it intends to increase rates this summer, or early fall at the latest. Even the perennially dovish Riksbank is moving away from its easy bias, as Sweden's resource utilization points to a continued acceleration in core inflation. But does this even matter? The global economy is strong, and beginning to remove accommodation is not quite the same thing as pushing rates into tight territory. The advanced economies are unlikely to suffer much from this development. However, the picture for EM is more concerning. Some key leading indicators of EM activity have already begun to roll over. For example, Taiwanese IP, a key bellwether of overall EM strength, is now contracting on a year-on-year basis (Chart I-2, top panel). Meanwhile EM PMIs rolled over three months ago and EM narrow money growth, a key forecaster of EM profits, is slowing sharply (Chart I-2, bottom panel). Despite these negative developments, EM stocks have remained resilient. The factor underpinning this impressive performance has been the rise in global liquidity. More technically, the rise in the global Marshallian K - the ratio of money to nominal GDP - over the past six months. Excess money has had to go somewhere. Among the many refuges, EM has been a key pole of attraction, with massive inflows supporting assets prices. The 8% appreciation in EM currencies versus the dollar since their January 2016 trough has been a vivid illustration of this phenomenon. The driver of the rise in excess money has been the ratio's numerator, dollar-based liquidity. The Fed's various QE programs were key determinants of dollar-based liquidity (Chart I-3). However, its tapering in late 2014 was enough to prompt a contraction of the measure. Now that the Fed is intent on decreasing its balance sheet while the ECB tapers and other smaller DM central banks begin increasing rates, the small improvement witnessed in the past three months is likely to end. The recent weakness in gold prices, despite the softness in the dollar, could be a sign that markets are beginning to sniff out the imminent tightening of global liquidity conditions. Chart I-2EM/China Profits Growth To Roll Over (I) EM Growth ##br##Has Deteriorated, Profits Will Suffer Chart I-3The Fed Balance Sheet Runoff ##br##Will Hurt Global Liquidity Additionally, not only are global central banks, led by the Fed, tightening or looking to tighten policy, they are doing so despite an absence of actual inflation. As a result, this means DM real yields are set to rise. As Chart I-4 illustrates, rising real DM yields have historically been a harbinger of poor EM bond performance. In fact, the action in DM real yields since mid-2016 already points to a problematic second half for EM bonds. As a result, EM bond investors are likely to suffer some losses in the coming months. Such losses would not only tighten EM financial conditions, but would also be symptomatic of capital leaving the region. Less money in those markets simply means less liquidity. With EM corporate spreads near historical lows, a repricing of credit risk on the back of softening global and EM liquidity is likely to prompt both a selloff in EM stocks and in EM currencies (Chart I-5). As a result, DM commodity currencies, the NZD and AUD in particular, could suffer. Chart I-4EM Financial Conditions##br## Are Set To Deteriorate Chart I-5If Liquidity Dries, Spreads Widen ##br##And EM Stocks Fall Bottom Line: In November 2016, a new leg of the EM rally began - a move driven by an expansion in global liquidity, even as a key bellwether of EM economic activity rolled over in the interim. Global excess liquidity is set to roll over as DM central banks abandon their dovish biases and the Fed begins to let its balance sheet run off. With EM weaker from a technical perspective, the second half of 2017 could be a tough environment for EM plays. Chinese Liquidity Joins The Fray In May 2015, EM equities in U.S.-dollar terms peaked just before global liquidity began to roll over. Compounding the risks, back then Chinese economic conditions were also problematic. Excess capacity and massive deflationary forces were wearing down on profits and investment. China is thus another key factor to watch. In this optic, beyond DM liquidity, a key driver of the rebound in EM last year was actually Chinese liquidity conditions. In the second half of 2015, China's own Marshallian K - based on M2 relative to nominal GDP growth - was rebounding sharply, as the PBoC was easing policy and the fiscal authorities were pressing on the gas pedal, expanding both public expenditures and pushing credit growth through the economy. However, that was then. Today, China has joined the tightening party. The quarterly moving average of Chinese interbank rates has increased by 100 basis points over the past year. Crackdowns on real estate and excess leverage have also resumed. Most importantly, the issuance of bonds by small and medium banks - a key source of grease to total social financing - has also massively decelerated, which points to a sharp slowdown and even a contraction in the Chinese credit impulse (Chart I-6). Thanks to this development, the Chinese Marshallian K is now in negative territory. The global impact of tighter Chinese monetary conditions is also flashing a red flag. Our indicator is based on the relative performance of Chinese bank stocks and USD/HKD. Underperformance of Chinese banks tends to send warning signs that tightening policy is beginning to negatively affect the outlook for Chinese credit growth. Additionally, USD/HKD is at an 18-month high because Hong Kong interest rates have not been able to follow U.S. ones, as loan demand by mainland-China entities has been poor. Most of the time, this indicator tends to move with EM stock prices, providing very little information. However, as Chart I-7 illustrates, this gauge is at its most useful when it diverges from EM equity prices. In each case, such as in 2007, 2011, and 2014, the divergences between the falling price-based Chinese liquidity indicator and rising EM stock prices was resolved by a correction in the latter. Today, the indicator points to a large amount of downside risk for EM stocks. Chart I-6Chinese Credit Impulse Will Slow Chart I-7A Worrying Divergence Again, it is important to reiterate that in and of itself, such a divergence is not enough to prompt investors to run for the hills and ditch EM stocks and related plays. However, when this happens as DM liquidity is also set to deteriorate, and most crucially, when EM breadth turns negative, decreasing EM exposure makes sense. Bottom Line: Chinese liquidity conditions are also deteriorating. The People's Bank of China may not want to push the economy into another slowdown cycle, which will most likely limit how far the Chinese central bank will tighten policy. However, this tightening has not been priced in by EM equities, and is happening as DM central banks are also reducing accommodation and as EM breadth has greatly deteriorated. A sizeable correction in EM plays is becoming increasingly likely. Investment Implications Chart I-8Global Liquidity Leads EM ##br##By More Than A Year A tightening of dollar-based liquidity and Chinese-based liquidity is a big problem for non-China EM economies. EM economies outside of China and OPEC nations still run an annual current account deficit of more than US$200 billion. They need liquidity. Moreover, they still have at least US$3.6 trillion in foreign-currency debt. With liquidity conditions deteriorating, we should expect a widening of EM spreads, falling EM stock prices and falling commodity currencies. In fact, we are today in the window of maximum risk. Chart I-8 shows the combined G7 and Chinese Marshallian K, standardized. This indicator tends to have long leads over EM equity prices. It turned negative in the summer of 2006, though EM stock prices did not peak until the fourth quarter of 2007. It turned negative again in the early days of 2010, but EM equity prices did not peak until April 2011. The indicator moved below zero in mid-2014, yet EM equities only sold off in the second quarter of 2015. This time around, the combined liquidity indicator became negative in early 2016, suggesting great risks for EM assets and related plays in the second half of 2017. High carry EM currencies like the BRL or the TRY are at risk. The ZAR looks especially poorly positioned as well but the RUB seems better cushioned against these risks. The MXN could suffer too as Mexico has a lot of U.S. dollar-denominated debt. Nonetheless, MXN remains much cheaper than the BRL and could still outperform its Brazilian brethren. The SGD is very sensitive to global liquidity conditions, as Singapore is a key banking center for EM, and could also suffer substantially against the USD. In terms of timing for the G10 currency markets, the deterioration of EM breadth has historically been a dangerous sign for commodity currencies (Chart I-9). This combination of deteriorating liquidity and breadth is often associated with a sharp selloff in NZD/JPY (Chart I-10). Investors should short this cross, and we are re-opening this trade this week. Chart I-9Commodity Currencies##br## Prefer A Fresh Breadth... Chart I-10...So Does ##br##NZD/JPY The dynamics highlighted above also explain why despite our positive stance on Canada and the CAD, we are not willing to chase the selloff in USD/CAD further, and prefer to play the CAD's strength through its crosses. The risk-reward ratio seems better this way, as we are not as negatively exposed to an EM selloff as we would be buying the CAD against the USD. Indeed, a cleaner way to play the BoC's change of tone while gaining exposure to an EM-risk off theme, is to short AUD/CAD, a trade that is already on our book. On the domestic front, this week the Reserve Bank of Australia disappointed markets and did not try to indicate a change in stance away from its dovish bias. Markets have taken notice, with the AUD incapable of rallying against a weak USD, despite very strong trade data yesterday. Meanwhile, the BoC is telegraphing a rate hike in the very near future. Additionally, an abnormal gap has emerged between AUD/CAD and AUD/USD. As Chart I-11 shows, historically, AUD/CAD and AUD/USD have tracked one another. This makes sense. The Australian economy is very levered to Asian growth and liquidity dynamics, while Canada is a crucial link in the North American supply chain. With the U.S. and Canadian business cycles so tightly integrated, the CAD tends to mimic the greenback when compared to non-USD currencies. Chart I-11AUD/CAD Is A Short The points in time when AUD/CAD has been much stronger than the AUD/USD deserve closer attention. They are periods of booms in EM Asia, such as the middle of the 1990s, or 2004 to 2005. Today, AUD/CAD is again out of line with AUD/USD, reflecting the boom in EM assets prices in 2016 and in the first half of 2017. However, if our view is correct that EM is entering a dangerous zone, AUD/CAD should weaken further. Chart I-12When Investors Are Short, ##br##EUR/USD Likes EM Selloffs Last but certainly not least the euro. EUR/USD has much momentum and could continue to rally into the 1.15-1.16 zone. In fact, historically, EM shocks have been able to lift the euro, albeit temporarily. This definitely was the case in 2015 when EM sold off: in April 2015, when EM began to weaken, in August 2015, when a temporary selling climax emerged after the Chinese floated the CNY, and in December 2015, after the Fed hiked. The euro spiked in all three instances. However, investors were very short EUR/USD entering each of these periods, and the ensuing rallies were short-covering rallies (Chart I-12). This time around, investors are very long the euro, suggesting that the euro has not been used as a funding vehicle to the same extent as it was in 2015. Additionally, in all these previous episodes, EUR/USD traded at a small discount to the fair value implied by real rate differentials, today it is trading at a premium. Thus, the same kind of short-covering rally is unlikely. As a result, we do not anticipate EUR/USD to break out of its range on the back of an EM risk-off event. That being said, EUR could outperform GBP in this type of environment. The pound remains very dependent on global liquidity conditions to finance its current account deficit of more than 4% of GDP. With big financial institutions announcing more divesture from the U.K., these hot-money flows could prove even more crucial. As a result, we are removing our call to short EUR/GBP if it moves above 0.88, and expect a move in EUR/GBP toward 0.92-0.93 in the second half of 2017. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 The greenback slipped on weak as the ADP employment, the ISM-non manufacturing employment component, and continuing as well as initial jobless claims all underperformed expectations. While the dollar reacted negatively to this news, the Fed's hawkish stance should ultimately help the USD. Supplementing the increases in interest rates, are plans to reverse the multi-year quantitative easing program.The FOMC is also increasingly worried about the "quite high" stock valuations which, could lead to financial instability. U.S. 10-year yields have gone up 4 basis points following the release of the minutes, after the 20 bps spike following initial Fed comments on June 27. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Look Ahead, Not Back - June 9, 2017 Capacity Explosion = Inflation Implosion - June 2, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 The euro's strength extends as the union experienced strong services and composite PMI measures this Wednesday. While it is true that the ECB may be looking to draw back its excessively easy monetary policy, Draghi and Praet have highlighted that accommodative policy is still needed as inflationary pressures are not yet entrenched. The euro's recent appreciation and weak producer price numbers could vindicate this view. The euro's strength has also weighed on manufacturing activity, as PMIs underperformed expectations. This is likely to weigh on EUR/USD going forward, especially as European stocks have been underperofming U.S. ones in recent weeks. EUR/SEK can face considerable pressure ahead due to the Riksbank's change in rhetoric. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 A Market Update: June 23, 2017 Europe's Divine Comedy Part II: Italy In Purgatorio - June 21, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan has been mixed: National inflation came in at 0.4%, while Tokyo ex fresh food and energy inflation contracted by 0.2%. Both of these measures underperformed expectations. On the other hand, Japan's job-to-applicant ratio continues to climb, coming in at 1.49, and outperforming expectations. This last data point is key, as it highlights that the Japanese labor market is very tight, and that the stage is set for inflation to come back to Japan. However, as evidenced by the recent disappointments in data, the currency holds the key to unleash inflation in Japan. Thus, not only is a selloff in the yen needed for inflation to remerge, but this selloff would feed on itself, as a falling currency and a tight labor market would raise inflation (and thus lower real rates, as Japanese 10-year rates are anchored at 0), which would push the yen down further. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 A Market Update: June 23, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. has been mixed: Markit manufacturing PMI declined from last month's reading and also came in below expectations at 54.3. Construction PMI also declined and came in below expectations at 53.4 However credit had a strong showing as net lending to individuals, consumer credit and mortgage approvals all came in above expectations at 5.3 billion pounds, 1.73 billion pounds and 65 thousand respectively. Various BoE members have stated that rising interest rates might be necessary to keep a lid on the island's high inflation. Although there are still some voices within the BoE who are more cautious, given the uncertainty that Brexit poses, overall the BoE has shown a much more hawkish tone in recent weeks. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 The AUD has experienced considerable weakness this week, following a drawback in inflation estimates for June by the TD Securities measure, of 2.3% from 2.8% and a less hawkish than anticipated RBA. While retail sales beat expectations of 0.2% - coming in at 0.6% - the pace of appreciation in the RBA Commodity Index in SDR terms continues to slow Nevertheless, these factors were not the only contributors to the recent AUD weakness. Australia remains highly levered to emerging markets, and the Fed tightening remains a major risk for the AUD. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand has been mixed: The annual trade balance underperformed expectations, coming in at a deficit of 3.75 billion U.S. dollars. However the ANZ business confidence index continued climbing, and now stands at the highest level in 8 months Overall the New Zealand economy continues to be one of the best performing in the G10. If one were to be guided merely by domestic factors, the RBNZ should be the next central bank to hike after the Fed. However the picture is slightly more nuanced, as the RBNZ is still worried about foreign developments, particularly EM weakness. This justifies why they continue to state that "monetary policy will remain accommodative for a considerable period". Thus, we continue to be bullish on the NZD against the AUD, while we are shorting it against the JPY, as a mean to benefit from a potential EM dislocation. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 USD/CAD has broken down from a crucial technical level following Poloz's statements about the Canadian economy. He states that the "cuts have done their job". When asked about oil, the reply was reassuring, declaring that the expected level of WTI is at USD 40-50 bbl, which implies that fluctuations within that band should not influence movements the BoC path, helping the CAD in the process. He also suggested that "the adjustment we've been talking about... is largely complete now". While inflation is weak, the BoC governor highlighted that forward looking indicators for inflation should be monitored instead of current inflation. These variables are pointing to stronger growth, and are in line with the bank's expectations of a closing output gap in the first half of 2018. While this may be true, a strengthening CAD will remain a risk for inflation. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Exploring Risks To Our DXY View - May 26, 2017 Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland has been mixed: Although real retail sales yearly growth came in negative at -0.3%, it outperformed expectations and was better than last month. Additionally, the SVME PMI came also blew away expectations, increasing from last month's 55.6 reading to 60.1. However Consumer price inflation came in at -0.1%, underperforming expectations. The Swiss economy continues to be haunted by the ghost of deflation. Nonetheless, some economic indicators appear to be ticking up, most likely as a result of the sharp rally in EUR/CHF. We continue to believe that a rally of EUR/CHF beyond 1.1 is unlikely, as most of the good news in the euro area are already priced into the euro. Furthermore, any disappointments, particularly in EM could trigger a selloff in this cross. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 The Labor Force survey, which measures the number of unemployed people as a percentage of the total civilian labor force came in at 4.6%, increased since last month. This measure shows that despite the increase in oil prices the Norwegian labour market continues to be tepid. The Norges Bank agrees with our assessment, as it lowered its projected near term policy rate path. Furthermore, they projected that rates in Norway will not rise until the beginning of 2019. The reasons for this are two fold: first, inflation should continue to remain weak, as the pass through from the collapse in the currency has faded. Additionally, bubbly real estate prices, which were the only factor, which could incite the Norges Bank to become more hawkish, have gone down, following reform in lending standards. Thus, despite its good value, the NOK will continue to underperform amongst commodity currencies. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 A Market Update: June 23, 2017 Exploring Risks To Our DXY View - May 26, 2017 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 It is true that the Riksbank recently hinted towards a more neutral stance, acknowledging "that inflation has recently been slightly higher than expected", which has made it "less likely than before that the Riksbank will cut the repo rate in the near term". However, the Riksbank also highlighted the fact that the bank is "prepared to implement further monetary policy easing if necessary to stabilize inflation". A very nuanced statement referred to the exchange rate, which "is important that [it] does not appreciate too rapidly", further stating that "this could happen if, for example, the Riksbank's monetary policy deviates clearly from that of other countries." This conclusively highlights that the bank is wary of diverging rates lifting undesirably on the krona, which is a limiting factor for substantial krona strength in the near term. However, the change of guard at the helm of this central bank in early 2018 could change all this caution. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

GAA DM Equity Country Allocation Model Update The GAA DM Equity Country Allocation model is updated as of June 30th, 2017. The model has continued to reduce its allocation to the U.S. and now for the first time the U.S. allocation is slightly below benchmark. Within the non-U.S. universe of the 11 countries, the model has also made significant adjustments to shift weights to Italy (now the largest overweight) and Australia (now for the first time it is overweight by the model), while underweight Germany and France. These adjustments are mainly due to liquidity and technical indicators, as shown in Table 1. As shown in Table 2 and Charts 1, 2 and 3, the overall model underperformed its benchmark by 14 bps in June, largely due to the underperformance of Level 2 model where the overweight of the Euro area v.s. the underweight of Australia and Canada hurt the performance. Since going live, the overall model has outperformed its benchmark by 139 bps. Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD) Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level 1) Please see also on the website http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/trades/allocation_performance. For more details on the models, please see the January 29th, 2016 Special Report "Global Equity Allocation: Introducing the Developed Markets Country Allocation Model". http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/articles/view_report/18850. GAA Equity Sector Selection Model The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model (Chart 4) is updated as of June 30, 2017. Chart 3GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) Chart 4Overall Model Performance Table 3Allocations Table 4Performance Since Going Live The model continues to overweight cyclicals versus defensives. Additionally, the model has turned overweight financials and underweight consumer discretionary on the back of momentum. This overweight in financials is now in line with our global sector recommendations published yesterday. For more details on the model, please see the Special Report "Introducing The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model," July 27, 2016 available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President xiaoli@bcaresearch.com Aditya Kurian, Research Analyst adityak@bcaresearch.com

Highlights Recommended Allocation Risk assets have continued to outperform, despite soft inflation data and falling interest rates. Either inflation will pick up again, amid decent growth, and the Fed (and, to a degree, other central banks) will tighten, or the Fed will capitulate and stay on hold. Either scenario should be good for risk assets. No indicator signals a recession on the horizon, and so we continue to expect equities to outperform bonds over the next 12 months. Within equities, we favor DM over EM; we maintain a pro-cyclical sector tilt, but rotate out of Tech into Financials, which are cheaper and should benefit from steeper yield curves. In fixed income, we prefer credit to government bonds, but trim our overweight in investment grade credit as spreads are unlikely to contract further. We are overweight TIPS and Japanese inflation-linked bonds. Feature Overview How To Square Lower Rates And Rising Equities One of the basic principles of BCA's Global Asset Allocation service is that it is highly unusual for equities to underperform bonds for any extended period except in the run-up to, and during, recessions (Chart 1). After the recent decline in long-term interest rates and softness in inflation, we find investors worldwide becoming increasingly nervous about the outlook. We see nothing in the data, however, to indicate a recession in the coming 12 months. Of the three historically most reliable recession indicators - PMIs, credit spreads, and the yield curve (Chart 2) - only the last raises some concerns, but it is still far from inverting, which is the requirement for a recession signal. None of the formal recession models is flashing a warning signal either (Chart 3). Chart 1Stocks Outperform Except Ahead Of Recession Chart 2Usual Recession Signals Still Absent Chart 3Recession Risk Models Not Rising Either Nonetheless, market action in recent months has been unusual. Bond yields have fallen (with the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield slipping to 2.2% from 2.6%), and the dollar has weakened, but risk assets have continued to perform well, with global equities giving a total return of 13% year to date and 4% in Q2. Can this desynchronization continue? We see three possible scenarios:1 Chart 4Market Expects Fed To Be Dovish Reflation returns. The Fed proves to be right that the recent weak inflation data is temporary. Inflation picks up and the Fed raises rates more quickly than the market is currently pricing in (which is only 25 bps over the next 12 months, Chart 4). Initially, the rebound in inflation might be a shock for risk assets but, as long as the Fed is tightening because it is confident about growth and unconcerned about global risk, over 12 months risk assets such as equities should continue to outperform. The Fed capitulates. Inflation fails to rebound and the Fed tightens only in line with what the market is currently pricing in. This could be good for risk assets, as long as the soft inflation is not accompanied by disappointing data on growth. The U.S. dollar would probably weaken further, which should be positive for EM assets and commodities. A policy mistake. The Fed pushes stubbornly ahead with tightening even though inflation fails to rebound. Bond yields fall and the yield curve moves closer to inverting. This would be negative for risk assets, which would start to price in the risk of recession. We think the first scenario is the most likely. Leading indicators of employment suggest the recent sluggish wage growth should prove temporary (Chart 5). The softness in U.S. PCE inflation probably reflects mostly the weak economic growth last year and the recent fall in commodity prices (as well as special factors in telecoms, healthcare and autos). Even if reflation pushes the Fed to tighten more quickly - followed by central banks in the euro area, U.K, and Canada, which have also sounded more hawkish recently - this should not fundamentally undermine the case for risk assets, given how easy monetary policy remains everywhere (Chart 6). It would represent merely a step towards "normalization". Chart 5Sluggish Wage Growth Should Be Temporary Chart 6Real Rates Still Negative Everywhere While scenario (2) would also probably be generally positive for risk assets, the correct portfolio allocation would be different. Under scenario (1) - our central view - the dollar would appreciate, causing commodities and EM assets to underperform, higher beta markets (such as the euro area and Japan) and cyclical sectors would perform the best, and in bond markets investors should be underweight duration and overweight TIPS. Scenario (2) would suggest a less aggressive positioning in equities, with income-generating assets outperforming as bond yields stay low at around current levels. Scenario (3), which we see only as a tail risk, would point to an outright defensive stance. What should investors watch for over the coming months? Besides the trends in inflation and wages discussed above, we would be concerned to see any slippage in global growth expectations, which have so far continued to rise despite the softness in inflation and wages (Chart 7). The most likely cause of this would be a Chinese slowdown, though recent comments by Premier Li Keqiang ("we continue to implement a proactive fiscal policy and prudent monetary policy....[but] will not resort to massive stimulative measures") seem to confirm our view that Chinese growth may slow a little further, but that the authorities will not allow it to collapse ahead of the Party Congress in the fall. As potential upside catalysts for risk assets we see: a rebound in crude oil prices (driven by a drawdown in inventories over coming months as the OPEC production cuts reduce supply, Chart 8), progress on a U.S. tax cut (which BCA's Geopolitical Strategy still expects to come into effect from early 2018), and further surprises in earnings growth (where analysts continue to revise up their forecasts, Chart 9). Chart 7No Signs Of Global Growth Slipping Chart 8Oil Inventories To Draw Down Chart 9Earnings Continue To Be Revised Up Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com What Our Clients Are Asking Why Haven't Inflation And Wages Picked Up? Chart 10Just A Temporary Phenomenon? Eight years into an expansion, U.S. inflation remains stubbornly below 2% on every measure and has even slowed in recent months (Chart 10, panel 1). And, despite headline unemployment of only 4.3% (below the Fed's estimate of 4.6% for the Nairu), wage growth also remains sluggish (panel 3). The Fed's view is that inflation has been pulled down by special factors: weak auto sales, the introduction of unlimited cell phone data packages (which lower hedonically-adjusted prices), and drugs companies which raised prices before last year's U.S. presidential election (panel 2). We agree that these factors are likely to be temporary. But the recent weak wage growth is more puzzling. Wages have trended up since 2012, suggesting that the Phillips Curve is not dead. But the relationship seems to have weakened. With U6 unemployment (which includes marginally attached workers and those working part-time who would like full-time jobs) currently at only 8.4%, one would have expected wage growth to be 1 ppt higher than it is (panel 4). Changes in the structure of the workforce may partly explain this (the growing proportion of low-wage service jobs, the "gig economy"). Last year's weak corporate profits may also be a factor. But, with the labor market clearly very tight, we expect wages - and therefore core inflation - to pick up again over the next 12 months. What To Do When VIX Is So Low? After two brief spikes earlier in the year, VIX has declined to 11.4, closer to the historical low of 9.3 reached in 1993, than the historical average of 19.5. In fact, asset price volatilities have been low across the board in fixed income, currencies and commodities, even though the latter two are not at the same extreme low levels as equities and fixed income (Chart 11). However, the VIX futures curve is still in steep contango, which means that getting the timing wrong would make it very costly to go long the volatility index. In addition, correlation among the index members of the S&P 500 is very low, and so are cross-market equity correlations. We do not forecast a recession until 2019, so a sharp reversal in VIX is unlikely, but brief spikes are possible, implying possible corrections in S&P 500 given the inverse correlation between the two. As such, we recommend four strategies for investors who are concerned that markets are too complacent: Focus on security selection, and rotate into cheaper sectors from expensive ones without altering the pro-cyclical bias. Our preferred way is to buy the much cheaper Financials by selling the more expensive Tech; Allocate a portion of funds to the minimum volatility style as it has been relatively oversold; Raise cash and buy a call spread on the S&P 500; Buy longer-dated VIX futures and sell shorter-dated futures to mitigate the rolling cost. Chart 11Are Investors Too Complacent? Chart 12Overweight To Neutral Have Technology Stock Run Too Far? Technology stocks have outperformed the broad market by 33% since April 2013 and investors are increasingly skeptical about whether the run-up can continue. In this Quarterly, we cut our weighting in the Tech sector from Overweight, but we believe it deserves no lower than a Neutral weighting for the following reasons: Sales & Earnings: New order growth is improving alongside rising consumer spending on technology (Chart 12, panel 2). Sales are growing at 5% YoY and this is likely to continue. Pricing power has also recovered over the past year. These factors should support margins and earnings growth. Valuations: Investors are worried about valuation. However, the recent rally has not led to an expansion of relative forward P/E, which is below the historical average (panel 4). Sector relative performance over the past four years has moved in line with its superior return on equity. Breadth: Improving breadth suggests that relative outperformance should be sustainable. An increasing number of firms are participating in the rally, as seen by the improving advances/declines ratio (panel 3). However, we also have some concerns. For example, a handful of large-cap technology firms have generated the bulk of the stock price performance. However, these firms currently trade at 23x.2 earnings compared to 60x.3 for the top firms at the peak of the TMT bubble in 2000. Additionally, the five largest stocks in the sector comprise only 13% of the index, compared to 16% at the peak of the 2000 bubble. Our recommendation, then, is that investors should hold this sector in line with benchmark. Are Canadian Banks At Risk Due To The Housing Bubble? Chart 13Canadian Housing Puzzle The recent problems at Home Capital Group have drawn investors' attention to the Canadian housing market. Home Capital's shares fell by 70% in April after regulators accused the mortgage lender of being slow to disclose fraud among its brokers. However, the issue is unlikely to have wider consequences: the event took place two years ago and had no impact on the lender's assets. Home Capital lends only to individuals with reliable collateral, and accounts for only 1% of total mortgage loans. We don't see imminent risks to the housing and banking sectors, since the economy is recovering and monetary policy remains loose. Vancouver and Toronto home prices have surged for almost a decade (Chart 13, panel 1). After Vancouver introduced a 15% foreign buyer tax in July 2016, house prices initially pulled back but quickly recovered. A similar tax in Ontario this April is also likely to have limited impact. Cautious macro-prudential rules should ensure banks' health: mortgage insurance is required for down-payments under 20%, and the gross debt service ratio (total housing costs over household income) cannot exceed 32%. However, the rise in house prices has caused household debt to run up (Chart 13, panel 2). Carolyn Wilkins, Senior Deputy Governor of the Bank of Canada, hinted in a speech in June that the central bank may soon raise rates. Tighter monetary policy could hurt mortgage borrowers who have enjoyed low interest payments for years (Chart 13, panel 3). Over the longer-term, therefore, we are concerned about the level of household debt, and recommend a cautious stance toward Canadian bank stocks. Global Economy Overview: Goldilocks continues, with global growth prospects still good (PMIs in developed economies generally remain around 55 - see Chart 14 panel 2 and Chart 15 panel 1), but inflation surprising on the downside in recent months. The wild card is China, where growth has slowed since Q1, when GDP reached 6.9%, and it is unclear whether the authorities will ease fiscal and monetary tightening to cushion the slowdown. Chart 14Growth Prospects Generally Remain Good Chart 15But Inflation Expectations Have Fallen U.S.: Growth has been weaker than the over-heated consensus expected, pushing down the Citigroup Economic Surprise Indexes (CESI) sharply (Chart 14, panel 1). However, prospects remain positive for the next 12 months: the Manufacturing ISM is at 54.9, retail sales are growing at 3.8% YoY, and capex has begun to reaccelerate (Chart 14, panel 5). The Fed's Nowcasts point to Q2 GDP growth at 1.9%-2.7% QoQ annualized. With expections now lowered, the CESI is likely to bottom around here. Euro Area: Growth has been stronger than in the U.S, with the PMI continuing to accelerate to 57.3. However, this is largely due to the euro area's strong cyclicality and exposure to global growth. Domestic momentum remains weak in most countries, with region-wide wage growth only 1.4% YoY. European PMIs are likely to roll over in line with the U.S. ISM. But GDP growth for the year is not likely to fall much from the 1.9% achieved in Q1. Japan remains a dual-paced economy, with international sectors doing well (exports rose by 14.9% YoY in May and industrial production by 5.7%) but domestic sectors stagnating, as wage growth remains sluggish (up just 0.5% YoY). Bank of Japan policy will remain ultra-easy, but there is scant sign of fiscal stimulus or structural reform. Emerging Markets: China is showing clear signs of slowdown, with the Caixin Manufacturing PMI falling below 50 (Chart 15, panel 3). The PBoC has tightened monetary policy, causing corporate bond yields to rise by 100 bps since the start of the year and the yield curve to invert. However, with the 19th Communist Party Conference scheduled for the fall, the authorities will prioritize stability: there are signs they are increasing fiscal spending. Elsewhere, many emerging markets are characterized by sluggish growth but falling inflation, which may allow central banks to cut rates. Interest rates: Inflation has softened recently, with U.S. core PCE inflation slowing to 1.4% and euro zone core CPI to 1.1%. We agree with the Fed that the recent weak inflation was caused by temporary factors and, with little slack in the labor market, core PCE will rise to 2% by next year, causing the Fed to hike in line with its dots. In the euro zone, however, the output gap remains around -2% of GDP and countries such as Italy could not bear tightening, so the ECB will taper only gradually next year and not raise rates soon. Chart 16Powered by Earnings and Margin Improvement! Global Equities In Q2 2017 the price gain in global equities was driven entirely by earnings growth, as forward earnings grew by 3.5% while the forward PE multiple barely changed. This is distinctively different from the equity rally in 2016 when multiple expansion dominated earnings growth (Chart 16). The scope of the improvement in earnings so far in 2017 has been wide. Not only are forward earnings being revised up, but 12-month trailing earnings growth has also come in very strong, with 90% of sectors registering positive earnings growth. Margins improved in both DM and EM. Equity valuation is not cheap by historical standards but, as an asset class, equities are still attractively valued compared to bonds given how low global bond yields are. We remain overweight equities versus bonds even though we are a little concerned about the extremely low volatility in all asset classes (see "What Our Clients Are Asking" on page 8). Within equities, we maintain our call to favor DM versus EM despite the 7% EM outperformance year-to-date, which was supported by attractive valuations and the weak U.S. dollar. BCA's house view is that the USD will strengthen versus EM currencies over the coming 12 months. Within EM, we have been more positive on China and remain so on a 6-9 month horizon, in spite of China's 6.7% outperformance versus EM. Our upgrade of euro area equities to overweight at the expense of the U.S. in our last Quarterly Portfolio Outlook proved to be timely as the euro area outperformed the U.S. by 641 bps in Q2. We continue to like Japan on a currency hedged basis (see next page). Sector-wise, we maintain a pro-cyclical tilt. However, we are taking profit on our overweight in Technology (downgrade to neutral) and upgrading Financials to overweight from neutral. Japanese Equities: Maintain Overweight, With Yen Hedge We upgraded Japanese equities to overweight in June 2016 (please see our Quarterly Report, dated June 30, 2016 and our Special Report, dated June 8, 2016) on a currency hedged basis. These positions have worked very well as the yen is down by 10% and MSCI Japan has gained 32% in yen term, outperforming the global benchmark by 12% in local currency terms, but in line with benchmark in USD (Chart 17). Going forward, we recommend clients continue to overweight Japanese equities in a global portfolio and hedge the JPY exposure. Reasons: First, since December 2012 when Abenomics started, MSCI Japanese equities have gained 82% in yen terms, but earnings have risen by much more, with a 180% increase. Valuation multiples have contracted, in stark contrast to other major equity markets where multiple expansion has led to stretched valuations. Second, divergent monetary policy between the BOJ and the Fed will put more downside pressure on the JPY. More importantly, weak fundamentals, as evidenced by falling inflation and a slowing in GDP growth, are likely to push the BOJ to resort to more extraordinary policy measures, such as debt monetization, which would further weaken the JPY, boosting exports and therefore the export sector dominated Japanese equity market. Note that our quant model is still underweight Japan, but has become slightly less so compared to six months ago. We have overridden the model because 1) the model is unhedged in USD terms and, more importantly, 2) the model cannot capture potential policy action such as debt monetization. Chart 17Japanese Equities: Remain Overweight Chart 18Financials Vs Tech: Trading Places Sector Allocation: Upgrade Financials to Overweight by Downgrading Tech to Neutral. We have been overweight Technology since July 2016 (please see our Monthly Update, July 29, 2016) and the sector has outperformed the global benchmark by 11.8%, of which 9% came this year. In line with our general concern on asset valuations, we are taking profit on the Tech overweight and use the proceeds to fund an overweight in the much cheaper Financials sector. As shown in Chart 18, the relative total return performance of Financials vs. Technology is back to extreme levels (panel 1), while the relative valuation of Financials measured by price to book has reached an extremely cheap level (panel 2). Also, Financial shares offer a good yield pick-up over Tech even though this advantage is in line with the historical average (panel 3). BCA's house view calls for higher interest rates and steeper yield curves over the next 9-12 months. Financial earnings benefit from a steepening yield curve. If history is any guide, we should see more aggressive analysts' earnings revisions going forward in favor of Financials (panel 4). Overall, our sector positioning retains its tilt towards cyclicals vs. defensives. (Please see Recommended Allocation table on page 1), in line with the tilt from our quant model. Within the cyclical sectors, however, we have overridden the model on Financials and Tech since the momentum factor is a major driver in the model and we judge that momentum has probably run too far. Chart 19MSCI ACW: Factor Relative Performance Smart Beta Update: In Q2, an equal-weighted multi-factor portfolio outperformed the global benchmark (Chart 19, top panel). Among the five most enduring factors - size, value, quality, minimum volatility, and momentum - quality and momentum factors continued the Q1 trend of outperformance, while value continued to underperform. It's worth noting that the underperformance of minimum volatility stabilized in the last two months of the quarter, indicating that the extremely low market vol has caught investor attention and some investors have started to seek protection by moving into the low vol space, albeit gradually. Value has continued to underperform growth, and small caps to underperform large caps. We maintain our neutral view on styles and prefer to use sector positioning to implement the underlying themes given the historically close correlation between styles and cyclicals versus defensives (bottom two panels). As show in Table 1, however, even though value has underperformed growth across the globe, small caps in Japan and the euro area have consistently outperformed large caps year-to-date, the opposite to that in the U.S., in line with the higher beta nature of these two markets. Table 1Divergence In Style Government Bonds Maintain Slight Underweight Duration. U.S. bond yields declined significantly in Q2 to below fair value levels in response to weaker "hard data" (Chart 20, top panel). But weakness in Q1 U.S. GDP was concentrated in consumer spending and inventories, both of which are likely to strengthen in the months ahead. In addition, after the June rate hike, we expect the Fed to deliver another rate hike by year end, while the market is pricing in only 14 bps of rate rise. Maintain overweight TIPS vs. Treasuries. As the nominal 10-year yield fell, so did 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation. In terms of relative valuation, now TIPS is fairly valued vs. the nominal bonds (panel 2). However, our U.S. Bond Strategy's core PCE model, which closely tracks the 10-year TIPS breakeven rate (panel 3), is sending the message that inflationary pressures are building in the economy and that core PCE should reach the Fed's 2% target later this year. This suggests that the bond markets are not providing adequate compensation for the inflationary economic backdrop. Overweight Inflation-linked JGBs (JGBi) vs. Nominal JGBs. Inflation in Japan has been falling despite strong GDP growth. However, the labor market has not been this tight since the mid-1990s, with the unemployment rate at 3.1% and jobs-to-applicants ratio at 1.49, both post-1995 extremes (Chart 21, panel 2). BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy service believes that wage pressures, in addition to the inflationary effect of a weakening yen, could lead inflation higher. Accordingly, inflation-linked JGBs offer good value relative to nominal JGBs (Chart 21, panel 1). Chart 20Inflationary Pressures Are Building Chart 21Overweight JGBi Vs JGB Corporate Bonds Given our expectations that global growth will remain robust over the coming 12 months, pushing the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield above 3%, we continue to favor credit over government bonds. However, U.S. corporate health has deteriorated further in the past two quarters (Chart 22) and so, when the next recession comes, returns from corporate credit may be particularly bad. We cut our double overweight in investment grade debt to single overweight. The spread over Treasuries of U.S. IG credit has fallen to around 100 bps. Given high U.S. corporate leverage currently, it is unlikely that the spread will tighten any further to reach previous lows (Chart 23), so investors will benefit only from the carry. Moreover, the ECB is likely to reduce its bond buying from January 2018 and, though it is unclear whether it will taper corporate as well as sovereign purchases, this represents a potential headwind for European credit. Remain overweight high yield debt. U.S. junk bonds have been remarkably resilient in the face of falling oil prices and the subsequent blowout in energy bond spreads. The default-adjusted spread is just over 200 bps (Chart 24), based on Moody's default assumption of 2.7% over the next 12 months and a recovery rate of 47%. Historically, a spread of this size has produced an excess return over the following year 74% of the time, for an average of 84 bps. Chart 22U.S. Corporate Health Deteriorating Chart 23IG Spreads Unlikely To Tighten Further Chart 24Junk Spreads Give Sufficient Reward Commodities Chart 25Mixed Feelings Towards Commodities Secular Perspective: Bearish: We continue to hold a negative secular outlook for commodities (Chart 25). A gradual shift towards a service-led economy in China, combined with sluggish global growth, will prevent demand from rising further. This lack of demand, together with record high inventory levels for major commodities, keep us from turning bullish. Cyclical Perspective: Neutral We are positive on oil because we believe that inventories will continue to draw. We are negative on base metals due to weak demand and excess supply. We are somewhat bullish on precious metals based on the political uncertainties ahead. Energy: Bullish OPECextended its production cuts for another nine months, carrying the cuts through to Q1, when the oil price is typically seasonally weak. We expect demand growth will increasingly outpace production growth in 2017, producing inventory drawdowns. The current weakness in the crude price is largely due to investors' concerns over shale production. However, the OPEC cut of 1.2 MMb/d, supplemented by an additional 200,000 - 300,000 b/d of voluntary restrictions on non-OPEC oil, are enough to offset any spurt in shale production. Base metals: Bearish China is slowly tightening monetary policy and, following the 19th Communist Party Congress later this year, reflationary stimulus will probably continue to wind down. We have seen a cooling in the Chinese property market along with a slowdown in the manufacturing sector. The Caixin manufacturing PMI, a key indicator for metals demand, fell below 50 in May for the first time in 11 months. At the same time, inventories for copper and iron ore have risen. Precious metals: Long-term Bullish Inflation has not picked up as we expected, which may prevent the gold price from rising further in 2017. However, we expect inflation to move higher going into 2018. As a safe haven, gold is also a good hedge against geopolitical risks. We believe that the political risks in 2018 are underestimated, especially the Italian general election (probably in March or April). Currencies Chart 26Fed Will Support The Dollar In 2017, the U.S. dollar (Chart 26) has weakened by 5% on a trade-weighted basis. However, we believe that the soft patch in inflation and wage data that caused this weakness is temporary and that underlying economic momentum remains strong. Following its rate hike in June, the Fed kept its forecast for core PCE in 2018 and 2019 at 2%. As inflation and wage pressures return, market expectations will converge with the Fed's forecast. The subsequent improvement in relative interest rates will support the dollar. Euro: The euro is up by 8% versus the dollar so far this year. The ECB is likely to continue to set policy for the weakest members of the euro zone, in the absence of a major pickup in inflation. While economic activity has improved, inflation has recently fallen back again, along with the oil price. The ECB is particularly sensitive to political uncertainty surrounding the upcoming Italian elections and the fragility of the Italian banking system. This suggests that the ECB will only gradually taper its asset purchases starting early next year, but will not move to raise rates until at least mid-2019. This is likely to cause the euro to weaken over the coming months. Yen: The yen has strengthened by 4% versus the dollar year to date. With core core inflation in Japan struggling to stay above 0%, we think it highly likely that the BOJ will continue its yield curve control policy. If, as we expect, U.S. long-term interest rate trend up in the coming months, relative rates will put downward pressure on the yen. Our FX strategists expect the USD/JPY at 125 within 12 months. EM Currencies: With Chinese growth likely to remain questionable over the coming months, emerging market currencies will lack their biggest tailwind. Terms of trade will continue to turn negative as commodity prices weaken. EM monetary authorities will mostly be easing policy in order to support growth. With rates kept low, relative monetary policy is likely to will force EM currencies, especially those for commodity exporters, to depreciate from current levels. Alternatives Chart 27Attractive Risk-Return Profile Return Enhancers: Favor private equity vs. hedge funds In 2016, private equity returned 9%, whereas hedge funds managed only a 3% return (Chart 27). Strong performance led to private equity funds raising $378 bn last year, the highest level of capital secured since the Global Financial Crisis. By contrast, hedge funds have underperformed global equities and private equity since the financial crisis of 2008-09. However, investors have become increasingly concerned with valuation levels in private markets. Our recommendation is that investors should continue to overweight private equity vs hedge funds, since we do not see a recession as likely over the next 12 months. Within the hedge fund space, we would recommend overweighting event-driven funds over the cycle, and macro funds heading into a recession (please see our Special Report, dated June 16, 2017). Inflation Hedges: Favor direct real estate vs. commodity futures In 2016, direct real estate returned 9%, whereas commodity futures achieved 12%. Given the structural nature of this recommendation, investors need to look past recent short-term moves in commodity prices. Low interest rates will keep borrowing cheap, making the spread between real estate and fixed income yields continue to be attractive. Moreover, with 48% of institutional investors currently below their target allocation for real estate, there is a lot of potential for further capital allocations to the asset class. With regards to the commodity complex, the long-term transition of China to a services-based economy will lead to a structural decline in commodity demand. Investors should continue to overweight direct real estate vs commodity futures on a 3-5 year target horizon. Volatility Dampeners: Favor farmland & timberland vs. structured products In 2016, farmland and timberland returned 9% and 3% respectively, whereas structured products returned 2%. Farmland and timberland will continue to benefit from favorable global demographic trends, as a growing population and improving prosperity in the developing world increase food consumption. However, increased volatility in lumber and agriculture prices have made investors concerned about cash flows. With regards to structured products, increasing rates and deteriorating credit quality in the auto loan market will slow credit origination. Given that the Fed will start unwinding its balance sheet this year, increased supply will put upward pressure on spreads. Investors can reduce the volatility of a multi-asset portfolio with the inclusion of farmland and timberland. Risks To Our View We explained the two alternative scenarios to our main view in the Overview section of this Quarterly. There are three other specific areas where our views differ notably from the consensus: Strong dollar. Our view is predicated on the Fed tightening policy more than the market currently expects, and the ECB less. Interest rate differentials (Chart 28) certainly point to a stronger USD, and speculative positions have reversed from being very dollar-long at the start of the year. But the euro momentum could continue for a while, especially given mixed messages from Mario Draghi, for example when he said in late June that "the threat of deflation is gone and reflationary forces are at play." Crude oil back at $55. Our Energy strategists believe that the oil price is currently being driven by supply, not demand. They argue that OPEC production cuts will hold and cause inventories to draw down rapidly over the coming six months. However, speculative positioning in oil has shifted from very long to significantly short since the start of the year. The risk is that U.S. oil production continues to accelerate (Chart 29), as fracking technology improves and availability of capital for oil producers remains easy. Negative on EM. Our 12-month EM view is predicated on a stronger dollar, higher U.S. interest rates, slowing Chinese growth, and falling commodity prices. We could be wrong about these drivers. Falling inflation in emerging markets such as Brazil (Chart 30) could allow central banks to cut rates aggressively, which might temporarily boost growth. Chart 28Rate Differentials Suggest Strong Dollar Chart 29Oil Bears Point To U.S. Output Chart 30Sharp Fall In Brazilian Inflation 1 Our U.S. Bond Strategists explain the detailed thinking behind these three scenarios in their Weekly Report "Three Scenarios for Treasury Yields In 2017," dated June 20, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Market-cap weighted average of Apple, Alphabet, Microsoft, Amazon and Facebook. 3 Market-cap weighted average of Microsoft, Cisco Systems, Intel, Oracle and Lucent. Recommended Asset Allocation

Highlights Expanding trade volumes - led by EM growth - will continue to support commodity demand, particularly for base metals. In the first four months of this year, EM import growth averaged 8.4% year-on-year (yoy), led by an expansion of almost 13% in EM Asia. This compares with yoy growth averaging just 0.3% in the DM imports over the January - April period. EM exports grew 5.1% yoy in this interval vs. 2.7% for DM outbound trade. Overall, EM growth led world trade volumes 4% higher yoy, versus 0.8% growth over the January - April interval last year. We expect trade volumes to continue to grow as long as the Fed doesn't tighten monetary conditions too much in the U.S. Energy: Overweight. Benchmark crude oil prices continue their lackluster performance, as high-frequency inventory data in the U.S. fail to convince markets OPEC 2.0 cuts are succeeding in draining global inventories. We expect this to reverse, and remain long Dec/17 $50 vs. $55/bbl call spreads in WTI and Brent. Base Metals: Neutral. Expanded global trade, led by EM Asia, will be supportive of base metals prices. However, we do not expect higher trade volumes to prompt a surge in base metals. We remain neutral base metals generally. Precious Metals: Neutral. Palladium has consistently outperformed platinum in post-GFC markets, as has gold (see below). We remain neutral the precious-metals complex, but are keeping our long gold portfolio hedge in place. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The USDA's crop report will be released Friday. Weather-related crop distress in the grains could start showing up in the data. We remain bearish, but recommend staying on the sidelines. Feature Chart of the WeekStrong Growth In Global Trade Volumes##BR##Will Be Supportive Of Base Metals Growth in EM imports and exports continues to lead the expansion of global trade volumes. This is important, as the growth in trade supports EM income growth, which, in turn, supports commodity demand. EM growth is the principal source of commodity demand growth globally, particularly for oil and base metals. Global trade volumes expanded yoy in April, with imports up 3.7% and exports up 3.2%, down slightly from the pace in 1Q17, according to the CPB World Trade Monitor (Chart of the Week). The notional value of trade for the year ended in April was $16.3 trillion. The uptrend in global trade begun in 4Q16 continues, however, which we noted earlier this month. As was the case with oil, this expansion of global trade volumes, particularly out of the EM economies, will be supportive of base metals demand generally.1 Similar to EM oil demand, we find EM exports and imports are highly correlated with world base metals demand post-GFC (Chart 2). This is not unexpected, given the prominence of Chinese base metals demand, which accounts for roughly half of base metals demand globally. Given the low level of growth in DM imports and exports, we conclude that the bulk of the increase in global trading volumes is increasingly accounted for by trade within the EM economies with each other. This can be seen in Chart 3, which shows growth of EM imports and exports surpasses DM trade performance, shown in Chart 4. Chart 2World Base Metals Demand,##BR##Highly Correlated With EM Trade Volumes Chart 3Increased Trade Within##BR##EM Economies Powers Global Trade Growth Chart 4DM Growth Not##BR##Keeping Up With EM Growth Going Through The Trade Numbers For the year ended in April 2017, yoy world import levels grew 2.5% on average each month. DM imports averaged 1.8% yoy growth, while EM imports grew at twice that level. The notional value of DM imports was $9.6 trillion for the year ended in April. EM notional imports were $6.7 trillion, with EM Asia accounting for $4.7 trillion of this. For exports, world trade volumes grew at an average rate of 2.3% yoy each month for the 12 months ending in April, with DM growth coming in at 1.6%, and EM growth clocking in at 3.1% on average, just shy of double the rate of DM growth. The notional value of DM exports was $8.8 trillion for the year ended in April. EM notional exports were $7.4 trillion, with EM Asia responsible for $4.9 trillion of this. For April alone, DM imports were up 1.8% yoy, while EM imports were up 6.5%, down from a 9.1% average rate in 1Q17. DM exports in April were up 1.7% yoy, down from a 3% average rate in 1Q17, while EM exports rose 5%, equal to the 1Q17 average rate. Import volumes for EM Asia led global growth by a wide margin vs. other EM markets, particularly in Latin America and the Middle East (Chart 5). Average yoy import growth for the year ended in April was 6.6% for EM Asia, with yoy growth for April alone registering 10.4%. EM Asia also leads export volume growth (Chart 6), with average yoy outbound trade up 7.1% yoy. Chart 5EM Asia Dominates Import Growth YoY... Chart 6...And EM Export Growth As always, the evolution of China's economy will have an outsized influence on trade and EM growth. We continue to expect China's growth to moderate but not slow sharply, in line with our colleagues at our sister publication China Investment Strategy. The recent credit tightening likely will abate, given the central bank has reversed its credit contraction and injected liquidity into the interbank system in recent weeks, according to BCA's China Investment Strategy service.2 We agree with China Investment Strategy's assessment that, "The Chinese economy will likely continue to moderate, but the downside risk appears low at the moment and overall business activity will remain buoyant."3 Update On Global Inflation Vs. EM Trade Volumes World base metals demand is highly correlated with global consumer price inflation. In fact, these variables are cointegrated, meaning they share a common long-term trend. A 1% increase in world base metals demand can be expected to produce a 0.32% increase in U.S. CPI, a 0.25% increase in the Euro Area Harmonized CPI, and a 0.43% increase in China's CPI. Like the relationships between EM oil demand and EM trade volumes, which we presented earlier this month, the relationships between world base metal demand and EM trade volumes also allows us to track EM income levels. This is because the income elasticity of base metals demand also is ~ 1.0 for EM economies, according to the OECD, meaning a 1% increase in EM income can be expected to produce an increase in base metals demand of ~ 1%.4 Likewise, consumer inflation worldwide also is highly correlated with EM trade volumes post-GFC.5 In the regressions we ran for U.S., Euro Area and China CPI as a function of EM trade volumes, we find a 1% increase in EM imports can be expected to produce a 0.51% increase in the U.S. CPI, a 0.41% increase in the Euro Area harmonized CPI, and a 0.67% increase in the China CPI. A 1% increase in EM exports produces increases of 0.47%, 0.35% and 0.65%, respectively. These relationships can be seen in Charts 7, 8, and 9. Chart 7U.S. CPI Highly Correlated##BR##With EM Trade Volumes... Chart 8...Along With The Euro Area##BR##Harmonized CPI... Chart 9...And##BR##China's CPI Bottom Line: World base metals demand will continue to be supported by continued growth in EM trade volumes this year. While these volumes are up nicely, the rate of growth is moderating somewhat, suggesting global base metals demand will hold up this year, but won't surge ahead. We certainly do not see base metals prices falling precipitously this year, given the growth in EM imports and exports, which started to revive toward the end of last year. We remain neutral base metals, but will be watching the interplay between base metals demand and EM trade volumes for any sign global demand is being re-ignited. Inflation appears to be quiescent globally, but we would expect it to start ticking up if we see an uptick in base metals demand and EM trade volumes. Precious Metals Update PGM Notes Price relationships within the precious-metals complex, particularly vis-à-vis Platinum Group Metals (PGMs), have undergone profound transformations since the end of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). These changes have been bolstered by technology shifts in the automotive sector as well. Two trading relationships - palladium's relationship to platinum, and platinum's relationship to gold - best illustrate these changing fundamentals. Unlike gold and platinum prices, palladium is heavily influenced by automotive sales, in this case, gasoline-powered automobile sales. Gasoline-powered cars use palladium in their pollution-control catalysts. Such usage was up 5% last year to 7.4mm oz, according to Thomson Reuters GMFS data.6 Autocatalyst demand accounts for slightly more than three-quarters of palladium demand, according to GFMS data.7 Importantly, the two largest car markets in the world - the U.S. and China - are predominantly gasoline-powered, and sales in both have been strong, although the rate of growth has slowed (Chart 10). This is supportive of palladium prices, particularly as the metal registered a 1.2mm physical deficit last year. There is an increase in Chinese platinum-based auto catalyst demand for diesel cars, due to tightening regulation on emissions, but still is a small share of the total demand for platinum. Post-GFC, the value of palladium relative to platinum has consistently strengthened (Chart 11). Chart 10U.S. Sales Growth Down,##BR##But China Remains Strong Chart 11Platinum Eclipsed By##BR##Palladium And Gold Platinum's Discount To Gold Endures Platinum traded premium to gold until the GFC (Chart 11). Since then, gold has behaved more like a currency, with its price mostly dependent on financial variables (USD, real U.S. interest rates, and equity risk premium). Importantly, the yellow metal has traded premium to platinum since the GFC ended. While platinum prices are somewhat sensitive to the same financial factors as gold, and also can be modeled as a function of these financial variables, the metal also has a real-demand driver: diesel-powered car sales. These vehicles use platinum in their pollution-control catalysts. Autocatalysts accounted for 3.3mm oz of platinum sales last year, or 42% of demand, according to Thomson Reuters GFMS. Most of this goes to diesel catalysts, which are mainly sold in Europe. Diesel-powered car sales have been trending lower (Chart 12) in Europe, where they are the dominant type of car sold. The second largest demand segment for platinum is jewelry sales, which fell 12% last year to 2.2mm oz, following a 3.6% decline the prior year. Both gold and platinum will be responsive to the same set of financial variables, meaning a stronger USD along with higher real rates will be bearish for both, and vice versa. However, given platinum is also sensitive to the diesel-powered auto market, its price evolution has a component strongly influenced by physical platinum demand and supply. Supply comes from mines and recycling, which increases when steel prices rise. Sales of diesel-powered cars are falling in Europe partly due to the Volkswagen emissions-testing scandal and a longer-lasting trend of cities attempting to lower pollution by restricting where diesel-powered vehicles can drive (e.g., Athens, Madrid, Paris and Mexico City are eliminating diesel traffic by 2025).8 In addition, high steel prices will increase platinum recycling volumes this year (people scrap their cars more when steel prices are high). High steel prices also incentivize the scraping of gasoline-powered vehicles, which use palladium in their pollution-control catalysts. Platinum competes at the margin in the pollution-control catalyst market with palladium. The ratio between palladium and platinum is at its highest level since 2002 (Chart 11). The premium of platinum against palladium (platinum minus palladium) went from $1200/oz. in 2010 to close to parity recently (Chart 13). Chart 12EU Sales Still Growing,##BR##But Diesel Loses Share Chart 13Platinum's Premium To##BR##Palladium Disappears Continue To Favor Palladium We are more favorably disposed toward palladium than platinum. Given palladium's price is dominated by sales of gasoline-powered cars, which should, all else equal, do well relative to diesel-powered auto sales, even with a globally synchronized economic upturn. With the U.S. Fed expected to continue tightening, gold and platinum will face financial headwinds that will restrain price appreciation. Palladium, on the other hand, will be less sensitive to these headwinds, although higher interest rates in the U.S. relative to the rest of the world will restrain demand for goods purchased on credit like autos. While we remain neutral the precious metals complex generally, we recently recommended a long spot-gold position as a portfolio hedge against rising inflation and inflation expectations.9 Even though inflation has remained quiescent, and markets are trading as if the odds of a return of inflation are extremely low, BCA's Global Investment Strategy argues "the combination of faster growth and dwindling spare capacity will cause inflation to rise. This is particularly the case for the U.S., where the economy has already reached full employment."10 We believe the strengthening of household incomes resulting from the tight U.S. labor market likely will keep the Fed on track to continue with its rates-normalization policy, vs. market expectations of a mere 21 basis points in cumulative Fed rate hikes over the next 12 months. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Strong EM Trade Volumes Will Support Oil," published June 8, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. The CPB World Trade Monitor is published monthly by the CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. Please see https://www.cpb.nl/en/worldtrademonitor for data and documentation. We use CPB's volumetric data for imports and exports in our analysis, which are indexed to 2010 = 100; we converted these data to USD values to see how the composition of imports and exports is changing so as to better see how the relative shares of EM and DM are evolving. 2 Please see BCA Research's China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Chinese Financial Tightening: Passing The Phase Of Maximum Strength," published by on June 22, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research's China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "A Chinese Slowdown: How Much Downside," published on June 8, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 As we noted in our research earlier this month, the read-through on this is EM trade volumes are closely tied to income levels, given this income elasticity in non-OECD economies. Please see "The Price of Oil - Will It Start Rising Again?" OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 1031, p. 6 (2013). In our modeling, we assume the GFC ended in 2010. Our oil results vis-à-vis EM income elasticities can be found in BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Strong EM Trade Volumes Will Support Oil," published June 8, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5 We originally published these results for EM oil demand vs. EM trade volumes in the June 8, 2017 article referenced above in footnote 1, in BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Strong EM Trade Volumes Will Support Oil," available at ces.bcaresearch.com. The average R2 coefficient of determination for the regressions on imports was 0.89, while the average for the regressions on exports was 0.89. 6 Palladium supply totalled 8.6mm oz, while demand came in at 9.8mm oz, according to the Thomson Reuters - GFMS Platinum Group Metals Survey 2017. 7 In our modelling, we treat palladium as an industrial metal, given the overwhelming influence auto demand - particularly gasoline-powered vehicles - has on its price. Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "2016 Commodity Outlook: Precious Metals," published by December 3, 2015, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 8 A number of cities are looking to ban diesel cars entirely from their central districts. Please see https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/dec/02/four-of-worlds-biggest-cities-to-ban-diesel-cars-from-their-centres. 9 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Go Long Gold As A Strategic Portfolio Hedge," published May 4, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see BCA Research's Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Stocks Are From Mars, Bonds Are From Venus?," published June 23, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016

Bank Credit Analyst

Our new Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) is the latest installment in our ongoing research into trading rules that can augment our top-down macro approach to asset allocation. The RPI borrows from Paul Samuelson's "revealed preference" theory of consumer behavior to market behavior. It combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and the monetary policy backdrop. A trading rule for the stock/bond allocation based on the RPI outperforms traditional technical, monetary, and valuation indicators. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive equity market momentum lines up with positive signals from policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if constructive market momentum is not supported by valuation and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. This model adds value on its own, but we feel that it is best used in conjunction with other indicators designed to improve performance around major market turning points. Future research will experiment with combining the RPI with other indicators to further enhance performance. In the meantime, we will present the RPI's signals each month in Section III of the monthly publication. As with all indicators and models, however, the RPI is only one input to our decision process. We base our asset allocation decision on a combination of indicators, macro themes, detailed data analysis and judgment. In 1938, economist Paul Samuelson published a paper entitled, "A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer's Behavior," in which he outlined an alternative to the well-known economic principle, utility theory. He dubbed his work "revealed preference theory."1 His goal was to redefine utility - a measure of consumer satisfaction with a good or service - by observing behavior. He posited that when consumers reveal their preferences by buying one item rather than another, they reveal the way in which they maximize happiness or satisfaction. For instance, one can measure preferences via experiments in which a subject is given $200 and the choice between two brands of shoes at different prices. Repeating the exercise at different levels of income and relative prices generates "preference axioms." Samuelson's theory has many more layers of complexity, but this Special Report focuses on modelling investors' preferences through observed behavior. Borrowing from Samuelson's reasoning, we developed a methodology to identify investors' axioms of preference for equities and bonds at different levels of incomes and prices. Then we compared investors' real actions with those anticipated by our methodology. This allowed us to generalize our findings and analyze the effects on a portfolio of equities and bonds. The main finding of our statistical exercise is that asset allocators can profit from understanding how short-term moves are linked to the market's revealed preferences at different times during the economic cycle. We then use the results to construct an indicator and a trading rule that not only outperforms a buy-and-hold strategy by a wide margin, it outperforms other traditional trading rules as well. Building A Revealed Preference Model Our primary objective in constructing a revealed preference indicator (RPI) is to understand: (1) how market preferences shape the behavior of investors; and (2) how they ultimately affect future returns. To do so, we broke down our analysis into three key areas: Part I identifies market preferences for different levels of income and price in the economy. Part II defines a general investment strategy that utilizes historic preferences and short-term market movements as a market timing tool. Part III optimizes the RPI and compares its historical track record with a buy-and-hold asset allocation and trading rules based on other indicators. Part I - Developing The Framework The first step in building the RPI is to establish the proper control variables. We limited our basket of investable "goods" to U.S. equities and 10-year Treasurys. We also need a variable that is analogous to the income measure that Samuelson used in his study. For the choice facing investors who are deciding between buying two financial assets, we believe that a measure of market "liquidity" is more appropriate than income. By this we do not mean the ease by which financial assets can be bought and sold. Rather, it is "funding liquidity", or how easily it is to borrow to invest. BCA often uses the four phases of the Fed cycle, as interest rates fluctuate around the equilibrium level, as a measure of funding liquidity (Chart II-1):2 Chart II-1Fed Funds Rate As A Proxy For Income Phase I = Policy is accommodative but the fed funds rate is rising. Phase II = Policy is tight and the Fed is still tightening. Phase III = Policy is tight but the Fed is cutting rates. Phase IV = Policy is easy and the Fed is cutting rates. The rationale for using the fed funds-rate cycle as a proxy for income is that, when interest rates are below equilibrium, monetary conditions are accommodative. Leverage is easy to obtain because there is plenty of liquidity (income) to fund investments. When conditions are tight, funding liquidity is relatively scarce. To measure relative prices, we first divided the S&P 500 price index by its 12-month moving average and second, we took the inverse of the 10-year Treasury yield divided by 12-month moving average.3 We then used the ratio of these two deviations-from-trend to construct a relative price measure (Chart II-2). This ratio provides a single measure of how expensive stocks and bonds are, not only to each other, but to their own history as well. We then grouped the relative price data into four sets of percentiles, or buckets, shown in Table II-1. Stocks are expensive and bonds cheap at the top of the table, while the reverse is true at the bottom. Chart II-2Constructing A Single Price Measure For Equities And Bonds Table II-1Distribution Of Relative Price Table II-2A presents the average historical monthly percent change in stock prices for each combination of the four relative price and liquidity buckets over the entire dataset. In the fourth phase of the Fed cycle (when monetary conditions are easy and the Fed is still cutting interest rates), and when relative prices are in the first bucket (i.e. stocks are expensive), the average stock price increase during the month was slightly above 1% percent. Table II-2B provides the same breakdown for the average change in bond yields (shown in basis points, not returns). Tables II-2A and II-2B are recalculated at each point in time - meaning that we used an expanding sample to calculate the price buckets, and updated the results for the ensuing price or yield movements as new data are added. That way, we completely avoid the advantage of hindsight. To simplify our methodology, we coded the results to end up with the stock and bond returns for the 16 different combinations of Fed and relative price buckets. Table II-3 uses the results from Tables II-2A and II-2B in the last period of history as an example. The "Liquidity" and "Price" columns indicate the bucket (e.g. price in bucket 1 and liquidity in bucket 1). The "Stocks" and "Bonds" columns are coded as "1" if the asset appreciated during the month given the indicated liquidity/price bucket, and a "0" if it depreciated that month. Table II-2AEquity Market Reactions At Given Levels Of Price And Liquidity Table II-2BTreasury Market Reactions At Given Levels Of Price And Liquidity Chart II-3Revealing What Investors Prefer Part II - Habits Create Expectations It is important to keep in mind that the objective of our revealed preference model is not to use the revealed market preferences as forecasts but rather to examine what happens when investors decide to follow or ignore them. Our hypothesis in building this model is that, when investors go against their historical preferences, the result should be interpreted as short-term noise. It is only when preferences and (subsequent) short-term market moves are aligned that we should heed the signal and invest accordingly. Table II-3 can be thought of as the market's revealed preference. Again, keep in mind that we allowed revealed preferences to change over time by recalculating it under our stretching-sample approach. The following steps detail how we used investor preferences to create a trading rule that verifies our hypothesis empirically: Step 1 - Expected vs. Actual: The first step is to examine how actual equity prices and bond yields behaved relative to their expected trajectory. We created two variables - one for equities and one for bonds. If revealed preference last month (t-1) suggested that the asset's return should be positive in the subsequent month (t), and it indeed turned out to be positive in period t, then we coded month t as "1." If both the revealed preference and the actual outcome were negative, we coded it as "-1." If they did not match, the code is "0" (in other words, the market did not follow the typical historical revealed preference). Thus we have two time series, one for bonds and one for stocks, which are made up of 1s, -1s and zeros. Step 2 - Bullish, Bearish, and Neutral: We combined the coded series for stocks and bonds to encompass the nine possible outcomes in our model (i.e. both bonds and stocks can have a value in any month of 1, 0 or -1, providing 9 different combinations). Table II-4 presents the nine outcomes along with the asset allocation that would have maximized investor returns based on our historical analysis. For example, investors were paid to be overweight equities when equities and bonds have a code of "1" and "-1," respectively (top row in Table II-4). In other words, stocks tended to outperform bonds when revealed preferences from the month before predicted rising stock prices and rising bond yields, and these predictions were confirmed. Table II-4Understanding The Signals From Preferences If revealed preference is not confirmed for both bonds and stocks, then it is best for investors to stand aside with a benchmark allocation. Step 3 - "If It Don't Make Dollars, It Don't Make Sense": To test whether our theory would add strategic value, we computed a trading rule to see how well it performed against a benchmark portfolio of 50% equities and 50% Treasurys. The trading rule was computed as follows: when the revealed preference for equities is positive (at time t-1) and this signal is confirmed in t, then in t+1 we allocate 100% to the S&P 500 and 0% to Treasurys. When the revealed equity preference signal is correctly bearish, we removed all exposure to equities and allocated 100% to Treasurys. When the signal was neutral, we kept a benchmark allocation of 50% equities and 50% Treasurys. Chart II-3 shows that this trading rule outperforms the benchmark, confirming our initial hypothesis - one should fade the short-term movements when investors go against their preferences, and only follow the signals when those movements align with historical preferences. History shows that investors tend to underperform in terms of the stock/bond allocation when they deviate from their revealed preference. Chart II-3Correctly Gauging How Investors Behave Pays Off Part III - Validating The Results One drawback is that this trading rule would require frequent portfolio allocation changes every month, as shown in Chart II-4. As such, we constructed a smoothed version by imposing the rule that asset allocation is unchanged unless the model provides a new signal for two months in a row (Chart II-5).4 These restrictions not only dramatically reduced the frequency of the asset allocation adjustments, but it also augmented historical cumulative excess returns (Chart II-6). Chart II-4Revealed Preference Indicator Is Inherently Volatile Chart II-5Removing Some Of The Noise Any new indicator of course must be able to outperform a buy-and-hold strategy to be useful but it is also interesting to see how its performance ranks compared to a set of random portfolios. This way, we can identify if the indicator truly provides additional information. Random portfolios are generated using a monthly allocations of 100% or 0% to equities, with the remainder in Treasurys. Chart II-7 shows the performance of the smoothed indicator versus a set of 1,000 randomly generated portfolios. Chart II-6Once Smoothed, The RPI Truly Shines Chart II-7The RPI Adds A Significant Amount Of Information We compared the indicator's trading rule to simple moving averages or BCA's other indicators. We also wanted to ensure that the RPI adds value beyond investing based strictly on the four phases of the liquidity cycle or based on relative value alone. We therefore compared the track record of the RPI trading rule to rules that are based on: (1) the deviation of the S&P 500 from its 12-month moving trend; (2) BCA's monetary conditions indicator; (3) BCA's valuation indicator; (4) BCA's technical indicator; (5) the four phases of the Fed cycle; and (6) the relative price index. Charts II-8A and II-8B highlights that RPI indeed impressively dominates the other trading rules. The one exception is that, during the Great Recession, the model's performance fell to roughly match the performance of a S&P 500 technical trading rule. Chart II-8AThe RPI Outperforms The Sum Of Its Parts... Chart II-8B...As Well As Other Indicators Part IV - Conclusions The RPI is the latest installment in our ongoing research into trading rules that can augment our top-down macro approach to asset allocation. Quite simply, it combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and policy measures. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive market momentum lines up with constructive signals from the policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if constructive market momentum is not supported by valuation and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. This model adds value on its own, but we feel that it will best be used in conjunction with other indicators designed to improve performance around major market turning points. Future research will experiment with combining the RPI with other indicators to further enhance performance. In the meantime, we will present the RPI's signals each month in Section III of the monthly publication. As with all indicators and models, however, the RPI is only one input to our decision process. We base our asset allocation decision on a combination of indicators, macro themes, detailed data analysis and judgment. The indicator's current reading for stocks versus bonds, at benchmark, is more conservative than our official recommendation. The benchmark reading reflects the fact that equities are overvalued and that investors have deviated from their preferences in their past two quarters. David Boucher Associate Vice President Quantitative Strategist 1 For more information, please see P. A. Samuelson, "A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer's Behavior," Economica 5:17 (1938), pp. 61-71. 2 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Special Report "Stocks And The Fed Funds Rate Cycle," dated December 23, 2013, available at usis.bcaresearch.com 3 We tested a few other measures, most notably the stock-to-bond total return ratio (measured by comparing each asset's total returns), but the chosen measures provided the best and most robust results. 4 We conducted a statistical exercise to validate and optimize the allocations in Table 4 to provide a smoother performance.

Bank Credit Analyst

Highlights A whiff of global deflation shook-up financial markets in June, driven by melting oil prices and a startling May U.S. CPI report. Nonetheless, we have not changed our recommended asset allocation. Bond markets have over-discounted the impact of the commodity price weakness, especially with regard to Fed policy and long-term inflation expectations in the major countries. We do not see the selling pressure in the commodity pits as a harbinger of slower global growth. Above-trend growth in the U.S. is likely in the second half of the year, along with continuing robust activity at the global level. Oil prices should rebound, based on our view that consumption will outstrip production in the second half of the year; the surprise will be how strong oil prices are in the coming months. The FOMC appears more determined than in the past to stick with the current policy normalization timetable. Unemployment will edge further below the full-employment level if the FOMC does not slow the pace of job creation. We believe that the labor market is tight enough to gradually push up inflation. Together with a rebound in the commodity pits, this means that the recent bond rally will reverse. Soft U.S. CPI readings are a challenge to our view. The Fed will delay the next rate hike into next year if core inflation does not move up in the next few months. The equity market is vulnerable to unforeseen shocks given stretched valuation. Nonetheless, none of the main indicators that have provided leading information in the past are warning of an equity bear market. The profit backdrop remains constructive. Our base case is that stocks beat bonds and cash for the remainder of 2017. We expect to trim exposure to equities next year, but the evolution of a number of indicators will influence the timing. The same is true for corporate bonds. The dollar's bull phase has one more upleg left. Japanese, European and U.K. equities will outperform the U.S. in local currency terms. Feature A whiff of global deflation shook-up financial markets in June, driven by melting oil prices and a startling May U.S. CPI report. Investors quickly concluded that the Fed will have to proceed even more slowly in terms of its policy normalization plan which, in turn, sent the dollar and global bond yields sharply lower. Equity indexes held up because of the dollar and bond yield "relief valves". Stocks are also benefiting from the continuing rebound in corporate earnings growth in the major economies. Nonetheless, the commodity pullback and soft U.S. inflation data are a challenge to our reflation theme, which includes a final upleg in the U.S. dollar and a negative view on bond prices. We believe that markets have over-discounted the impact of the commodity price weakness, especially with regard to Fed policy and long-term inflation expectations in the major countries. Above-trend growth in the U.S. is likely in the second half of the year, along with continuing robust activity at the global level. We also think that the FOMC is more determined than in the past to stick with the current policy normalization timetable. The bottom line is that we are not changing our recommended asset allocation based on June's market action. We remain overweight stocks and corporate bonds relative to government bonds and cash. We are also short duration and long the dollar. A key risk to our asset allocation relates to our contrarily bullish view on oil prices. Oil Drove The Bond Rally... The decline in long-term bond yields since March reflected in large part a drop in inflation expectations (Chart I-1). BCA's fixed-income strategists point out that the slump in long-term inflation expectations has been widespread across the major countries, irrespective of whether actual inflation is trending up or down.1 Core inflation has moved lower in the U.S., Japan, Canada and (slightly) in the Eurozone, but has increased in Australia and the U.K. In terms of diffusion indexes, which often lead core inflation, they are falling in the U.S., Japan and Canada, but are rising in the U.K., the Eurozone and Australia (Chart I-2). Chart I-1 Inflation Expectations Drive Bond Rally Chart I-2Diverging Inflation Trends Given all these diverging signals within the national inflation data, it is odd that there has been such a uniform decline in inflation expectations across the major bond markets. That leads us to look to the commodity price decline as the main driver of the downshift in expectations. Short-term moves in oil prices should not affect long-term inflation expectations, but in practice the correlation has been strong since the plunge in oil prices beginning in 2014. Weaker oil and other commodity prices have also fed investor concerns that global growth is waning. We see little evidence of any slowdown in global growth, although some leading indicators have softened. Key monthly data such as industrial production, retail sales and capital goods orders reveal an acceleration in growth for the advanced economies as a group (Chart I-3). There has also been a general upgrading of the consensus growth forecast for the major countries and for the world in both 2017 and 2018 (Chart I-4). This is unlike previous years, when growth forecasts started the year high, only to be slashed as the year progressed. Chart I-3No Slowdown In Advanced Economies Chart I-4Growth Expectations Revised Up ...But Watch Out For A Reversal The implication is that we do not see the selling pressure in the commodity pits as a harbinger of slower global growth. Nonetheless, the mini oil meltdown in June went against our medium-term bullish view. In a recent report,2 our Energy Sector Strategy team noted that investors are confused about conflicting supply signals in oil markets. Traders do not yet see the physical shortage that the IEA/EIA/OPEC and BCA's top-down supply & demand analyses argue will prevail in the coming months. Chart I-5Falling Inventories To Drive Oil Rebound The investment community is being overly pessimistic in our view. The coalition led by the Saudi Arabia and Russia will have removed 1.4 MMB/d of production on average from the market between January 2017 and end-March 2018, versus peak production in November of last year. This will be diluted somewhat by the Libyan and U.S. production gains, but the increased production will not be sufficient to counter the OPEC/Russia cuts entirely. We expect global production to increase by only 0.7 MMB/d in 2017, an estimate that includes rapid increases in U.S. shale output. Meanwhile, we expect consumption to grow by 1.5 MMB/d, implying that oil inventories will fall over the remainder of this year. If history is any guide, this will lead to a rebound in oil prices (Chart I-5). It will be quite a shock to markets if crude reaches $60/bbl by December as we expect. As for base metals, it appears that the correction is largely related to reduced speculative demand rather than weak global and/or Chinese demand. It is true that the Chinese economy has slipped a notch according to some measures, such as housing starts and M2 growth. Nonetheless, the government remains cognizant of the risks of tightening policy too aggressively, especially with the National Party Congress slated for this autumn. The PBoC injected 250 billion yuan into the financial system in June and fiscal policy has been eased. Real-time measures of industrial activity such as railway freight traffic, excavator sales, and electricity production remain upbeat. Retail sales continue to expand at a healthy clip. Export growth is accelerating thanks to a weaker currency and stronger global activity. Given that many investors remain concerned about a hard landing in China, the bar for positive surprises is comfortably low. If China can clear this bar, as we expect it will, it will be good news for the commodity currencies and other commodity plays. A rebound in base metal and, especially, oil prices would boost global inflation expectations and bond yields, especially since inflation expectations have fallen too far relative to underlying non-energy inflation pressures. This forecast also applies to the U.S. bond market, although there was more to the soft May CPI report than oil prices. Is The Fed's Inflation Target Credible? Investors are questioning whether the Fed has the ability to reach its inflation goals. Is it possible that the U.S. is following Japan's roadmap where even an over-heated labor market is insufficient to generate any meaningful inflation? We argued above that the moderation in inflation expectations in the major markets was mostly related to the decline in commodity prices. However, in the U.S., it also reflected a fairly widespread pullback in CPI inflation this year. This is contrary to Fed Chair Yellen's assertion that most of it reflects special factors such as wireless telecommunications prices. The deceleration in inflation began around the start of the year. The three-month rate of change of the headline index fell by more than five percentage points between January and May, of which energy accounts for 3.3 percentage points. The deceleration in the core rate was a less severe, but still substantial at 2.8 percentage points. Table I-1 presents the components of the CPI that made the largest contribution to the deceleration in core inflation. Motor vehicles, owners' equivalent rent, apparel, recreation, wireless telecom and medical care services accounted for 1.2 percentage points as a group. However, many other sectors contributed in a small way to the overall deceleration of core inflation in the first five months of the year. Table I-1Key Drivers Of U.S. Core Inflation Deceleration In 2017 Some special factors were at play. The moderation in rent inflation likely reflects the bottoming of the vacancy rate. Discounting in the auto sector is not a surprise given weak sales. Wireless prices can be viewed as a special case as well. Nonetheless, the breadth and suddenness of the deceleration in core inflation across such diverse sectors, some unrelated to labor markets, commodity prices, the dollar or on-line shopping, is worrying. The disinflation this year in the Fed's preferred measure, the PCE price index, is not as extended but the data are published almost a month behind the CPI data. A diffusion index made up of the components of the PCE index is still in positive territory, unlike the CPI's diffusion index (Chart I-6). Nonetheless, the CPI data suggest that core PCE inflation will edge lower when the May data are released at the end of June. There has also been a moderation in some of the wage inflation data, such as average hourly earnings (Chart I-7). The slowdown has been fairly widespread across manufacturing and services. However, the soft patch already appears to be over; 3-month rates of change have firmed almost across the board (retail is a major exception). There is no slowdown evident at all in the better-constructed Employment Cost Index (ECI) as of the first quarter (Chart I-8). The ECI is adjusted to avoid compositional effects that can distort the aggregate index. The related diffusion indexes also remain constructive. Chart I-6PCE Inflation Rate To Follow CPI Lower Chart I-7AHE SoftPatch Appears Over... Chart I-8...And The ECI Marches Higher We conclude from these and other wage measures that the Phillips curve is still operating in the U.S. Admittedly, the curve appears to be quite flat, which means it is difficult to generate inflation even with a tight labor market. Nonetheless, the relationship between the ECI and various measures of labor market tightness shown in Chart I-8 does not appear to have broken down. The percentage of U.S. states with unemployment below the Fed's estimate of full employment jumped to 70% in May. Anything over 60% in the past has been associated with wage pressure (Chart I-9). The bottom line is that, while we are concerned about the breadth of the soft patch in the consumer price data, we are in agreement with the Fed hawks that the labor market is tight enough to gradually push up inflation. We are willing at this point to chalk up the recent drop in core inflation partly to randomness in the data, and partly to lagged effects of the slowdown in real GDP growth in the first half of 2016 (Chart I-10). Admittedly, however, the U.S. inflation reports in the coming months are a key risk to our reflation-related asset allocation. Chart I-9More Than 70% Of U.S. States Have Excess Labor Demand Chart I-10Financial Conditions Point To Faster Growth And Inflation What Will The Fed Do? The CPI data have certainly rattled some members of the FOMC. Federal Reserve Bank Presidents Kaplan and Kashkari, for example, believe that the Fed needs to be patient to ensure that the inflation pullback is temporary. However, the June FOMC Statement and Yellen's press conference suggested that the consensus is determined to stick with the current tightening timetable in terms of rate hikes and balance sheet adjustment. She stressed that the FOMC makes policy for the "medium term," and should not over-react to short-term wiggles in the data. Vice President Dudley echoed this view in recent comments he made to the press. The Fed has been quick to back away from planned rate hikes at the first hint of trouble in recent years. However, it appears that the reaction function has changed, now that the labor market is at full employment. This is especially the case because financial conditions have eased further, despite the June rate hike. Unemployment will edge further below the full-employment level if the FOMC does not slow the pace of job creation. Policymakers know that the Fed has had little success in the past when it tried to nudge unemployment higher in order to relieve budding inflation pressure; these attempts almost always ended in recession. Dudley added that "...pausing policy now could raise the risk of inflation surging and hurting the economy." Other FOMC members are worried that financial stability risk will build if the low-rate environment extends much further. The bottom line is that we expect the Fed to stick with the game-plan for now. The FOMC will begin shrinking the balance sheet in September, but will wait until December for the next rate hike. That said, a stubbornly low inflation rate in the coming months would likely see the FOMC postpone the next rate increase into next year. Where Next For Bonds? We see three possible scenarios for the bond market: Reflation Returns: Weak recent inflation readings are nothing more than a lagged response to last year's deceleration in economic growth. U.S. growth accelerates in the second half, unemployment falls further and both wage growth and inflation pick up. Oil inventories begin to contract and prices head higher. The FOMC is vindicated in its inflation view and proceeds with the current rate hike and balance sheet adjustment agenda. Investors receive a "wake up call" from the Fed, bond prices get hit and recent curve-flattening trend reverses. Fed Capitulates: The U.S. labor market continues to tighten, but core PCE inflation is still close to 1½% by the September FOMC meeting. We would expect the Fed to lower its forecasted rate hike path, signaling that no further rate hikes are likely in 2017. Long-maturity real yields would fall in this scenario, although long-term inflation expectations could rise to the extent that the Fed's more dovish tilt will weaken the dollar and generate more inflation in the medium term. Nominal yields may not end up moving much in this scenario. A Policy Mistake: If core inflation remains low between now and the September FOMC meeting and the Fed continues to write-off low inflation as transitory, signaling its intention to stick to its current projected rate hike path, then the market would begin to discount a "policy mistake" scenario. The yield curve would flatten and long-maturity nominal yields would fall, led by tighter TIPS breakevens. In terms of probabilities, we would characterize Scenario 1 as our base case, Scenario 2 as unlikely and Scenario 3 as a tail risk. We remain short-duration in anticipation of a rebound in long-term inflation expectations and higher yields. A bond selloff, however, should not present a major headwind for stocks as long as the earnings backdrop remains constructive. Will The Real Profit Margin Please Stand Up For some time we have been highlighting the importance of the mini-cycle in U.S. earnings growth; the corporate sector is in a catch-up phase following last year's profit recession, a trend that extends beyond the energy patch. EPS growth has surged this year on the back of somewhat stronger sales and rising S&P 500 margins. The National Accounts (NIPA) data, however, paint a different picture. Earnings growth for the entire corporate sector fell sharply in the first quarter and margins continued to slide. If the NIPA data are telling the true story, then the equity market is in big trouble because it suggests that the earnings outlook is much weaker than what is discounted in stock prices. There are many definitional differences that make it difficult to reconcile the NIPA and S&P data.3 Nonetheless, we can make some general observations. Chart I-11 presents the 4-quarter growth rate of NIPA profits4 and a proxy for aggregate S&P earnings. For the latter, we multiplied earnings-per-share by the divisor to obtain an estimate of the level of aggregate earnings in dollar terms (i.e. not on a per-share basis). The bottom panel of Chart I-11 compares the level of profits, each indexed to be 100 in 2011 Q1. The charts highlight that, while there have been marked differences in annual growth rates between the two measures in some years, the levels ended up being close to the same point in the first quarter of 2017. The dip in NIPA profit growth in the first quarter was not reflected in the S&P measure. It appears that this is partly due to different profiles for profit growth in the energy and financials sectors. That said, broadly speaking, it does not appear that the difference in margins is due to a significant divergence in aggregate profits. It turns out that most of the margin divergence is related to the denominator of the calculation (Chart I-12). The NIPA denominator is corporate sector Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This is a value-added concept that is quite different from sales. It is not clear why, but GDP has grown much faster than sales since the end of 2014. It appears to us that the S&P data are telling the correct story at the moment. After all, sales are straight forward to measure, while value added is complicated to construct. The fact that sales are growing slowly is not a bullish point for stocks. Nonetheless, it does not appear that financial engineering has distorted bottom-up company data to such an extent that the S&P data are signaling strong profit growth when the reality is the opposite. We expect the secular mean-reversion of margins to re-assert itself in the S&P data, perhaps beginning early in 2018. Nonetheless, the profit backdrop remains positive for stocks for now. The same is true in the Eurozone and Japan, where margins are also rising. It is worrying that a large part of this year's U.S. equity market advance has been concentrated in a small number of stocks, but that belies the breadth of the profit recovery (Chart I-13). The proportion of S&P industry groups with rising earnings estimates is above 75%. Such widespread participation is consistent with ongoing upward revisions to 12-month forward earnings estimates. Chart I-11S&P And NIPA Profit Comparison Chart I-12Denominator Explains S&P/NIPA Margin Divergence Chart I-13Positive Earnings Revisions Are Broadly Based The solid earnings backdrop is the main reason we remain overweight stocks versus bonds and cash. Of course, given poor valuation, we must be extra vigilant in watching for warning signs of a bear market. Valuation has never been good leading indicator for bear markets, but it does provide information on the risks. Monitoring The Bear Market Barometer BCA's Chief Economist, Martin Barnes, highlighted the best "equity bear market" indicators to watch in a 2014 Special Report.5 He noted that no two bear markets are the same, and that there are no indicators that have reliably heralded bear phases. Nonetheless, there are some common elements. The safest time to invest in the market is when monetary conditions are favorable, there are no signs of a looming economic downturn, there is not extreme overvaluation, and technical indicators are not flashing red. Some indicators related to each of these fundamental factors are shown in Chart I-14: Chart I-14Equity Bear Market Indicators Monetary Conditions: The yield curve is quite flat by historical standards, but it is far from inverting. Moreover, real short-term interest rates are normally substantially higher than today, and above 2%, when bear markets commence. Excess liquidity, which we define as M2 growth less nominal GDP growth, is also still well above the zero line, a threshold that has warned of a downturn in stock prices in the past. Valuation: Our composite valuation indicator is still shy of the +1 standard deviation level that defines over-valued. However, this is because of the components that compare equity prices to bond yields. The other three components of the equity indicator, which are unrelated to bond yields, suggest that stock valuation is quite stretched. Economic Outlook: Economic data such as the leading economic indicator and ISM have been unreliable bear market signals. That said, we do not see anything that suggests that a recession is on the horizon. Indeed, U.S. growth is likely to remain above-trend in the second half of the year based on its relationship with financial conditions. Technical conditions: Sentiment is elevated, which is bearish from a contrary perspective. However, breadth, the deviation from the 40-week moving average, and our composite technical indicator are not flashing red. Earnings: Trends in earnings and margins did not provide any additional reliable signals for timing equity market downturns in the past. Still, it has been a bad sign when EPS growth topped out. And this has often been preceded by a peak in industrial production growth. We expect U.S. EPS growth to continue to accelerate for at least a few more months, but are watching industrial production closely. EPS growth in Japan and the Eurozone will likely peak after the U.S., since these markets are not as advanced in the profit rebound. The bottom line is that the equity market is vulnerable to unforeseen shocks given stretched valuation. Nonetheless, none of the main indicators that have provided some leading information in the past are warning of an equity bear market. Investment Conclusions The major world bourses remain in a sweet spot because of the mini cyclical rebound in profits. One can imagine many scenarios in which equities suffer a major correction or bear phase. However, stocks would likely perform well under the two most likely scenarios for the remainder of the year. If U.S. and global growth disappoint, the combination of low bond yields and still-robust earnings growth will continue to support prices. Conversely, if world growth remains solid and the U.S. picks up, as we expect, then bond yields will rise but investors will pencil-in an even stronger profit advance over the next year. Of course, this win-win situation for stocks will not last forever. Perhaps paradoxically, the economic cycle could be shortened if the U.S. Congress gets around to passing a bill that imparts fiscal stimulus in 2018. The Fed would have to respond with a more aggressive tightening timetable, setting the stage for the next recession. In contrast, the economic cycle would be further stretched out in the absence of fiscal stimulus, keeping alive for a while longer the lackluster growth/low inflation/low bond yield backdrop that has been favorable for the equity market. We are watching the indicators discussed above to time the exit from our pro-risk asset allocation that favors stocks and corporate bonds to government bonds and cash. As for the duration call, the whiff of deflation that has depressed bond yields over the past month is overdone. Investors have also become too complacent on the Fed. We expect that the recent drop in commodity prices, especially oil, will reverse. If this view is correct, it means that the cyclical bull phase in the dollar is not over because market expectations for the pace of Fed rate hikes will rise relative to expectations in the other major economies (with the exception of Canada). We are still looking for a 10% dollar appreciation. It also means that Treasurys will underperform JGBs and Bunds within currency-hedged fixed-income portfolios. We expect the Eurostoxx 600 and the Nikkei indexes to outperform the S&P 500 this year in local currencies, despite our constructive view on U.S. growth. Stocks are cheaper in the former two markets. Moreover, both Japan and the Eurozone are earlier in the profit mini-cycle, which means that there is room for catch-up versus the U.S. over the next 6-12 months when growth in the latter tops-out. The prospect of structural reform in France is also constructive for European stocks, following the election of a reformist legislature in June. However, the upcoming Italian election warrants close scrutiny. The key risk to this base case is our view that oil prices will rebound. This is clearly a non-consensus call. If OPEC production cuts are unable to overwhelm the rise in U.S. shale output, then inventories will remain elevated and oil prices could move even lower in the near term. Our bullish equity view would be fine in this case, but the bond bear market and dollar appreciation we expect would at least be delayed. Finally, a few words on the U.K. Our geopolitical experts highlight two key points related to June's election outcome: fiscal austerity is dead and the U.K. will pursue a "softer" variety of Brexit. This combination should provide a relatively benign backdrop for U.K. stocks and the economy over the next year. Nonetheless, the cloud of uncertainty hanging over the U.K. is large enough to keep the Bank of England (BoE) on hold. Some BoE hawks are agitating for tighter policy due to the worsening inflation overshoot, but it will probably be some time before the consensus on the Monetary Policy Committee shifts in favor of rate hikes. This means that it is too early to position for gilt underperformance within fixed-income portfolios. Sterling weakness looks overdone, although we do not see much upside either. As long as Brexit talks do not become acrimonious (which is our view), the U.K. stock market should be one of the outperformers in local currency terms among the major developed markets. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst June 29, 2017 Next Report: July 27, 2017 1 For more discussion, see Alternative Facts in the Bond Market at BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, dated June 13, 2017 available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "Views from the Road," dated June 21, 2017, available at nrg.bcaresearch.com 3 The first problem is that the S&P data are expressed on a per-share basis. Moreover, the NIPA data adjusts for inventory and depreciation allowance. S&P margins are calculated using sales in the denominator, while we generally use GDP as the denominator for calculating NIPA profits. 4 The NIPA data shown include financials and profits earned overseas, as is the case for the S&P. 5 Please see BCA Special Report "Timing The Next Equity Bear Market," dated January 24, 2014, available at bcaresearch.com II. Preferences As Trading Constraints: A New Asset Allocation Indicator Our new Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) is the latest installment in our ongoing research into trading rules that can augment our top-down macro approach to asset allocation. The RPI borrows from Paul Samuelson's "revealed preference" theory of consumer behavior to market behavior. It combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and the monetary policy backdrop. A trading rule for the stock/bond allocation based on the RPI outperforms traditional technical, monetary, and valuation indicators. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive equity market momentum lines up with positive signals from policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if constructive market momentum is not supported by valuation and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. This model adds value on its own, but we feel that it is best used in conjunction with other indicators designed to improve performance around major market turning points. Future research will experiment with combining the RPI with other indicators to further enhance performance. In the meantime, we will present the RPI's signals each month in Section III of the monthly publication. As with all indicators and models, however, the RPI is only one input to our decision process. We base our asset allocation decision on a combination of indicators, macro themes, detailed data analysis and judgment. In 1938, economist Paul Samuelson published a paper entitled, "A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer's Behavior," in which he outlined an alternative to the well-known economic principle, utility theory. He dubbed his work "revealed preference theory."1 His goal was to redefine utility - a measure of consumer satisfaction with a good or service - by observing behavior. He posited that when consumers reveal their preferences by buying one item rather than another, they reveal the way in which they maximize happiness or satisfaction. For instance, one can measure preferences via experiments in which a subject is given $200 and the choice between two brands of shoes at different prices. Repeating the exercise at different levels of income and relative prices generates "preference axioms." Samuelson's theory has many more layers of complexity, but this Special Report focuses on modelling investors' preferences through observed behavior. Borrowing from Samuelson's reasoning, we developed a methodology to identify investors' axioms of preference for equities and bonds at different levels of incomes and prices. Then we compared investors' real actions with those anticipated by our methodology. This allowed us to generalize our findings and analyze the effects on a portfolio of equities and bonds. The main finding of our statistical exercise is that asset allocators can profit from understanding how short-term moves are linked to the market's revealed preferences at different times during the economic cycle. We then use the results to construct an indicator and a trading rule that not only outperforms a buy-and-hold strategy by a wide margin, it outperforms other traditional trading rules as well. Building A Revealed Preference Model Our primary objective in constructing a revealed preference indicator (RPI) is to understand: (1) how market preferences shape the behavior of investors; and (2) how they ultimately affect future returns. To do so, we broke down our analysis into three key areas: Part I identifies market preferences for different levels of income and price in the economy. Part II defines a general investment strategy that utilizes historic preferences and short-term market movements as a market timing tool. Part III optimizes the RPI and compares its historical track record with a buy-and-hold asset allocation and trading rules based on other indicators. Part I - Developing The Framework The first step in building the RPI is to establish the proper control variables. We limited our basket of investable "goods" to U.S. equities and 10-year Treasurys. We also need a variable that is analogous to the income measure that Samuelson used in his study. For the choice facing investors who are deciding between buying two financial assets, we believe that a measure of market "liquidity" is more appropriate than income. By this we do not mean the ease by which financial assets can be bought and sold. Rather, it is "funding liquidity", or how easily it is to borrow to invest. BCA often uses the four phases of the Fed cycle, as interest rates fluctuate around the equilibrium level, as a measure of funding liquidity (Chart II-1):2 Chart II-1Fed Funds Rate As A Proxy For Income Phase I = Policy is accommodative but the fed funds rate is rising. Phase II = Policy is tight and the Fed is still tightening. Phase III = Policy is tight but the Fed is cutting rates. Phase IV = Policy is easy and the Fed is cutting rates. The rationale for using the fed funds-rate cycle as a proxy for income is that, when interest rates are below equilibrium, monetary conditions are accommodative. Leverage is easy to obtain because there is plenty of liquidity (income) to fund investments. When conditions are tight, funding liquidity is relatively scarce. To measure relative prices, we first divided the S&P 500 price index by its 12-month moving average and second, we took the inverse of the 10-year Treasury yield divided by 12-month moving average.3 We then used the ratio of these two deviations-from-trend to construct a relative price measure (Chart II-2). This ratio provides a single measure of how expensive stocks and bonds are, not only to each other, but to their own history as well. We then grouped the relative price data into four sets of percentiles, or buckets, shown in Table II-1. Stocks are expensive and bonds cheap at the top of the table, while the reverse is true at the bottom. Chart II-2Constructing A Single Price Measure For Equities And Bonds Table II-1Distribution Of Relative Price Table II-2A presents the average historical monthly percent change in stock prices for each combination of the four relative price and liquidity buckets over the entire dataset. In the fourth phase of the Fed cycle (when monetary conditions are easy and the Fed is still cutting interest rates), and when relative prices are in the first bucket (i.e. stocks are expensive), the average stock price increase during the month was slightly above 1% percent. Table II-2B provides the same breakdown for the average change in bond yields (shown in basis points, not returns). Tables II-2A and II-2B are recalculated at each point in time - meaning that we used an expanding sample to calculate the price buckets, and updated the results for the ensuing price or yield movements as new data are added. That way, we completely avoid the advantage of hindsight. To simplify our methodology, we coded the results to end up with the stock and bond returns for the 16 different combinations of Fed and relative price buckets. Table II-3 uses the results from Tables II-2A and II-2B in the last period of history as an example. The "Liquidity" and "Price" columns indicate the bucket (e.g. price in bucket 1 and liquidity in bucket 1). The "Stocks" and "Bonds" columns are coded as "1" if the asset appreciated during the month given the indicated liquidity/price bucket, and a "0" if it depreciated that month. Table II-2AEquity Market Reactions At Given Levels Of Price And Liquidity Table II-2BTreasury Market Reactions At Given Levels Of Price And Liquidity Chart II-3Revealing What Investors Prefer Part II - Habits Create Expectations It is important to keep in mind that the objective of our revealed preference model is not to use the revealed market preferences as forecasts but rather to examine what happens when investors decide to follow or ignore them. Our hypothesis in building this model is that, when investors go against their historical preferences, the result should be interpreted as short-term noise. It is only when preferences and (subsequent) short-term market moves are aligned that we should heed the signal and invest accordingly. Table II-3 can be thought of as the market's revealed preference. Again, keep in mind that we allowed revealed preferences to change over time by recalculating it under our stretching-sample approach. The following steps detail how we used investor preferences to create a trading rule that verifies our hypothesis empirically: Step 1 - Expected vs. Actual: The first step is to examine how actual equity prices and bond yields behaved relative to their expected trajectory. We created two variables - one for equities and one for bonds. If revealed preference last month (t-1) suggested that the asset's return should be positive in the subsequent month (t), and it indeed turned out to be positive in period t, then we coded month t as "1." If both the revealed preference and the actual outcome were negative, we coded it as "-1." If they did not match, the code is "0" (in other words, the market did not follow the typical historical revealed preference). Thus we have two time series, one for bonds and one for stocks, which are made up of 1s, -1s and zeros. Step 2 - Bullish, Bearish, and Neutral: We combined the coded series for stocks and bonds to encompass the nine possible outcomes in our model (i.e. both bonds and stocks can have a value in any month of 1, 0 or -1, providing 9 different combinations). Table II-4 presents the nine outcomes along with the asset allocation that would have maximized investor returns based on our historical analysis. For example, investors were paid to be overweight equities when equities and bonds have a code of "1" and "-1," respectively (top row in Table II-4). In other words, stocks tended to outperform bonds when revealed preferences from the month before predicted rising stock prices and rising bond yields, and these predictions were confirmed. Table II-4Understanding The Signals From Preferences If revealed preference is not confirmed for both bonds and stocks, then it is best for investors to stand aside with a benchmark allocation. Step 3 - "If It Don't Make Dollars, It Don't Make Sense": To test whether our theory would add strategic value, we computed a trading rule to see how well it performed against a benchmark portfolio of 50% equities and 50% Treasurys. The trading rule was computed as follows: when the revealed preference for equities is positive (at time t-1) and this signal is confirmed in t, then in t+1 we allocate 100% to the S&P 500 and 0% to Treasurys. When the revealed equity preference signal is correctly bearish, we removed all exposure to equities and allocated 100% to Treasurys. When the signal was neutral, we kept a benchmark allocation of 50% equities and 50% Treasurys. Chart II-3 shows that this trading rule outperforms the benchmark, confirming our initial hypothesis - one should fade the short-term movements when investors go against their preferences, and only follow the signals when those movements align with historical preferences. History shows that investors tend to underperform in terms of the stock/bond allocation when they deviate from their revealed preference. Chart II-3Correctly Gauging How Investors Behave Pays Off Part III - Validating The Results One drawback is that this trading rule would require frequent portfolio allocation changes every month, as shown in Chart II-4. As such, we constructed a smoothed version by imposing the rule that asset allocation is unchanged unless the model provides a new signal for two months in a row (Chart II-5).4 These restrictions not only dramatically reduced the frequency of the asset allocation adjustments, but it also augmented historical cumulative excess returns (Chart II-6). Chart II-4Revealed Preference Indicator Is Inherently Volatile Chart II-5Removing Some Of The Noise Any new indicator of course must be able to outperform a buy-and-hold strategy to be useful but it is also interesting to see how its performance ranks compared to a set of random portfolios. This way, we can identify if the indicator truly provides additional information. Random portfolios are generated using a monthly allocations of 100% or 0% to equities, with the remainder in Treasurys. Chart II-7 shows the performance of the smoothed indicator versus a set of 1,000 randomly generated portfolios. Chart II-6Once Smoothed, The RPI Truly Shines Chart II-7The RPI Adds A Significant Amount Of Information We compared the indicator's trading rule to simple moving averages or BCA's other indicators. We also wanted to ensure that the RPI adds value beyond investing based strictly on the four phases of the liquidity cycle or based on relative value alone. We therefore compared the track record of the RPI trading rule to rules that are based on: (1) the deviation of the S&P 500 from its 12-month moving trend; (2) BCA's monetary conditions indicator; (3) BCA's valuation indicator; (4) BCA's technical indicator; (5) the four phases of the Fed cycle; and (6) the relative price index. Charts II-8A and II-8B highlights that RPI indeed impressively dominates the other trading rules. The one exception is that, during the Great Recession, the model's performance fell to roughly match the performance of a S&P 500 technical trading rule. Chart II-8AThe RPI Outperforms The Sum Of Its Parts... Chart II-8B...As Well As Other Indicators Part IV - Conclusions The RPI is the latest installment in our ongoing research into trading rules that can augment our top-down macro approach to asset allocation. Quite simply, it combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and policy measures. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive market momentum lines up with constructive signals from the policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if constructive market momentum is not supported by valuation and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. This model adds value on its own, but we feel that it will best be used in conjunction with other indicators designed to improve performance around major market turning points. Future research will experiment with combining the RPI with other indicators to further enhance performance. In the meantime, we will present the RPI's signals each month in Section III of the monthly publication. As with all indicators and models, however, the RPI is only one input to our decision process. We base our asset allocation decision on a combination of indicators, macro themes, detailed data analysis and judgment. The indicator's current reading for stocks versus bonds, at benchmark, is more conservative than our official recommendation. The benchmark reading reflects the fact that equities are overvalued and that investors have deviated from their preferences in their past two quarters. David Boucher Associate Vice President Quantitative Strategist 1 For more information, please see P. A. Samuelson, "A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer's Behavior," Economica 5:17 (1938), pp. 61-71. 2 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Special Report "Stocks And The Fed Funds Rate Cycle," dated December 23, 2013, available at usis.bcaresearch.com 3 We tested a few other measures, most notably the stock-to-bond total return ratio (measured by comparing each asset's total returns), but the chosen measures provided the best and most robust results. 4 We conducted a statistical exercise to validate and optimize the allocations in Table 4 to provide a smoother performance. III. Indicators And Reference Charts Thanks to the recent dollar and bond yield “relief valves”, the S&P 500 is stubbornly holding above the 2,400 level. The breakout above this level further stretched valuation metrics. Measures such as the Shiller P/E and price/book are at post tech-bubble highs. Stocks remain expensive based on our composite Valuation Index, although it is still shy of the +1 standard deviation level that demarcates over-valuation. This is because our composite indicator includes valuation measures that take into account the low level of interest rates. Of course, once interest rate normalization is well underway, these indicator will not look as favorable. It is good news for the equity market that our Monetary Indicator did not move further into negative territory over the past month. Indeed, the indicator has hooked up slightly and is sitting close to a neutral level. Our equity Technical Indicator remains constructive. Other measures, such as our Speculation Index, composite sentiment and the VIX suggest that equity investors are overly bullish from a contrary perspective. On the other hand, the U.S. earnings surprises diffusion index highlights that upside earnings surprises are broadly based. Our elevated U.S. Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicator ticked down from a high level this month, suggesting that ‘dry powder’ available to buy this market is depleted. This indicator tracks flows, and thus provides information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. Investors often say they are bullish but remain conservative in their asset allocation. In contrast to the U.S., the WTP indicators for both the Eurozone and Japan are rising from a low level. This suggests that a rotation into these equity markets is underway and has some ways to go. We remain overweight both the Eurozone and Japanese markets relative to the U.S. on a currency-hedged basis. The pull back in long-term bond yields since March was enough to “move the dial” in terms of the bond valuation or technical indicators. U.S. bond valuation has inched lower to fair value. However, we believe that fair value itself is moving higher as some of the economic headwinds fade. We also think that the FOMC is determined to stick with the current tightening timetable in terms of rate hikes and balance sheet adjustment, which support our negative view on bond prices. Now that oversold technical conditions have been unwound, it suggests that the consolidation phase for bond yields is largely complete. The trade-weighted dollar remains quite overvalued on a PPP basis, although less so by other measures. Technically, it is a bearish sign that the dollar moved lower and crossed its 200-day moving average. However, our Composite Technical Indicator highlights that overbought conditions have been worked off. We still believe the U.S. dollar’s bull phase has one more upleg left. Technical conditions are also benign in the commodity complex. Most commodities have shifted down over the last month to meet support at their 200-day moving averages. Base metals are due for a bounce, but we are most bullish on oil. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-5U.S. Earnings Chart III-6Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-8U.S. Treasurys and Valuations Chart III-9U.S. Treasury Indicators Chart III-10Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1110-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-12U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-13Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-14Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-15U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-17U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-18Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-19Euro Technicals Chart III-20Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-22Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-23Commodity Prices Chart III-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Sentiment Chart III-26Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-27U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-28U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-29U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-30U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-31U.S. Labor Market Chart III-32U.S. Consumption Chart III-33U.S. Housing Chart III-34U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-35U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-36Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: China

Highlights Odds the leaders of the OPEC 2.0 petro-states will be forced to back up last month's "whatever it takes" declaration - perhaps deepening and extending the 1.8mm b/d production cuts agreed at the end of last year - are not yet overwhelming. All the same, they will continue to increase, if markets do not see sustained draws in visible storage. Our updated supply-demand balances indicate global crude inventories will continue to draw, and that these draws will accelerate. This will keep global storage levels on track to normalize later this year or in 1Q18. We continue to expect Brent to trade to $60/bbl by December, with WTI ~ $2/bbl under that. Energy: Overweight. Our low-risk call spread initiated last week - long Dec/17 $50/bbl WTI calls vs. short $55/bbl WTI calls - is down 18.9%, following continued selling. We are adding to the position with the same Dec/17 strikes in Brent at tonight's close. These are strategic positions. Base Metals: Neutral. SHFE copper inventories fell on the back of increased demand for collateral to support financing deals in China. Tightening credit conditions are beginning to bite as the government pushes deleveraging policies, according to Metal Bulletin. Precious Metals: Neutral. We remain long gold, despite the hawkish rhetoric being thrown around by Fed officials, particularly William Dudley, head of the NY Fed. Our long gold portfolio hedge is up 1.1% since it was put on May 4, 2017. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Chicago and KC winter wheat remain bid, as concerns over drought-induced damage to the crop continue to weigh on markets. Feature Chart of the WeekUpdated Balances Leave Us Bullish Crude Insomuch as such things can ever be "official," crude oil officially entered a bear market - down 20% or more from recent highs - with the unexpected arrival of WTI futures below the lower end of our long-time $45-to-$65/bbl trading range this week.1 The proximate causes of this turn of events are persistently sticky inventory levels - most visible in the high-frequency data from the U.S. - and growing fears increasing Libyan and U.S. shale-oil production will undermine OPEC 2.0's 1.8mm b/d production cuts. We are hard-pressed to see the case for such fears, even though the market is consistently trading in a manner that is more aligned with supply cuts being far less than advertised by OPEC 2.0, or demand slowing considerably more than any agency or data service has yet picked up on. We will never be able to confirm sovereign hedging - e.g., Mexico or Iraq hedging oil-production revenues - until after the fact. However, this cannot be dismissed out of hand. Based on our latest supply-demand analysis, OPEC 2.0 - the coalition lead by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia - will have removed some 1.4mm b/d of production on average from the market between January 2017 and end-March 2018 vs. peak production in November of last year (Chart of the Week). This will be diluted somewhat by the Libyan and U.S. production gains, but this increased production will not be sufficient to counter the OPEC 2.0 cuts entirely. Global Oil Supply Contracting Sharply Chart 2OECD Storage Draws On Track Against peak production in November 2016, we see just over 1.2mm b/d of crude oil production being cut by OPEC between January and end-March-2018.2 Throw in another 200 - 300k b/d or so from the non-OPEC members of the OPEC 2.0 coalition - mostly Russia - and we get to 1.4 to 1.5mm b/d of production taken off the market in the Jan/17 - Mar/18, interval in our modeling. This will leave the highly visible OECD storage levels being targeted by OPEC 2.0 at ~ 2.70 billion barrels by the end of the year, or some time close to the start of next year (Chart 2). In our modeling, we do not agree with the implied 1.9mm b/d of production cuts that follow from the reported OPEC 2.0 compliance statistics in the press. These reports indicate OPEC 2.0 coalition members are at 106% compliance. This is remarkably high, even if reports of this compliance rely on anonymous sources speaking to reporters following the coalition's technical committee meeting in Vienna earlier this week.3 If the production discipline attested to is true, we will raise our estimate of how quickly inventories will draw this year, and lower our expected global inventory levels for the end of March 2018. As for U.S. crude production, while we do have Dec/17 production 1.1mm b/d over Dec/16, we expect America's contribution to yoy global production growth to be only ~ 340k b/d on average over the course of 2017. The U.S. gains will be driven by shale-oil production, which we expect to grow ~ 410k b/d to 5.2mm b/d this year (Chart 3). Libya's production recently surged to 900k b/d, according to press reports, but, so far this year, it is averaging just under 700k b/d (Chart 4). This is slightly higher than the level we've been modeling in our balances for this year. The 300k b/d yoy increase in Libya's production is impressive, but it does not overwhelm OPEC 2.0's cuts. Even if Libyan production were to average 1mm b/d in 2H17, its net contribution to global production this year would be ~ 840k b/d, an increase of ~ 400k b/d over 2016's levels. We also note that as production and revenue increase the likelihood of renewed violence in Libya also increases.4 Chart 3U.S. Shale-Oil##BR##Growth Could Slow Chart 4Libya's Recover Is Impressive,##BR##But It Won't Reverse OPEC 2.0's Cuts Between them, combined growth in U.S. and Libyan production looks like it will be a touch under 650k b/d yoy (on average). Meanwhile, OPEC 2.0's production cuts - assessed against peak output for 2016 - are on track to exceed targets set at the outset of the agreement last December. Net, on a yoy basis, we expect to register inventory draws of close to 900k b/d this year. This should lead to cumulative draws in global storage levels of at least 400mm bbls by end-March. Demand Remains Strong The EIA revised its liquids demand estimates in its most recent Short-term Energy Outlook (STEO), and now has 2015 global consumption up 300k b/d from previous estimates at 95.4mm b/d, and 2016 consumption up 180k b/d at 96.9mm b/d. Our expected growth in global demand for this year and next is in line with the EIA's average estimate of ~ 1.6mm b/d, which will put 2017 demand at 98.5mm b/d and 2018 at 100.1mm b/d, respectively. Growth this year and next is expected to be slightly higher than last year's level (Chart 5). Once again, we expect EM demand - proxied by non-OECD liquids consumption - to lead global growth this year and next. Concern over apparent slowing in U.S. refined-product demand - particularly gasoline - is, we believe, overdone. Growth this year is being compared to stellar rates last year (Chart 6), which still leaves the level of demand above 20mm b/d. Growth in gasoline demand specifically also has slowed, but, again, this is occurring in a market where the level of demand remains high, pushing toward 10mm b/d, which is a mere 2.5% below record demand set in August of last year (Chart 7). Chart 5Expect Global Demand##BR##To Remain Stout Chart 6The Level Of U.S. Product##BR##Demand Remains High Chart 7U.S. Gasoline Demand##BR##Also Remains Stout 2018 Getting Foggy Uncertainty surrounding the evolution of the oil market next year is growing. The EIA believes markets will tighten in 3Q17, but then get progressively looser going into 2018, apparently disregarding OPEC 2.0's efforts to date, and the high likelihood - in our view - that the coalition will maintain production discipline for the most part (Chart 8). Combined with the robust demand growth BCA and the EIA expect, we get a fairly balanced market next year (Chart of the Week). U.S. shale-oil production, once again, will dictate just how tight markets become next year. Presently, we have average 2018 U.S. shale production in the Big 4 basins - Bakken, Eagle Ford, Niobrara, and the Permian - coming in more than 1mm b/d over 2017 levels. However, the recent sell-off that took WTI into bear-market territory this week could have a profound effect on shale-drilling activity next year, if it persists. Recent econometric work we've done confirms rig counts in the Big 4 plays are highly sensitive to WTI price. A prolonged stretch below $45/bbl could reduce rig counts by as much as 40% next year, especially if private-equity-backed companies cut spending. With hedging levels down, this is not a trivial concern (Chart 9).5 If prices stay depressed for any length of time for whatever reason - an outcome we do not expect - U.S. shale drilling activity could once again plummet. Chart 8EIA Fades OPEC 2.0's Resolve,##BR##BCA Does Not Chart 9Weak Prices Could##BR##Reduce Shale Rig Counts In addition, low prices also increase fiscal stress levels in petro-state revenues. This is of particular concern for KSA and Russia. The former is almost wholly dependent on oil revenues to fund its budgets, and will be looking to IPO its state-owned oil company, Aramco, next year. The latter is heavily dependent on oil and gas revenues, and will be holding an election in mid-March, just ahead of the expiry of the OPEC 2.0 production-cut extensions. The benchmark Russian crude, Urals, trades ~ $1.00 to $1.25/bbl under Brent, and any prolonged excursion into the low-$40s by Brent would stress the state's revenues. This is not our base case, but it is worthwhile considering. This mutual dependence on oil prices to support their respective economies is what compels strong compliance with the OPEC 2.0 production deal. Bottom Line: Our updated balances modeling continues to support our view global oil storage will draw, with OECD inventories likely falling below five-year average levels by year-end or early next year. Self-reported compliance with OPEC 2.0's production-cutting agreement exceeds 100%, implying the coalition is tracking to a 1.9mm b/d reduction in crude-oil output at present. On the demand side, even after upward revisions to 2015 and 2016 demand figures by the U.S. EIA, liquids consumption still is expected to grow on average ~ 1.6mm b/d this year and next. Cuts in production by OPEC 2.0 this year are more than sufficient to offset increases in Libyan and U.S. production, leaving overall production below consumption globally by close to 900k b/d, which will ensure inventories draw. For next year, after storage draws have abated, we expect supply and demand to be roughly balanced. We continue to expect Brent prices to trade to $60/bbl by year-end, and, on that basis, are recommending a long Dec/17 $50/bbl Brent call vs. short a Dec/17 $55/bbl Brent call. Longer term, our central tendency for price remains $55/bbl, with a range of $45 to $65/bbl prevailing most of the time. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 We are using the front-line WTI futures contract, which hit its recent high on Feb. 23 at $54.45/bbl (last price) and traded down to $43.23/bbl on June 20, registering a drop of 20.6%. First-line Brent has yet to fall more than 20% from its recent high of $57.10/bbl on Jan. 6 to $46.02/bbl on June 20 (a 19.4% drop). 2 Measuring against peak production - rather than the October levels referenced by OPEC 2.0 coalition members - is an inherently more conservative way of assessing the effect of the production cuts. 3 Please see "OPEC, non-OPEC compliance with oil cuts hits highest in May: source," published by reuters.com on June 21, 2017. 4 An uptick in Nigerian production also is cited by some observers as a cause for concern vis-à-vis slowing the normalization of global storage levels. However, as Chart 4 illustrates, that country's production remains on either side of 1.5mm b/d, more than 500k b/d below recent steady-state levels. 5 Looking at rig-count sensitivity to prices and rig productivity, we find a 1% increase (decrease) in nearby prices translates into a roughly 70bp increase (decrease) in rig counts, while a 1% increase (decrease) in lagged, deferred WTI futures prices (out to 3 years forward) translates into a 2% change in the same direction. The R2 coefficients of determination for the models we estimated average ~ 0.95. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016

Special Report

Highlights Risk Budgeting: We are introducing a more formal risk measurement element to our model global bond portfolio. This is to identify if our individual views are potentially creating too much volatility, in aggregate, but also as a way to express the conviction of our individual recommendations through allocation of a "risk budget". Tracking Error Of Our Portfolio: We are setting our maximum allowable tracking error, or excess volatility of our portfolio versus our benchmark index, at 100 basis points. Our current tracking error is just under ½ of that limit. We estimate that our highest conviction views at the moment - staying below-benchmark on duration risk, overweighting U.S. corporates, underweighting both U.S. Treasuries and Italian government debt - contribute nearly 4/5ths of our overall portfolio tracking error. Feature Last September, we introduced a model portfolio framework to Global Fixed Income Strategy.1 This was done to better communicate our investment research into actionable ideas more in line with the day-to-day decisions and trade-offs made by professional bond managers. We followed that up with the addition of performance measurement tools to more accurately track the returns of our model bond portfolio versus a stated benchmark.2 We are now initiating the final piece of our model bond portfolio framework in this Special Report - introducing a risk management component to identify cumulative exposures and guide the relative sizes of our suggested tilts. Our goal is to translate our individual investment recommendations into the language of a "risk budget", i.e. how much of the desired volatility of the portfolio would we suggest placing into any single trade idea. This will allow our readers to apply our proposed tilts - based on how much conviction (i.e. "risk") we allocate to each position - to their own portfolios which may have different risk limits and return expectations. For example, our current recommendation to overweight U.S. corporate debt, both Investment Grade (IG) and High-Yield (HY) represents nearly 1/3 of our estimated total portfolio risk, by far our largest source of potential volatility both in absolute terms and versus our benchmark index (Table 1). Overweighting U.S. corporates, both versus U.S. Treasuries and Euro Area equivalents, is one of our highest conviction trades at the moment. A client who may choose to run a lower risk portfolio can still follow our recommendation by placing enough into U.S. corporates so that 33% of the desired portfolio volatility will come from those positions. Table 1Risk Allocation In Our Model Bond Portfolio In the rest of this Special Report, we will discuss some of the various ways to measure fixed income portfolio risk, apply them to our model portfolio, and introduce some measures to monitor our aggregate portfolio volatility. Going forward, we will closely watch our established metrics and position sizes to ensure that the combination of our individual investment recommendations that we discuss on a week-to-week basis does not create a portfolio that is potentially more volatile than desired. Risk Measurement In Fixed Income Portfolios While investors are typically focused on meeting return targets for their portfolios, the other side of the equation - managing portfolio volatility - is often less stressed. This is especially true during bull markets for any asset class. Investors may become complacent if returns meet or exceed their targets when, in fact, excess returns may have actually been earned through overly risky positions that could have easily not worked in the investors' favor. In the current macro environment, where many financial asset prices are at new highs with stretched valuations and with most of the major global central banks incrementally moving towards less accommodative monetary policy stances, risk management should be even more important for investors. Overly concentrated positioning could now lead to considerable portfolio losses, especially if measuring risk with a metric that is flawed or incomplete, which can lead to a false sense of security. With that in mind, we consider some typical risk measurement metrics used by fixed income investors: Duration: Duration is usually the most popular risk metric for fixed income portfolios as it measures interest rate sensitivity. Duration is defined as the percentage change in a portfolio or asset resulting from a one percentage point change in interest rates. While it provides a solid base understanding of interest rate risk, it does make a simplifying assumption that there is a linear relationship between interest rates and bond prices. Value-At-Risk: Value-At-Risk (VaR) is a statistical technique that measures the loss of an investment, or of an entire portfolio, over a certain period with a given level of confidence. However, there are two considerable flaws with this approach. First, the VaR output suggests a portfolio can lose at least X%, it does not actually indicate how big the potential loss could be. Instead, using a measure such as Historical VaR, if a portfolio has a long enough track record, can better quantify potential losses. Second, VaR is highly susceptible to estimation errors. Certain assumptions on correlations and the normality of return distributions can have a substantial impact on VaR readings. Table 2Value At Risk Of Our Benchmark In Table 2, we show the Historical VaR (HVAR) of our benchmark index, calculating the potential monthly loss using data going back to 2005. On that basis, the worst expected monthly loss for our benchmark is -1.6% (using a 95% confidence interval) and -2.1% (using a 99% confidence interval). Tracking Error: Tracking error measures the volatility of excess returns relative to a certain benchmark. It is a standard risk measure used by a typical "real money" bond manager with a benchmark performance index, like a mutual fund. Tracking error does not offer information on alpha generation (i.e. how much you can expect to beat your benchmark based on your current investments), it simply indicates how much more volatile a portfolio is expected to be versus its benchmark. As our model portfolio returns are measured on a relative basis to our stated bond benchmark index, tracking error is quite appropriate as our main risk metric. A Historical Examination Of Our Portfolio When we first created our model portfolio, we also introduced a benchmark index against which we could measure our performance. Our customized benchmark differs from typical multi-sector measures like the Barclays Global Aggregate Index in that it has a broader scope, including sectors that can have credit ratings below investment grade such as High Yield corporates. The benchmark does, however, exclude smaller regions that we only occasionally discuss such as Sweden, Portugal, Norway and New Zealand. These smaller markets offer comparatively poor liquidity and we want our benchmark to be as investible as possible. Nevertheless, our customized benchmark has been highly correlated to the Barclays Global Aggregate Index over the past decade. As our portfolio has not had a full year of return data, its history is quite limited. Still, in our first performance review conducted two months ago, we indicated that our portfolio had been very closely tracking our customized benchmark. We have since increased our positions in our highest conviction views and our tracking error has risen noticeably and now sits at just over 40bps (Chart 1). Within our model portfolio, we are setting an expected excess return target of 100bps per year. That means that we are setting a goal of beating our benchmark index returns by one full percentage point per year. Given that we are measuring our performance versus currency-hedged benchmarks that are primarily rated investment grade or better, 100bps of annual excess return is a reasonable target. We are also setting a limit where the excess return/tracking error ratio should aim to be equal to 1 each year. This is under the simple assumption that we want an equal amount of return over our benchmark for our expected excess volatility versus our benchmark. On that basis, we are setting our tracking error "limit" at 100bps per year. That suggests that our current tracking error is relatively low. However, correlations between the individual components of our benchmark index have been rising over the past couple of years (Chart 2). Therefore, running a relatively low overall level of risk at a time where diversification among the positions within our portfolio is now harder to achieve, and when the valuations on most government bond and credit markets look rich, is prudent. Chart 1Higher Tracking Error, But Still Well Below Our Target Chart 2Correlations Across Fixed Income Sectors Have Been Rising This is another way that we can control the overall riskiness of our model portfolio. Not only by how much of our risk budget (tracking error) that we want to allocate to each of our recommended positions, but also how big of a risk budget do we want to run at any given point in time. If we see more assets trading at cheap valuations, then we could choose to run a higher tracking error than when most assets look expensive. Bottom Line: We are introducing a more formal risk measurement element to our model global bond portfolio. This is to identify if our individual views are potentially creating too much volatility, in aggregate, but also as a way to express the conviction of our individual recommendations through allocation of a "risk budget". We are setting our maximum allowable tracking error, or excess volatility of our portfolio versus our benchmark index, at 100 basis points. Measuring The Contribution To Risk From Our Market Tilts In our model portfolio, we include a wide range of geographies and sectors from the global fixed income universe. Understanding the risk contribution of each position to the overall portfolio provides a clearer picture as to where our potential risks lie, and by how much. To measure the risk contribution of each of our individual recommendations to our overall portfolio volatility, we used the following formula: wA * E CovAB * wB Where W = the weight of any single asset in our portfolio and COV is the covariance between the asset and other assets in the portfolio. As such, an asset's contribution to risk is a function of its weight in the portfolio and its covariance with the other assets. Importantly, since we are measuring our model portfolio performance in terms of excess returns, we examined each position's contribution to risk relative to the benchmark. All calculations begin in late 2005, when return data is available for all of the assets in our portfolio. The results are summarized in Table 1 on Page 1. Our portfolio tilts are based off of our four highest conviction themes. They include: Stronger global growth led by the U.S. The U.S. economy should expand at a faster pace in the latter half of the year on the back of a rebound in consumption and strong capital spending, all supported by solid income growth and easy financial conditions. We have expressed this theme through our overweight allocation to U.S. corporate debt. While our U.S. Corporate Health Monitor is flashing that balance sheets are becoming increasingly strained, easy monetary conditions and an expansionary economic backdrop should continue to support excess returns for U.S. corporates. More Fed rate hikes than expected. We expect U.S. economic and corporate profit growth to remain robust due to accommodative monetary conditions, diminishing slack and resilient consumption. As such, the Fed will continue tightening policy by more than what markets are currently pricing in. This theme is expressed through an underweight position in U.S. Treasuries, which accounts for 17% of our volatility versus 24% for that of the benchmark. This wide spread relative to the benchmark is a substantial source of our tracking error, but one that we are comfortable running given our view that U.S. Treasury yields are too low. Chart 3Realized Bond Volatility Has Been Declining Rising tapering risks in Europe. Our expectation is that the European Central Bank (ECB) will be forced to announce a slower pace (tapering) of bond buying starting next year, given the current robust economic expansion in Europe that is rapidly absorbing spare capacity. An ECB taper announcement is expected to lead to rising longer-term global bond yields, mostly via rising term premia. We are expressing that view in our portfolio through our overall underweight interest rate duration stance. Our current portfolio duration is 5.6 years versus our benchmark duration of 7.0 years. That is a large tilt that represents a significant portion of our tracking error, but given our view that U.S. Treasuries also look overvalued, running a large overall duration underweight does correlate to our conviction level. Rising geopolitical risks and banking sector issues in Italy. Geopolitical risks remain elevated leading up to parliamentary elections in 2018, and Italian banks remain undercapitalized with non-performing loans still in an uptrend. Therefore, we are underweight Italian debt, though this is a smaller deviation of portfolio risk versus our benchmark (around 2%), given the smaller size of Italy in our benchmark. Purely looking at geography and sector selection, our four highest conviction views make up almost 80% of the active portfolio risk that we are "running" in our model portfolio. That number may seem high but, as described earlier, our realized portfolio volatility has been quite low (Chart 3). That suggests that there could be some degree of underlying diversification within our recommended portfolio given lower correlations of certain assets to the rest of the portfolio. This is a topic that we will investigate more deeply in future Weekly Reports. Bottom Line: We estimate that our highest conviction views at the moment - staying below-benchmark on duration risk, overweighting U.S. corporates, underweighting both U.S. Treasuries and Italian government debt - contribute nearly 4/5ths of our overall portfolio tracking error. Patrick Trinh, Associate Editor Patrick@bcaresearch.com Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "Introducing Our Recommended Global Fixed Income Portfolio", dated September 20 2016, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "An Initial Look At The Performance Of Our Model Bond Portfolio", dated April 18 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Table 4

Special Report

Highlights Investors have soured on hedge funds, withdrawing US$ 70 billion net last year. This is unsurprising because hedge funds have greatly underperformed global equities since the Global Financial Crisis, and have struggled to achieve a return of even cash plus 4% because of low volatility and high cross-asset correlation. But hedge funds still have a place in a balanced multi-asset portfolio. They have a good track record of outperforming equities in recessions. We favor macro funds as a recession hedge. This strategy has outperformed even bonds in the past three recessions, and is the only hedge fund class with positive skew and low kurtosis. Outside of a recession, we favor event-driven funds for their lower-beta equity exposure and idiosyncratic return profile. Feature The hedge fund industry has received a considerable amount of bad press over the past couple of years due to its poor performance and high fees. Since 2010, the average annual return from hedge funds has been just 4%, while global equities have returned almost 9% a year. Fees have been trimmed back from the traditional 2/20, but still average 1.5% of assets and 17% of performance.1 As a result, investors last year withdrew a net US$ 70.1 billion from hedge funds, the first year ever of net withdrawals, apart from the Global Financial Crisis years of 2008-9 (Feature Chart). According to a survey by Preqin, 84%2 of investors cited unfavorable terms and conditions as the reason for withdrawing their money. But are investors right to have turned sour on hedge funds? Does the asset class no longer have a place in a diversified multi-asset portfolio? Can hedge funds still provide a useful hedge against the sharp drawdown in risk assets likely in the next recession? As so often, the general picture obscures the details. Hedge funds invest using wildly different strategies. In this report, we analyze the historical risk and return characteristics of different categories of hedge funds, and test their resilience during historical recessions and equity bear markets. We also examine the characteristics of each main hedge fund strategy individually, and asses its usefulness in asset allocation. Our conclusions are that, in general, hedge funds represent an expensive way to generate a return that in recent times has failed to beat a target of cash plus 4%. Hedge funds suffer from style drift (tending to take on increasing risk as an equity bull market continues), and therefore do not always provide acceptable returns in downturns. Moreover, manager selection is difficult, especially for smaller funds without the manpower or expertise to handle it well. However, we find that: Event-driven funds (for example, activist and M&A arbitrage strategies) do have a good long-term track record of generating alpha; Macro funds have historically provided attractive downside protection in recessions. Investors, therefore, should not abandon their allocations in hedge funds. In a world where valuations for most asset classes (equities, bonds, private equity, real estate etc.) are stretched, and where the probability of a global recession in the next two to three years is relatively high, a thoughtful and well-scaled investment in hedge funds still makes sense. A note on the data we used in this report. All the hedge fund returns are based on the equally-weighted monthly indices (HFRI)3 produced by Hedge Fund Research, Inc. Funds included in these indices must (1) report returns net of all fees, and (2) have at least $50 million under management or have been actively trading for at least 12 months. HFR makes significant efforts to avoid survivor bias. When a fund is removed from the index, the performance remains in the index until the point of liquidation or when the manager requests removal from the database. HFR makes stringent efforts to receive data of a fund's performance right up until the point of liquidation. Likewise, when a new fund is added to the index, its performance up to that date does not affect the historical performance of the index. Finally, if a non-liquidated fund does not report to the HFR database for three consecutive months, the fund is subject to removal from the HFRI, but its historical data remains. Analyzing Historical Returns Hedge funds have produced an impressive return of 10.1% a year since 1990, when reliable data starts. This compares to 6.9% for global equities and 6.2% for global bonds over the same period (Table 1). But all of this outperformance came before 2010. Over the past seven years, hedge funds have returned only 4% a year, compared to 8.5% for equities and 3.8% for bonds. Table 1Risk And Return Analysis There has clearly been a structural decline in hedge fund returns over time. Each five-year period since 1990 has seen a lower return than the previous five years, and the trend decline in returns is seen across all the major categories of hedge fund strategy (Table 2 and Chart 2). This is probably because the rapid growth in the hedge fund industry caused arbitrage opportunities to dry up and because, as individual funds got larger, they had less flexibility to invest. Table 2Risk And Return Analysis - By Period Chart 2Structural Or Cyclical? Hedge funds are supposed to be vehicles that "hedge" downside risk in periods of market stress and so can consequently generate a consistent return in excess of the risk-free rate. As one would expect, their performance, therefore, tends to be closer to that of bonds than of equities and, unsurprisingly, they have a close correlation with the performance of bonds over equities (Chart 3). But they have struggled in recent years to beat even their generally accepted benchmark of Libor + 4% (Chart 2 panel 1). Chart 3Are Hedge Funds Just 2/20 Bonds? From a risk perspective, all hedge fund strategies have a volatility somewhere between that of equities and bonds. Hedge fund return distribution is non-normal. Three of the four hedge fund strategies have exhibited negative skew, i.e. a higher-than-normal probability of negative returns. However, relative value is the only strategy with a large excess kurtosis, meaning that investors should expect extreme returns in periods of market stress. Macro has been the only strategy with a positive skew and a lower excess kurtosis than global equities. What Happened In Recessions? Hedge funds are, in theory, designed to give positive returns even during recessions and equity bear markets. Indeed they did so during the recessions of July 1990-March 1991 and March-November 2000. But, with the exception of global macro funds, they failed dismally to achieve a positive return in the December 2007-June 2009 recession (Table 3). Note, however, that all categories of hedge funds did outperform equities in the most recent recession. Table 3Recession Performance Global macro has clearly been the best hedge fund strategy at giving downside protection during recessions. It was the only category to outperform bonds during all three recessions in our analysis (Chart 4). The strategy's global cross-asset mandate and extensive use of derivatives enables it to achieve an option-like return distribution. Its nimbleness at switching exposures depending on the macro environment is clear from its sharp change of correlation with bonds and equities between recessions and expansions (Chart 5). This phenomenon is also seen to a lesser extent for event-driven and relative-value strategies. On the other hand, equity-hedge strategies have rising correlations with equities during recessions, mainly because of their net long bias. The cause of each equity bear market also has an impact on which hedge fund strategies perform the best (Chart 6). For example, relative-value strategies did well in the 1990-91 bear market, which was not accompanied by a deep economic recession. Conversely, event-driven funds severely underperformed during the 2007-2009 bear market because M&A deal activity dried up. Accordingly, investors looking to preserve capital in the next equity bear market need to pick a strategy after careful consideration of the likely cause of the next turndown. Hedge Fund Strategies Hedge funds encompass a wide range of investment styles, with managers using a myriad of different strategies to try to generate alpha. Below, we analyze the four main hedge fund strategies, explain the dynamics of their sub-categories and the relative attractions of their styles, and draw some conclusions about which are likely to be most appropriate in which environments. We also touch on whether using a fund of funds ever makes sense. Equity Hedge This strategy (Table 4) takes a long-short approach in equities, working under dedicated mandates with regard to capitalization, style and sector. The core strength of the group is superior bottom-up stock-picking coupled with long-short systematic risk hedging. Alpha generation is greater in less efficient, segmented markets with barriers to the free flow of information. Relative performance of this category (Chart 7) tends to be strongest when: There is significant dispersion of performance between sectors and stocks, giving hedge funds increasing opportunities for long-short trades; Value stocks outperform, since many long-short funds tend to be long cheap stocks and short expensive ones; Small caps outperform large caps. Many relative-value funds focus their long positions in smaller firms and their short positions in larger ones since small-cap stocks are less covered by sell-side analysts, resulting in more pricing inefficiencies. As a result of these biases and their generally net long positions, long-short equity hedge funds tend to have the strongest correlations with global equity markets and to perform worst in equity bear markets. Table 4Equity Hedge Strategies Chart 7Equity Hedge: High Beta Equity Exposure Event Driven This strategy (Table 5) pursues more opportunistic mandates and its returns are usually contingent on the successful completion of a specific corporate event. These funds tend to have a shorter investment horizon and use hedging techniques to isolate the event's impact on returns by reducing systematic risk. Alpha generation is dependent on the manager's ability to predict the outcome of corporate events. Activist and distressed funds focus more on value creation through operational turnarounds and hence have a longer investment period. The health of the M&A market (Chart 8) is the single biggest factor determining relative performance versus the hedge fund composite since it dictates exit valuations for most of the sub-strategies. We do not expect a recession until 2019 at the earliest, so deal volumes are likely to remain buoyant, which should help merger arbitrage funds generate good returns. Table 5Event Driven Strategies Chart 8Event Driven: Dependent On M&A Health The strategy also has a close correlation with credit spreads. This is partly because M&A deals tend to increase as the cost of funding the acquisition declines in an economic expansion. But it is also because distressed and restructuring funds have become more prominent over the years and their performance is linked to improving credit conditions. Macro This group (Table 6) utilizes a wide range of strategies taking exposure to movements in macroeconomic factors and their impact on asset classes. These funds tend to use leverage extensively and also dynamic risk-management techniques. Macro funds try to structure tactical positions to anticipate inflection points, and have a track record of generating significant outperformance in periods of stress. This means that this category has low kurtosis and skew, and has proved to be the best strategy for downside protection in recessions. Apart from in recessions, macro funds tend to outperform (Chart 9) only in times of credit-market stress (high-yield spread widening). But their recession-hedging properties are attractive, as seen by their negative correlation with equities and positive correlation with bonds during downturns. These tactical shifts in correlation led it to be the best strategy in three out of past four equity bear markets. Table 6Macro Strategies Chart 9Macro: Best Recession Hedge We generally prefer systematic rules-based funds over actively managed discretionary funds, as systematic funds offer better downside protection in recessions. However, systematic funds tend to underperform in trendless sideways-moving markets. Relative Value This group (Table 7) predominantly takes long/short positions in the rates and credit space. Most of the trades are arbitrage driven and depend on long-run mean reversion, thereby profiting from short-term deviations from fair value. Individual trades tend to have small profits, and so managers rely on leverage to magnify returns. With leverage comes the potential for extreme swings, as seen in this strategy's extremely high kurtosis. A famous example is the failure of Long Term Capital Management,4 which, at its peak, had an AUM of US$ 125 billion but just US$ 5 billion in equity capital. During 1995 and 1996 returns averaged 40% a year after fees. But, in the Asian financial crisis and the Russian default of 1997-1998, assets shrank to less than $1 billion in a matter of months. Relative-value funds have outperformed the hedge fund composite since the Global Financial Crisis largely as a result of low interest rates, which have reduced the cost of gearing up their positions (Chart 10). A rise in interest rates would represent a major headwind for this strategy. Table 7Relative Value Strategies Chart 10Relative Value: Rising Rates Are A Headwind Equity and interest rate volatility are also bad for relative-value fixed-income funds. Spikes in volatility render risk management models less effective. Additionally, relative value funds have exposures to the corporate credit space within their convertible arbitrage and corporate arbitrage sub-strategies. Hence, this group tends to underperform when high-yield spreads widen. Funds Of Funds Chart 11FOFs: Underperforming All The Way This group has seen a secular decline in AUM from USD$ 1.2 trillion to US$ 340 billion over the past 10 years.5 Returns have been poor relative to hedge funds as a whole (Chart 11), mainly because of their double layer of fees. However, funds of funds continue to have some attractions for smaller investors that are unable to meet minimum subscriptions for hedge funds or do not have the ability to handle their own manager selection. Funds of funds typically charge 1-1.5% on top of the underlying hedge funds' fees (and sometimes also a 10% performance fee). However they can often use their size to negotiate with hedge funds for a better deal on fees and innovative fee structures: for example, a larger proportion of the fee based on performance coupled with a high hurdle rate. This way they can partly reduce the aggregate fee burden (Chart 11, Panel 3). For larger investors such as pension plans and university endowments there is a choice between using a fund of funds and running their own in-house multi-strategy program. If we assume that the average fund of funds charges 1% in management fees, an investor looking to allocate $100 million should prefer to do this via a fund of funds if the cost of running an in-house program would be more than $1 million a year. Investment Implications In theory, given their focus on absolute return, hedge funds should underperform somewhat in an expansion and outperform significantly in a recession. They will tend to perform relatively poorly when volatility is low and cross-asset correlations high, as has been the case over the past eight years. However, as intervention by global central banks fades over the coming years - and with the risk of a recession on the horizon - volatility is likely to mean-revert closer to historical averages, which should create more opportunities for alpha. The hedge fund industry could come into its own again. But picking the right managers and strategy is crucial. There is a large dispersion between the performance of top and bottom decile hedge fund managers: in 2016, for example, top-decile funds made an average return of +32.7%, bottom-decile managers -15.5%.6 Intra-correlation between hedge fund strategies has recently fallen to a new low (Chart 12), so it is also important to choose the right strategy. Investors should have a preference for smaller hedge funds. These can be more nimble, allowing them to liquidate assets more readily in a downturn, and to have easier access to smaller, more inefficiently priced markets. They are likely to continue their recent outperformance (Chart 13) in an environment more dependent on security selection. We have two broad strategy recommendations contingent on the market environment (Chart 14): In a recession. Overweight macro funds, given their track record of impressive downside protection in recessions and equity bear markets. Now should be an attractive entry point given that the group has underperformed the hedge fund composite by 35% since the financial crisis. Over the cycle. Overweight event-driven funds, which have historically been an effective equity play with idiosyncratic exposures and lower beta risk. Deal activity is likely to remain strong thanks to companies' large cash balances and, for U.S. companies, prospective corporate tax reforms which will allow them to repatriate retained earnings held overseas. Chart 12Strategy Picking Is Crucial Chart 14Overweight Event Driven And Macro Aditya Kurian, Research Analyst Global Asset Allocation adityak@bcaresearch.com 1 Source: Hedge Fund Research. 2 Source: Preqin Investor Outlook: Alternative Assets H1 2017. 3 Source: HFRI Hedge Fund Indices, Defined Formulaic Methodology. 4 Source: http://www.investmentreview.com/print-archives/winter-1999/the-story-of-long-term-capital-management-752/ 5 Source: BarclayHedge. 6 Source: Hedge Fund Research.