Commodities & Energy Sector

Highlights This week we highlight key charts for US Political Strategy themes and views in the New Year. For H1 2022, we maintain a pro-cyclical, risk-on approach. We favor industrials, energy, infrastructure, and cyclicals. Foreign supply kinks will persist due to Omicron. The US Congress will pass one more spending bill as Democrats try to save their skin ahead of the midterm election. Yet other trends are not so inflationary: Fed rate hikes, an 8% of GDP fiscal drag, and a looming return to congressional gridlock. Midterm elections usually see defensive and growth stocks outperform cyclical and value stocks. This is a risk to our view and may require adjustments later this year. Feature This week we offer our updated US Political Strategy chart pack for the new year. Inflation and stagflation are the top concerns. But the Federal Reserve is kicking into gear, with the market now expecting three-to-four interest rate hikes in 2022 alone. We doubt that will come to pass but it is possible and there is no question that a 12-month core PCE print of 4.7% is forcing the Fed to move. Since the mega-stimulus of March 2020, markets have seen a 91% rally in the S&P 500 and a 114% rally in the tech sector. Ultra-low interest rates and stay-at-home policies created a paradise for tech stocks. But the 10-year Treasury yield surged from 1.45% in December, when Omicron emerged and the Fed turned hawkish, to 1.76% today. An inflation-induced pullback and rotation out of tech stocks was to be expected and has been our most consistent sectoral view. Long-term inflation expectations have not taken off, however. Many investors see secular stagnation over the long run – and even in the short run the resilient dollar should work against inflation. Not only will the Fed wind down asset purchases by $30bn a month starting January 2022 and start hiking rates in March, but also the budget deficit is contracting, making for an 8% of GDP fiscal drag in 2022. In addition the market no longer has any confidence that Congress will pass President Biden’s “Build Back Better” plan. We still think a reconciliation bill will pass, albeit in watered down form. But ultimately the looming midterm election will paralyze Congress, as we argued in our 2022 outlook report, “Gridlock Begins Before The Midterms.” Gridlock will ensure that whatever passes only modestly expands the long-term deficit and then that fiscal taps will be turned off in 2023. In the context of Fed hikes, this should reduce fears of inflation later in 2022, though we still see inflation as a persistent long-term problem. If history is any guide, stocks and bond yields will be flattish for most of the year due to election uncertainty. The difference between this year and other midterm years is that the US consumer is in better financial shape and yet foreign supply kinks will persist due to Omicron. The takeaway is to prefer industrials, energy, small caps, and cyclicals, even though we may not maintain these recommendations for the whole year. We are hedging by staying long health care stocks. Omicron: Less Relevant At Home, More Relevant Abroad American economic growth is declining but will likely settle at or above trend (Chart 1A). Money growth, a proxy for stimulus, is also coming off its peaks while credit growth is rising moderately. The long deleveraging of the American consumer since 2008 appears to have come to an end. But it is too soon to say how aggressively Americans will lever back up and whether a new private sector “debt super cycle” will begin (Chart 1B). Chart 1AEconomic Growth Peaked, Will Slow To Trend Chart 1BEconomic Growth Peaked, Will Slow To Trend The Omicron variant of COVID-19 will have a modest negative impact early in the year. Hospitalizations are picking up in the wake of a surge in new cases following Christmas gatherings. Only 61% of Americans are fully vaccinated and only 23% have received the booster shot that is most effective against Omicron (Chart 2A & Chart 2B). Yet new deaths from the disease remain subdued and only about a fifth of those hospitalized go to the intensive care unit today. Chart 2BCOVID-19 Continues But Relevance Wanes Pharmaceuticals, both vaccines and anti-viral medications, are saving the day and Americans are becoming resigned to the likelihood of getting the virus at some point. Social mobility has dropped off since summer 2021 but will boom in the springtime and consumer confidence is already picking back up (Chart 3A & Chart 3B). The Biden administration is not likely to impose unpopular social restrictions during an election year unless a variant is deadlier, more contagious, and resistant to vaccines, which is not the case with Omicron. Chart 3AOmicron Not A Major Setback For Recovery The resilience of the US will come with persistent inflation in goods given that Omicron will still cause supply disruptions abroad. Not all countries have as effective vaccines when it comes to Omicron – if they maintain tighter social restrictions, prices of imported goods will continue to rise. The Fed cannot resolve foreign bottlenecks. While manufacturing surveys show bottlenecks easing from last year’s highs, foreign supply constraints will remain a problem throughout the year. Chart 3BOmicron Not A Major Setback For Recovery Buy The Rumor, Sell The News Of “Build Back Better” The Biden administration and Democratic Party are still likely to pass one last blast of fiscal spending – the “Build Back Better” budget reconciliation act, a social welfare bill. The output gap is virtually closed and the economy does not need new demand stimulus. However, the Democratic Party needs a legislative win ahead of the midterm election. Thin majorities in both chambers of Congress enable a single senator to derail the bill. But the bill’s provisions are popular among political independents and especially the Democratic Party’s base, which is lacking in enthusiasm about the election as things stand (Charts 4A & 4B). Moderate Democrats in the Senate are still negotiating: their goal is to chop the plan down to size and pass only the most popular provisions, rather than to sink the president and their own party. This means the bill’s top-line spending will be further reduced. The final size should fall from the earlier range of $2.5-$4.7 trillion to $2.3 trillion or less. Add a few tax hikes, like the minimum corporate tax, and the deficit impact will be around $600 billion (Table 1). Table 1"You’ve Gotta Pass It To See What’s In It" Ultimately we cannot have high conviction on the BBB plan because we cannot predict what a single senator will do. That is a matter of intelligence, not macro analysis. But subjectively we still give 65% odds that the Democratic Party will circle the wagons and pass the bill. The party views itself as surrounded by populism on both its right and left flanks – a failure to compromise will whet the appetites of both the Sanderistas (left-wing populists) and the Trumpists (right-wing populists) (Chart 5A). The Republicans still have a better position in the states, and the states have constitutional control of elections, so establishment Democrats are more terrified than usual of flopping in the midterm elections (Chart 5B). Otherwise the midterms – which are already likely to be bad for the Democrats – will deal a devastating blow. Republicans are recovering in party affiliation and tentatively surpassing Democrats among independent voters (Chart 6A). Biden and the Democrats lashed out at former President Trump and the Republican Party on the anniversary of the January 6, 2020 rebellion, but this tactic will not lift their popularity in polls. Their current polling is not much better than that of Republicans in 2018, when the latter suffered a bruising defeat in the midterms (Chart 6B). Chart 6ADemocrats Need A Win Before The Midterm Biden’s legislation would reduce the fiscal drag marginally in fiscal year 2023 but overall the budget deficit will shrink and then lie flat over 2022-24 regardless of what Congress does (Chart 7). New spending would be marginally inflationary over the long run since the budget deficit is expected to expand again beyond fiscal year 2024. Republicans will not be able to slash the budget until they control both Congress and the White House, but in that case they are likely to prove big spenders as in the past. Populism will persist on all sides: the political establishment will keep trying to use fiscal profligacy to peel voters away from populists, who are even more fiscally profligate. Only an inflation-induced recession will restore some fiscal discipline – and that is a way off. Ultimately the significance of the BBB bill is to verify whether establishment politicians – fiscal authorities – are capable of moderating their spending plans according to the threat of inflation, as Modern Monetary Theory maintains. Otherwise the implication is that polarization and populism will produce fiscal overshoots regardless of near-term inflation, even with the narrowest of possible majorities in Congress. The latter, a BBB fiscal overshoot, is what we expect. If it happens it will probably be received negatively by the equity market, fearing faster Fed rate hikes, and it would add credibility to long-term concerns about inflation, because it would reveal that fiscal authorities are not good at adjusting in real time. The former, a BBB failure and a halt to fiscal spending, would suggest that fiscal extravagance remains a crisis-era phenomenon and will be reined in by Congress after a crisis passes, which is probably positive for equities. It would at least suggest that fiscal authorities will adjust when the facts change. Of course, how investors respond to any legislative outcome will depend on a range of factors. But the takeaway is this: Inflation fears may or may not peak in the short run but they will persist over the long run. The Fed: Focus On The Framework In the wake of the Great Recession the Federal Reserve as an institution – both the Federal Open Market Committee and the Board of Governors – shifted in a more accommodative or dovish direction (Chart 8). The shift culminated in the review of monetary policy strategy in August 2020, which produced average inflation targeting. In practice the dovish policy shift is apparent in a real Fed funds rate at -4%, the lowest level since the inflationary 1970s under Fed Chair Arthur Burns. But what is more remarkable is the simultaneous surge in the budget deficit, unlike anything since World War II, and unlike anything in peacetime (Chart 9). Chart 9Inflation And Stagflation Risks The massive increase in federal debt, from 34% of GDP in 2000 to 75% before COVID-19 and 106% today, acts as a constraint on any future Fed hawkishness (Chart 10). A Fed chair who drives interest rates too high amid high debt levels will cause a recession and force the debt-to-GDP ratio up even higher. Yet the result of low rates is to stimulate indebtedness. While the private debt super cycle has subsided, a public debt super cycle is thriving. Chart 10A Major Check On Fed Hawkishness This brings us to today’s predicament. The Fed’s criteria for raising interest rates have mostly been met: 12-month core PCE inflation is running at 4.7% while the inflation breakeven rate in the Treasury market suggests that inflation is well anchored and likely to persist above the 2% inflation target for some time (Chart 11A). The economy is virtually at “maximum employment” (Table 2) – the Fed has set aside concerns about low labor force participation to focus on the collapsing unemployment rate, which is now within the range at which it will feed inflation (Chart 11B). Chart 11AThe Fed's Criteria For Liftoff Table 2The Fed’s Criteria For Liftoff Chart 11BThe Fed's Criteria For Liftoff The takeaway is that the Fed is suddenly restoring the credibility of its 2% inflation target, with headline PCE rapidly coming up on the trajectory established in the wake of the Great Recession (Chart 12), as our US bond strategist Ryan Swift has demonstrated. Chart 12Lo And Behold: Debt Monetization Generates Inflation The explosion of fiscal spending played a critical role in generating this new trajectory. The combination of monetary and fiscal accommodation has worked wonders. Assuming the BBB passes, Chairman Powell will face even greater pressure to prevent this correction of the inflation trajectory from overshooting and turning into a wage-price spiral. The unexpected risk would be if the BBB bill fails, the Fed hikes aggressively, global growth sputters, the dollar surges, and Republicans retake Congress — then Powell may yet see disinflationary challenges in his term in office. Our sense is that the BBB will pass, reinforcing Powell’s less dovish pivot, and yet the Fed’s framework will not permit too hawkish of a stance, resulting in persistent inflation risks over the long run. Three Strategic Themes In our annual strategic outlook, we highlighted three structural or strategic themes that are not beholden to the 12-month forecasting period: 1.   Rise Of Millennials And Generation Z: The sharp drop in labor force participation will gradually mend in the wake of the crisis but the aging of the population ensures that the general trend will decline over time as the dependency ratio rises (Chart 13A). Chart 13AStrategic Theme #1: Rise Of Millennials/Gen Z Politically the millennials and younger generations are gaining clout over time, although their partisan identity will also evolve as they mature and gain a greater stake in the economy and become asset owners (Chart 13B). 2.   Peak Polarization: US political polarization stands at historic highs and will likely remain so over the 2022-24 political cycle (Chart 14A). Polarization coincides with the transformation of society amid falling bond yields and technological revolution (Chart 14B). Chart 14AStrategic Theme #2: Peak Polarization Chart 14BStrategic Theme #2: Peak Polarization The pandemic era has been especially polarized due to the 2020 election and controversies over vaccination (Chart 15). Domestic terrorism of whatever stripe is possible (Chart 16). But any historic incidents will generate a majority opposed to political violence. Chart 16Risk Of Domestic Terrorism True, former President Trump is still likely to run on the Republican ticket, which will ensure that polarization remains elevated (Diagram 1). However, US elections hinge on structural factors, not individuals. Diagram 1GOP 2024 Is Up To Trump So far structural factors point to policy continuity: not only are Democrats still slated to retain the White House, but President Biden has coopted many of Trump’s key policies, including infrastructure, protectionism, and big budget deficits (Chart 17). If Democrats falter, Trump’s policies will be reaffirmed. The implication is that a new national policy consensus is taking shape beneath the surface. 3.   Limited “Big Government”: Americans have been turning away from “small government” and toward “big government” since the 1990s. Voters no longer worry so much about budget discipline and instead look for the “visible hand” of government to support the economy (Charts 18A & 18B). Both domestic populism and geopolitical challenges encourage this shift. Industrial policy and domestic manufacturing are making a comeback (Table 3). Table 3Strategic Theme #3: Limited “Big Government” With extremely robust fiscal policy, the US has avoided the policy mistake of the period after the Global Financial Crisis, when premature fiscal tightening undermined the economic recovery (Chart 19). Policy uncertainty will increase as gridlock returns to Congress and fiscal policy will be frozen. But investors need not fear a slide back into deflation. The Republican Party’s populist base may prevent more Democratic social spending but they will not be able to repeal what is done.  Chart 19Even With Looming Gridlock, The US Is Far From Tightening Fiscal Policy Too Soon This Time Three Key Views For 2022 The key views for the 12-month period are connected with the above but of a more short-term or cyclical duration: 1.   From Single-Party Rule To Gridlock: Republicans are highly likely to win back control of the House of Representatives and likely the Senate (Charts 20A & 20B). President Biden’s approval rating suggests that Democrats could lose 40 seats in the House (Chart 21) and three in the Senate (Chart 22), whereas they only need to lose five and one to lose control. Our quantitative Senate election model shows an even split but the model’s trend favors Republicans, as does the political cycle and partisan enthusiasm (Chart 23). 2.   From Legislative To Executive Power: Biden may still pass one more spending bill but otherwise the legislature will be frozen. Democrats will not succeed in ramming legislation through by abolishing the Senate filibuster. Biden will turn to executive decree, where he is already on track to make a historic increase in regulation, which will increase concerns among small business (Chart 24A & Chart 24B). Anti-trust laws are unlikely to be overhauled and Democrats will struggle to bring back the tough anti-trust posture of the 1900s-1950s without new legislation, meaning that Big Tech faces a bigger threat from inflation than regulation (Table 4). The green transition will continue but primarily in the form of any subsidies passed in the reconciliation bill, rather than new taxes or any carbon pricing scheme (Chart 25A & Chart 25B). Chart 24AKey View #2: From Legislative To Executive Power Table 4Key View #2: From Legislative To Executive Power Chart 25BGreen Energy: Subsidies But No Carbon Tax   3.   From Domestic To Foreign Policy Risks: Biden faces a slew of foreign policy and external risks that could damage the Democrats in the midterms. The surge in illegal immigration on the southern border is truly historic and will have significant policy ramifications over the long run (Chart 26A & Chart 26B). The surge in inflation will force Biden to contend with foreign policy challenges with one hand tied behind his back, since energy supply disruptions could derail his party ahead of the midterm election (Chart 27). While Biden could ease some inflationary pressure via reduced trade tariffs, protectionist impulses will prevail during an election year (Chart 28). Chart 26AKey View #3: External Risks For Biden Chart 26BKey View #3: External Risks For Biden Chart 27Foreign Policy Could Hit Prices At Pump Chart 28Tariff Relief In 2022? Don't Bet On It Investment Takeaways The stock market tends to be flat, with risks skewed to the downside, during midterm election years due to policy uncertainty. The same is true for bond yields (Chart 29). Chart 29Stocks And Bond Yields Trend Lower Before Midterms ... When united or single-party governments approach midterms, stocks tend to perform worse than for divided governments in midterm years, while bond yields tend to be a bit higher (Chart 30). This trend is supercharged in 2022 due to the inflationary effects of the pandemic. Chart 30... But United Govts See Higher Bond Yields And Weaker Stocks ... Assuming Republicans regain at least the House, the US will transition from united to divided government (gridlock). In previous such transitions, stocks tend to perform in line with the average for a midterm election year, but bond yields skew higher – reinforcing the previous point (Chart 31). Chart 31... Shift From United To Divided Govt Implies Higher Bond Yields Than Otherwise We will update our US Sector Political Risk Matrix to bring it better into line with our views, particularly in light of Table 5 below regarding sector relative performance during midterm election years. Normally defensives and growth stocks outperform in midterm years, Table 5ConDisc, Tech, Health Do Best During Midterms …But Waning Pandemic Makes An Exception while cyclicals and value stocks underperform, but 2022 looks to be different due to inflation. Still over the course of the year we would expect the historic trend to reassert itself. Investors should favor cyclicals even though they probably cannot outperform defensives for much longer (Chart 32A). We recommend health care stocks as a hedge given that the dollar should still be resilient this year, Fed hikes should moderate inflation expectations, and midterm policy uncertainty will eventually weigh on risk appetite (Chart 32B). Chart 32AFavor Cyclicals, Though They May Not Outperform Defensives Much Longer Chart 32BLong Health Care As Hedge Value stocks are forming a bottom relative to growth stocks, although this trend is less clear in the US, especially among US large caps, than it is abroad (Chart 33). We favor value over growth on a cyclical basis but midterm election uncertainties will pull the other way, making for a choppy bottom. Chart 33Favor Value And Small Caps, Though Bottom Formation Remains Choppy The same process is visible on a sector basis, where energy and materials continue to outperform tech (Chart 34A). We recommend staying long energy on a cyclical basis, though its outperformance against tech could abate later in 2022. Infrastructure stocks – such as building and construction materials – also continue to outperform. Since Biden’s honeymoon period ended, the outperformance is largely relative to tech rather than the S&P as a whole. We still favor infrastructure stocks as the fiscal policy theme will continue even beyond the current legislation, which will barely start to be implemented in 2022 (Chart 34B). Chart 34AFavor Energy, Materials, And Infrastructure Versus Tech Chart 34BFavor Energy, Materials, And Infrastructure Versus Tech   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Strategic View Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)

Highlights European economic activity will suffer in Q1 from both the Omicron wave and elevated natural gas prices. The Omicron wave will fade quickly and its impact on growth will be short lived. The biggest economic risk related to Omicron is inflation. Inflation is being caused by supply disruptions, a function of China’s zero-tolerance policy toward COVID. An ebbing of COVID will allow cyclicals to breakout relative to defensive equities in the second quarter. Buy banks / sell tech. For the remainder of the winter, European electricity will remain expensive because of elevated natural gas prices. This process creates a drag on growth and prevents the euro from recovering. European PMIs have not yet bottomed; however, they will do so in Q2. While French and UK economic activity has led Europe in recent months, Germany and the Netherlands are likely to continue to lag as the Omicron variant is only starting there. Italian and Spanish spreads have limited upside under these circumstances. Feature At the end of 2021, the European economy was hit by a spike in COVID-19 infections and another surge in natural gas prices. These shocks will continue to affect activity in the first few months of 2022. Understanding the evolution of these shocks will help investors find attractive entry points for the dominant trend that will play out for the remainder of the year. Omicron Spikes Chart 1Omicron Is Different COVID-19 cases are once again spiking across Europe because of the highly contagious Omicron variant. As Chart 1 shows, cases in the UK, France, Spain, and Italy have now eclipsed previous peaks. Cases in Germany and the Netherlands have declined recently, but this improvement reflects the ebbing Delta wave. These two countries are likely to follow the path of their European neighbors in relation to the Omicron variant. The Omicron wave will not have a lasting impact on European economic activity despite its frightening scale. Hospitalizations are rising, but they remain far from levels implied by the number of active cases in France, the UK, and Spain (Chart 1, third panel). Additionally, hospitalizations spans are shorter because the infection seems to be less virulent. Recent data out of France indicates that COVID-induced admissions in ICU are now around 18% with a median length of stay of three days, compared to roughly 30% and seven days in the previous waves. This more positive health outcome also reflects the benefit of elevated vaccination rates in the region. The evolution of the Omicron wave in South Africa also points toward a rapid turnaround of the COVID situation in Europe. Gauteng Province, where Omicron first became dominant, witnessed a sharp rise in new cases that declined less than four weeks after the outbreak began (Chart 1, bottom panel). The number of cases there thus seems to have reached its apex already. There are limited reasons to expect a different trajectory for the Omicron wave in Europe. This wave is also affecting individual behavior. Rules are now being developed to impose vaccinations on swath of the recalcitrant population in Italy and Austria, and the French president is openly defying anti-vaxxers by further limiting their daily lives. Vaccination rates are increasing and booster campaigns have rolled out successfully, as the UK illustrates. Finally, anti-viral drugs such as Pfizer Paxlovid will further limit the severity of infections of contaminated individuals. This background implies that the likelihood is low for long-lasting, severe lockdowns, such as those that prevailed in 2020 and in early 2021. As a result, the impact of the Omicron wave on economic activity and the labor market will be temporary and will wane before the end of Q1 2022. Chart 2Cyclicals Will Breakout... Eventually Financial markets have already adopted this view, as evidenced by European equities that rallied smartly through December—until the release of the Fed’s minutes last week spooked investors. We are inclined to agree with investors and look beyond the impact of COVID at the index level. Nonetheless, as long as the wave remains in place and economic activity bears its footprint, cyclicals will not break out relative to defensives (Chart 2). Omicron, however, is not without risks. China’s commitment to its zero-tolerance policy toward COVID-19 remains firmly in place, which may prove inflationary for the global economy. Entire cities such as Xi’an and Yuzhou have been pushed into lockdowns, and, if Omicron spreads further, more cities will suffer the same fate. If it is sufficiently widespread, then this process will produce global supply-chain bottlenecks again and renew pricing pressures, especially if it expands to Chinese port cities.  Investment Implications The first relevant market implication of a transitory Omicron shock is that, despite its violence and breadth, global markets will avoid a severe sell-off caused by plunging economic activity. As a corollary, cyclical stocks may continue to consolidate in the near-term against their defensive counterparts, but a breakout by the middle of 2022 remains highly likely. Chart 3Utilities Hate Ebbing Waves Tactical traders will also soon benefit from a short-term investment opportunity. Utilities have been outperforming in recent weeks as investors bid up defensive plays. However, the pattern of previous waves indicates that, as soon as this wave of cases peaks, utilities stocks will suffer a significant period of underperformance (Chart 3). Thus, short-term investors should sell European utilities once the seven days moving average of new cases peaks in the UK. Chart 4Banks To Outperform Tech The environment is also likely to remain favorable for banks relative to tech stocks in Europe. The recently released Fed minutes revealed that the FOMC has a strong hawkish bias and that the March meeting will be a live one. It also showed that, if Omicron proved to be inflationary because of its impact on supply chains, the Fed might be even more inclined to raise interest rates and cut its balance sheet size. Thus, a transitory Omicron shock to growth that is likely to have inflationary effects will contribute to higher yields. This will hurt tech stocks relative to banks, especially as European banks forward earnings are rising relative to the tech sector and their relative valuations are extremely favorable (Chart 4). Bottom Line: The number of COVID-19 cases in Europe is spiking rapidly, but we do not expect lengthy lockdowns to become the norm. As a result, the shock to growth caused by the Omicron variant will be ephemeral. Nonetheless, China’s health policy response points to some inflationary risks caused by supply bottlenecks. Investors should expect European markets to continue to take Omicron in stride and cyclicals to breakout later this year. Utilities are soon to be sold relative to the broad market and European banks will benefit at the expense of tech stocks. Natural Gas Remains The Euro’s Foe Chart 5Natural Gas Prices Are High And Volatile Dynamics in the European natural gas market remain a major risk for European economic activity and European currencies over the course of the first quarter of 2022. Natural gas prices on the Title Transfer Facility in the Netherlands spiked to a record close of EUR181/MWh on December 21, 2021, as tensions with Russia rose in Ukraine. Since then, Dutch natural gas prices—the continental European benchmark—have declined by 46% (Chart 5). The following combination of factors explains this sharp retrenchment: Europe, France, and Germany in particular have enjoyed exceptionally clement weather in recent days, stifling demand for heat and electricity. 11 LNG tankers from the US have been rerouted toward Europe, accounting for 800,000 tonnes of natural gas. Tensions between Russia and the West have eased somewhat. Despite this recent decline in the price of natural gas, it remains at elevated levels. BCA’s commodity and energy strategy team expects its volatility to stay high over the remaining winter months. First, Asia is not sitting on its hands as LNG shipments shift toward Europe. Instead, a bidding war is starting in order to attract liquefied gas to the East. Second, Europe’s winter is far from over, which means that demand-boosting cold fronts are still likely. Finally, Russia is sending gas back to its territory to fulfil its own domestic needs (and probably to continue to put pressure on European nations). Chart 6European Electricity Is Dear The continuation of elevated European natural gas prices and the potential for further upsides of volatility remain headwinds to European economic activity this winter, ones we deem comparable to Omicron. The main impact is via electricity prices. As Chart 6 highlights, they are still extremely high in France, Germany, and Spain. The continued surge in the price of CO2 emission quotas is increasing the pressure on electricity prices, as will the upcoming maintenance of many nuclear power plants in France. Gas consumption is contracting on a year-on-year basis in major European markets (Chart 7). This development indicates that elevated natural gas prices are already creating a supply shock to activity and sapping discretionary disposable income from households. The recent decline in European consumer confidence, despite strong employment numbers and growing net worth, confirms that households are feeling the pinch from elevated electricity and natural gas prices (Chart 8). Chart 8Consumers Feel The Pinch Chart 7Gap Consumption Is Slowing High natural gas and electricity prices also create further inflation risks for Europe. The recent spikes to 23.7% in PPI inflation and to 5% for headline CPI inflation show the effect of high-energy costs. Instead, a genuine threat would emerge if household inflation expectations followed energy prices, which could in turn trigger a wage-price spiral in Europe. We are not there yet, but the longer natural gas and electricity prices rise, the greater the likelihood of this scenario. Investment Implications The principal consequence of the strength of the European natural gas market is its euro-bearish impact. The tax on European growth is high, which delays the willingness of the ECB to remove monetary accommodation in a meaningful way. On the western shore of the Atlantic, the Fed is poised to pull the trigger soon and is now discussing a decrease in the size of its balance sheet, something the ECB is nowhere near ready to do. Consequently, although EUR/USD may be cheap and oversold on a cyclical basis, a turnaround is unlikely as long as electricity prices remain this elevated. Chart 9EUR/USD near An Existential Level Bottom Line: European natural gas prices may have come off their Christmas boil, but they remain elevated and will likely experience major bouts of upside volatility over the remainder of the winter. Hence, the drag on growth stemming from demanding electricity prices remains intact, which negatively affects consumer confidence. The euro cannot rally meaningfully until natural gas prices mean-revert, especially as the Fed ramps up its hawkishness. A re-test of EUR/USD long-term trendline around 1.10 is likely before the end of Q1 (Chart 9). The Evolution Of European PMIs European manufacturing activity remains below its June peak, but it has surprised many observers by how well it is withstanding the various shocks hitting the continent. Despite this encouraging behavior, it may take a few more months before the PMIs find a floor. The following three factors best explain why European manufacturing activity will decelerate further: The Chinese economic slowdown is not over. Credit growth is improving, but much of this comes from increasing purchases of banker’s acceptances by financial institutions, which does not in turn provide credit to the economy. Thus, European exports to China and EM will remain on the backfoot. The Omicron crisis remains intact and natural gas remains a drag, as previously discussed. Chart 10Manufacturing Deceleration Will End In Q2 The evolution of the Sentix Global Investor Survey and the ZEW survey, which are a very reliable forecaster of the Manufacturing PMI, points to more economic weakness in Q1 2022 (Chart 10). While these forces will hurt growth in the near term, they also suggest that this deceleration is long in the tooth and that activity will firm anew during the second quarter of the year. The gap between the expectation and current activity components of the Sentix Global Index Survey and the ZEW survey have already bottomed. Moreover, both Omicron and natural gas crises will ebb as winter passes. Finally, Chinese authorities will not let growth collapse and will likely generate a small pickup in activity after the Chinese New Year. Already, the PBoC has ramped up its liquidity injections and Premier Li Keqiang recently highlighted potential tax cuts and support for the corporate sector to help Q1 and Q2 domestic activity. Looking at European countries individually shows that current economic conditions are disparate and largely reflect the different impacts of both Omicron and natural gas prices. To judge economic conditions, we expand the Rotation Methodology introduced two months ago.1 Instead of analyzing financial assets, we examine manufacturing PMIs through this lens, looking at the evolution of the level and momentum of each country’s manufacturing PMIs compared to the overall European level. This approach reveals the following over the past six months (Chart 11): France experienced the greatest relative improvement, moving from a Lagging economy to the Leading economy in Europe. France benefits from limited lockdowns, from the large role of nuclear power in electricity generation, and from its diminished exposure to China’s slowdown compared to Germany. This economic performance explains why French equities have recently performed so much better than sectoral biases would have justified. The UK economy remains in the Leading quadrant despite the ferocity with which the Omicron wave has overtaken the nation. This paradox reflects the health policy chosen by Downing Street, emphasizing voluntary isolation and investing heavily in booster shots. Relative to that of the rest of Europe, Italy’s and Spain’s PMIs are still elevated, but they are losing momentum, which is pulling these two countries into the Weakening quadrant. The Netherlands suffered the greatest decrease in activity, dropping from the Leading quadrant to the Lagging one. The Netherlands is under a severe lockdown to combat the Delta wave. The situation is unlikely to improve meaningfully any time soon as the Omicron wave is starting there. Germany is trying to stage a recovery, moving from the Lagging quadrant into the Improving one. However, we worry that this will not work out and that Germany will shift back into the Lagging quadrant as the government prepares to crackdown further on COVID because the Omicron variant is starting to hit the country. Investment Implications Chart 12Peripheral Spreads To Stay Contained The continuation of the weakness observed in Germany and the Netherlands will force the ECB to remain more dovish than implied by the inflation rate. As a result, Spanish and Italian bond spreads are unlikely to move anywhere close to the levels recorded in the spring of 2020 (Chart 12), especially as their respective economies outperform those of Germany and the Netherlands.   Mathieu Savary, Chief European Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1     The “Leading” (“Lagging”) quadrant denotes countries with PMIs performing better (worse) than the benchmark, the European manufacturing PMI, with strengthening (weakening) momentum. The “Improving” (“Weakening”) quadrant denotes countries with PMIs that are performing worse (better) than the benchmark, with strengthening (weakening) momentum. Tactical Recommendations Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Trades Currency Performance Fixed Income Performance Equity Performance

Highlights Global equities are poised to deliver mid-to-high single-digit returns this year, with the outlook turning bleaker in 2023 and beyond. Non-US markets are likely to outperform. We examine the four pillars that have historically underpinned stock market performance. Pillar 1: Technically, the outlook for equities is modestly bullish, as investor sentiment is nowhere near as optimistic as it usually gets near market tops. Pillar 2: The outlook for economic growth and corporate earnings is modestly bullish as well. While global growth is slowing, it will remain solidly above trend in 2022. Pillar 3: Monetary and financial conditions are neutral. The Fed and a number of other central banks are set to raise rates and begin unwinding asset purchases this year. However, monetary policy will remain highly accommodative well into 2023. Pillar 4: Valuations are bearish in the US and neutral elsewhere. Investors should avoid tech stocks in 2022, focusing instead on banks and deep cyclicals, which are more attractively priced. The Bedrock For Equities In assessing the outlook for the stock market, our research has focused on four pillars: 1) Sentiment and other technical factors, which are most pertinent for stocks over short-term horizons of about three months; 2) cyclical fluctuations in economic growth and corporate earnings, which tend to dictate the path for stocks over medium-term horizons of about 12 months; 3) monetary and financial conditions, which are also most relevant over medium-term horizons; and finally 4) valuations, which tend to drive stocks over the long run. In this report, we examine all four pillars, concluding that global equities are likely to deliver mid-to-high single-digit returns this year, with the outlook turning bleaker in 2023 and beyond. Pillar 1: Sentiment And Other Technical Factors (Modestly Bullish)   Chart 1US Equities: Breadth Is A Concern Scaling The Wall Of Worry Stocks started the year on a high note, before tumbling on Wednesday following the release of the Fed minutes. Market breadth going into the year was quite poor. Even as the S&P 500 hit a record high on Tuesday, only 57% of NYSE stocks and 38% of NASDAQ stocks were trading above their 200-day moving averages compared to over 90% at the start of 2021 (Chart 1). The US stock market had become increasingly supported by a handful of mega-cap tech stocks, a potentially dangerous situation in an environment where bond yields are rising and stay-at-home restrictions are apt to ease (more on this later). That said, market tops often occur when sentiment reaches euphoric levels. That was not the case going into 2022 and it is certainly not the case after this week's sell-off. The number of bears exceeded the number of bulls in the AAII survey this week and in six of the past seven weeks (Chart 2). The share of financial advisors registering a bullish bias declined by 25 percentage points over the course of 2021 in the Investors Intelligence poll. Option pricing is far from complacent. The VIX stands at 19.6, above its post-GFC median of 16.7.  According to the Minneapolis Fed’s market-based probabilities model, the market was discounting a slightly negative 12-month return for the S&P 500 as of end-2021, with a 3.6 percentage-point larger chance of a 20% decline in the index than a 20% increase (Chart 3). Chart 3Option Pricing Is Not Pointing To Elevated Complacency Chart 2Sentiment Is Not Exceptionally Bullish, Despite The S&P 500 Trading Close To All-Time Highs Equities do best when sentiment is bearish but improving (Chart 4). With bulls in short supply, stocks can continue to climb the proverbial wall of worry.   Whither The January Effect? Historically, stocks have fared better between October and April than between May and September (Chart 5). One caveat is that the January effect, which often saw stocks rally at the start of the year, has disappeared. In fact, the S&P 500 has fallen in January by an average annualized rate of 5.2% since 2000 (Table 1). Other less well-known calendar effects – such as the tendency for stocks to underperform on Mondays but outperform on the first trading day of each month – have persisted, however. Table 1Calendar Effects Bottom Line: January trading may be choppy, but stocks should rise over the next few months as more bears join the bullish camp. Last year’s losers are likely to outperform last year’s winners. Pillar 2: Economic Growth And Corporate Earnings (Modestly Bullish)   Economic Growth And Earnings: Joined At The Hip The business cycle is the most important driver of stocks over medium-term horizons of about 12 months. The reason is evident in Chart 6: Corporate earnings tend to track key business cycle indicators such as the ISM manufacturing index, industrial production, business sales, and global trade. Chart 6The Business Cycle Is The Most Important Driver Of Stocks Over Medium-Term Horizons Chart 7PMIs Signaling Above-Trend Growth Global growth peaked in 2021 but should stay solidly above trend in 2022. Both the service and manufacturing PMIs remain in expansionary territory (Chart 7). The forward-looking new orders component of the ISM exceeded 60 for the second straight month in December. The Bloomberg consensus is for real GDP to rise by 3.9% in the G7 in 2022, well above the OECD’s estimate of trend G7 growth of 1.4% (Chart 8). Global earnings are expected to increase by 7.1%, rising 7.5% in the US and 6.7% abroad (Chart 9). Our sense is that both economic growth and earnings will surprise to the upside in 2022. Chart 9Analysts Expect Single-Digit Earnings Growth Plenty Of Pent-Up Demand For Both Consumer And Capital Goods US households are sitting on $2.3 trillion in excess savings (Chart 10). Around half of these savings will be spent over the next few years, helping to drive demand. Households in the other major advanced economies have also buttressed their balance sheets. Chart 10Plenty Of Pent-Up Demand After two decades of subdued corporate investment, capital goods orders have soared. This bodes well for capex in 2022. Inventories remain at rock-bottom levels, which implies that output will need to exceed spending for the foreseeable future (Chart 11). On the residential housing side, both the US homeowner vacancy rate and the inventory of homes for sale are near multi-decade lows. Building permits are 11% above pre-pandemic levels (Chart 12). Chart 11Business Investment Should Be Strong In 2022 Chart 12Residential Construction Will Remain Well Supported Chart 13China's Credit Impulse Has Bottomed Chinese Growth To Rebound, Europe To Benefit From Lower Natural Gas Prices Chinese credit growth decelerated last year. However, the 6-month credit impulse has bottomed, and the 12-month impulse is sure to follow (Chart 13). Chinese coal prices have collapsed following the government’s decision to instruct 170 mines to expand capacity (Chart 14). China generates 63% of its electricity from coal. Lower energy prices and increased stimulus should support Chinese industrial activity in 2022. Like China, Europe will benefit from lower energy costs. Natural gas prices have fallen by nearly 50% from their peak on December 21st. A shrinking energy bill will support the euro (Chart 15). Chart 14Coal Prices Are Renormalizing In China Chart 15A Shrinking Energy Bill Will Support The Euro Omicron Or Omicold? While the Omicron wave has led to an unprecedented spike in new cases across many countries, the economic fallout will be limited. The new variant is more contagious but significantly less lethal than previous ones. In South Africa, it blew through the population without triggering a major increase in mortality (Chart 16). Preliminary data suggest that exposure to Omicron confers at least partial immunity against Delta. The general tendency is for viral strains to become less lethal over time. After all, a virus that kills its host also kills itself. Given that Omicron is crowding out more dangerous strains such as Delta, any future variant is likely to emanate from Omicron; and odds are this new variant will be even milder than Omicron. Meanwhile, new antiviral drugs are starting to hit the market. Pfizer claims that its new drug, Paxlovid, cuts the risk of hospitalization by almost 90% if taken within five days from the onset of symptoms. Bottom Line: While global growth has peaked and the pandemic remains a risk, growth should stay well above trend in the major economies in 2022, fueling further gains in corporate earnings and equity prices.   Pillar 3: Monetary And Financial Factors (Neutral)   Chart 17The Overall Stance Of Monetary Policy Will Not Return To Pre-Pandemic Levels For At Least Another 12 Months Tighter But Not Tight Monetary and financial factors help govern the direction of equity prices both because they influence economic growth and also because they affect the earnings multiple at which stocks trade. There is little doubt that a number of central banks, including the Federal Reserve, are looking to dial back monetary stimulus. However, there is a big difference between tighter monetary policy and tight policy. Even if the FOMC were to raise rates three times in 2022, as the market is currently discounting, the fed funds rate would still be half of what it was on the eve of the pandemic (Chart 17). Likewise, even if the Fed were to allow maturing assets to run off in the middle of this year, as the minutes of the December FOMC meeting suggest is likely, the size of the Fed’s balance sheet will probably not return to pre-pandemic levels until the second half of this decade.   A Higher Neutral Rate We have argued in the past that the neutral rate of interest in the US is higher than widely believed. This implies that the overall stance of monetary policy remains exceptionally stimulative. Historically, stocks have shrugged off rising bond yields, as long as yields did not increase to prohibitively high levels (Table 2). Table 2As Long As Bond Yields Don’t Rise Into Restrictive Territory, Stocks Will Recover If the neutral rate ends up being higher than the Fed supposes, the danger is that monetary policy will stay too loose for too long. The question is one of timing. The good news is that inflation should recede in the US in 2022, as supply-chain bottlenecks ease and spending shifts back from goods to services. The bad news is that the respite from inflation will not last. As discussed in Section II of our recently-published 2022 Strategy Outlook, inflation will resume its upward trajectory in mid-2023 on the back of a tightening labor market and a budding price-wage spiral. This second inflationary wave could force the Fed to turn much more aggressive, spelling the end of the equity bull market. Bottom Line: While the Fed is gearing up to raise rates and trim the size of its balance sheet, monetary policy in the US and in other major economies will remain highly accommodative in 2022. US policy could turn more restrictive in 2023 as a second wave of inflation forces a more aggressive response from the Fed.   Pillar 4: Valuations (Bearish In The US; Neutral Elsewhere)   US Stocks Are Looking Pricey… While valuations are a poor timing tool in the short run, they are an excellent forecaster of stock prices in the long run. Chart 18 shows that the Shiller PE ratio has reliably predicted the 10-year return on equities. Today, the Shiller PE is consistent with total real returns of close to zero over the next decade. Investors’ allocation to stocks has also predicted the direction of equity prices (Chart 19). According to the Federal Reserve, US households held a record high 41% of their financial assets in equities as of the third quarter of 2021. If history is any guide, this would also correspond to near-zero long-term returns on stocks. Chart 19Valuations Matter For Long-Term Returns (II)   … But There Is More Value Abroad Valuations outside the US are more reasonable. Whereas US stocks trade at a Shiller PE ratio of 37, non-US stocks trade at 20-times their 10-year average earnings. Other valuation measures such as price-to-book, price-to-sales, and dividend yield tell a similar story (Chart 20). Chart 20AUS Stocks Are Trading At A Significant Premium To Their Non-US Peers (I) Chart 20BUS Stocks Are Trading At A Significant Premium To Their Non-US Peers (II) Cyclicals And Banks Overrepresented Abroad Our preferred sector skew for 2022 favors non-US equities. Increased capital spending in developed economies and incremental Chinese stimulus should boost industrial stocks and other deep cyclicals, which are overrepresented outside the US (Table 3). Banks are also heavily weighted in overseas markets; they should also do well in response to faster-than-expected growth and rising bond yields (Chart 21). Table 3Deep Cyclicals And Financials Are Overrepresented Outside The US Chart 21Rising Bond Yields Will Help Bank Shares Bottom Line: Valuations are more appealing outside the US, and with deep cyclicals and banks set to outperform tech over the coming months, overseas markets are the place to be in 2022. Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores

Highlights Industrial commodity and ag markets will continue to pull widely followed inflation gauges higher, as global fuel and fertilizer prices remain well bid (Chart of the Week). Unplanned production outages in Libya, faltering supply growth within OPEC 2.0 and a bullish read-through on demand in the wake of relatively mild public-health effects due to the omicron variant will keep oil prices well supported over the short term. Base metals prices will be pulled higher by the ongoing energy crises in Europe and China, which are forcing refiners to shutter capacity as fuels are re-directed to human needs. This is compounded by lockdowns in China – home to ~ 50% of global refining capacity – due to its zero-tolerance COVID-19 policy. These energy crises also are pulling grains higher, as farmers deal with soaring fertilizer costs – driven by soaring natgas prices – this year. Longer term – 2024 and beyond – industrial-commodity production will be concentrated in the hands of a few large producers. More explicit carbon pricing and ESG-induced cost increases will have to be recovered in higher wholesale prices for oil and metals. Grains will remain subject to volatile input costs, and erratic weather. We continue to favor broad-based exposure to commodities vis the S&P GSCI and the COMT ETF. Feature Fundamental supply-demand conditions in commodity markets – largely out of the control of fiscal- and monetary-policymakers – will continue to pull inflation gauges higher this year and for the rest of the 2020s. Oil markets are tight and getting tighter, owing to a dearth of capex since the price collapse triggered by OPEC's market-share war in 2014 (Chart 2). The same is true for base metals, where capex also has languished.1 Chart of the WeekCommodities Continue To Contribute To Global Inflationary Pressures Ag markets are confronting massive cost increases brought about by natgas shortages that first surfaced in 2021 and will continue to dog European and Asian fertilizer markets this year (Chart 3). These tight conditions leave markets vulnerable to unexpected supply and demand shocks, no matter how short-lived they might be. This is easily seen in oil markets: A force majeure declaration by Libya's national oil company following unplanned production shutdowns and pipeline maintenance pulled output below 800k b/d, or 30% lower than November 2021 levels, and almost completely neutralized a supply increase agreed by OPEC 2.0 earlier this week. Combined with what appears to be a relatively sanguine read-through on the impact of surging omicron infections in major consuming markets, these developments took prompt Brent back above $80/bbl.2 Chart 3Tight Natgas Markets Drive Fertilizer/Grain Prices Higher Oil Price Strength Will Persist Longer term – 2024 and beyond – OPEC 2.0's capacity to increase oil supply will be concentrated in the hands of a few large producers, while US shale-oil producers will face tougher ESG hurdles, which will raise their costs. More explicit carbon pricing also will raise costs. These cost increases will have to be recovered in higher prices. OPEC 2.0’s raison d'être at its inception in 2016 was to regain control over the level of global oil inventories. It has been remarkably successful in this endeavour, despite massive geopolitical uncertainty and a global pandemic (Chart 4). We do not expect any course changes over the coming years. What will change, however, are the fortunes of states in this coalition capable of increasing supply as global demand increases. At present, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia are the putative leaders of OPEC 2.0, and are two of the five states that can increase production at present (Iraq, the UAE and Kuwait also are in that group). By the end of this decade, the leadership of the coalition could come down to KSA and the UAE. While not certain, the US EIA expects Russia's output to level off and then gradually decline over the course of this decade. (Chart 5).3 Russia will remain a significant producer in the coalition, but it likely will be managing declining output as opposed to fighting for higher market share. Chart 4OPEC 2.0s Strategy Works Producers outside the OPEC 2.0 coalition – i.e., the price-taking cohort – have gone to great lengths to improve the attractiveness of their equity, and to maintain access to debt markets to fund their growth. These goals will not support any effort to increase production at the risk of reducing ROEs, as this would set efforts to regain investors' and lenders' favor back years. Going forward, capital markets, climate activists in board rooms and courtrooms, and an increasing load of ESG-related measures – most not yet even defined – will become central to the price-taking cohort's operations and returns. These will impose additional costs on the production of hydrocarbons, with explicit carbon pricing only one of many costs that will have to be recovered in higher prices. Base Metals Again Hit By Gas Shortages Shortages of natural gas continue to plague Europe: According to Gazprom, the Russian state-owned gas company, the continent has withdrawn more than 45% of total gas injected into storage this year, with peak winter in the Northern Hemisphere still to come.4 Just over 20% of power generation in Europe is gas-fired, which means tight gas markets drive gas prices and power prices higher. This power crunch is hitting the continent’s supply of refined aluminum and zinc particularly hard, which means global supplies also are being hit hard. Europe is responsible for ~ 12.5% and ~ 18% of global primary aluminum and zinc slab production, respectively. Low inventories at the start of winter, and cold weather is forcing European natgas to be directed to human needs at the expense of power generation. This has resulted in shutdowns of aluminum smelters in Europe – e.g., Aluminium Dunkerque Industries France was forced to curb production in the second half of December. Around the same time, Trafigura’s Nyrstar – which has the capacity to produce ~ 5.2% of global refined zinc – also announced plans to shut its zinc operations in France beginning January, citing high power prices. While power rationing has helped stabilize an earlier crisis in the world’s largest refined copper, aluminum, and zinc producer, the odds China’s power crisis will worsen has increased, following Indonesia's coal export ban in January to preserve the fuel for domestic energy security. China’s plans to curb air pollution ahead of the Winter Olympics next month will also dampen refining activity. Base metals also are contending with a new fundamental supply risk: Political uncertainty in the critically important producing states of Chile and Peru, the world’s largest producers of the red metal. Gabriel Boric, the new Chilean president, supports higher taxes on copper mining firms, as does his Peruvian counterpart Pedro Castillo. Boric’s election also signals more scrutiny on ore miners’ environmental practices – putting additional ESG-induced costs into wholesale copper prices. The uncertainty surrounding Peru’s constitutional rewrite, with the possibility for a change in mining rules to favor wealth redistribution and the environment will deter mining investments, according to Diego Hernandez, head of Sonami, the Chilean mining society. In Peru, the motion to and failure to impeach Castillo last month will increase political uncertainty, potentially reducing investors’ faith in the country’s mining sector. All of this has a chilling effect on investment in markets that are starved for capex.5 The lack of stable supply and low inventories have caused major price surges over the last year for industrial metals (Chart 6). We expect prices to rise and maintain higher levels over the course of this decade. Base metals production likely will fall short of demand as the world undertakes the green energy transition. Chart 6Copper Inventories Drawing Hard Investment Implications Industrial commodity markets are tightening over the short term and are on course to tighten further as the current decade progresses. This will raise the cost of the energy transition, as higher prices will be required to spur new supply investments in base metals, which are the sine qua non for this transition. This also will spur additional investment in oil and natgas supply, since these already have the infrastructure in place to move supply to market in order to meet the rising demand for energy we expect going forward. We will be exploring these themes throughout the year, particularly the implications for policy around the development of carbon-capture technologies – especially in natgas markets – and nuclear power, both of which may be the most "shovel ready" sources of incremental energy supply this decade.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish European natgas prices are once again rallying as inventories continue to be drawn down hard due to cold weather, reduced gas supplies from Russia, and higher demand generally (Chart 7). By the end of 2021, European natgas inventories were 57% full, vs the seasonal norm of 72%. At the end of December, close to 50 LNG tankers from the US were sailing to European destinations. As 2022 opens, the European TTF price for natural gas rose 30% to €94/MWh off their recent lows. Cargoes now will be bid in Asia, particularly in China, due to a halt in coal exports during January from Indonesia announced by the government at year end. China had replaced Australian coal imports with Indonesian-sourced material last year. Base Metals: Bullish MMG Ltd’s Las Bambas mine in Apurímac, Peru will restart operations after suspending production in late December. The mine's owner enacted the suspension following a month-long blockade at one of its key roads by the Chumbivilcas community. Prime Minister, Mirtha Vasquez travelled to the region to ensure the conflicting parties reached an agreement.  Las Bambas mine makes up ~2% of global mined copper supply and its tax payments are a significant source of government revenue. While an agreement was reached to lift the blockade, it did not address the Chumbivilcas’ primary concerns. The community wants the mine to employ more locals and provide higher cash contributions to support local infrastructure. This elevates the likelihood of further blockades and supply disruptions this year. Since it commenced operations in 2016, the Las Bambas mine has dealt with blockades over key roads on and off for over 400 days.  Ags/Softs:Neutral Global fertilizer markets will remain tight as natgas prices resume their rally and drive input costs higher. This will contribute to rising food price inflation and may result in global food shortages in 2022. High fertilizer prices might encourage farmers to delay planting this year, in the hope prices will fall. This risks increasing price volatility if too many farmers wait too long to apply fertilizers for their spring crops. Footnotes 1     Please see our most recent update on these factors in 2022 Key Views: Past As Prelude For Commodities, which we published on December 16, 2021. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2     Please see Libyan crude output falls below 800,000 b/d published by argusmedia.com on January 4, 2022, and Oil futures: Prices steady after OPEC+ hike, Brent close to $80/b published by qcintel.com on January 5, 2022. 3    In its December 2021 assessment of Russia's oil-production potential, the US EIA noted: "… declining output from Russia’s more mature fields (primarily in Western Siberia, Russia’s largest oil producing region) may offset the production growth coming from greenfield development, which may result in Russia’s crude oil production declining by the end of the 2020s decade. In addition to greenfield development, companies are increasing drilling at some existing mature oil fields and are tying in smaller fields to existing infrastructure at larger fields to help increase recovery rates and mitigate some of the production decline. However, brownfield development efforts in Russia are unlikely to reverse the decline in production in the longer term." Please see Country Analysis Executive Summary: Russia, published by the EIA on December 13, 2021. 4    Please refer to Hoping for cheaper gas to come, Europe reverses Russian link to tap storage, published by Reuters on December 30, 2021. 5    Please see Add Local Politics To Copper Supply Risks, which we published on November 25, 2021 for additional discussion   Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Trades Closed in 2021

Highlights For the time being, US core inflation will not drop anywhere close to the Fed’s target range. The Fed will continue tightening until something breaks. US bond yields and the US dollar are heading higher. The S&P500 will need to drop meaningfully for the Fed to stop tightening. The Fed’s tightening and the US dollar’s persistent strength amid the lack of recovery in the Chinese business cycle will eventually produce a drawdown in commodity prices in the coming months. Absolute-return investors should stay defensive on EM risk assets and asset allocators should continue to underweight EM versus DM in global equity and credit portfolios. Feature We are starting the year with a review of a few macro pillars of our view that will shape global financial markets in the coming months. US Core Inflation Will Prove Sticky… Chart 1Average Of All Core US Inflation Measures The average of seven various US core inflation measures – core CPI, core PCE, trimmed-mean CPI, median CPI, sticky core CPI, trimmed-mean PCE and market-based core PCE – has surged to 4% (Chart 1). Although the core inflation rate could decline in 2022 as supply bottlenecks ease and base effects become more favorable, it is unlikely to drop below 3%. Instead, it will remain well above the Fed’s inflation target. If the Fed adheres to its mandate, it will have to hike rates until inflation heads toward 2%. US core inflation will not drop toward 2% unless the economy slows materially. Consumer and business inflation expectations have risen substantially. US consumer inflation expectations for one and three years ahead have risen to 4-6%, and US non-farm businesses have been able to raise prices by 4.5% y/y in Q3 (Chart 2). We can say the genie – inflation and inflation expectations – is out of bottle and it will be hard to put it back in. Importantly, labor market shortages will persist, and employee wage demand will be strong. Employees’ current wage growth expectations are based on their inflation expectations in the next one to three years, not the next decade. Even though longer term inflation expectations remain somewhat muted, they will not prevent high wage growth. Critically, inflation has “eaten” into employee income: real wage growth – adjusted for headline consumer price inflation – has been negative in 2021 (Chart 3). Consistently, employees know their compensation has lagged inflation and will be demanding significant wage hikes in 2022. Chart 3Inflation Is "Eating" Into Wages In The US Chart 2US Inflation Expectations Have Risen Sharply   In short, a wage-price spiral of moderate proportions is unfolding. Given tight labor market conditions, businesses will have no choice but raise wages considerably and then try to pass the higher costs on to their consumers. … Prompting Higher US Bond Yields … Despite the surge in core inflation to a 30-plus year high, US bond yields have remained low. The long end of the US yield curve has continued to be suppressed even as the market participants raised their rate hike expectations. Not only has the expected terminal Fed funds target rate not risen much, but also the bond term premium has remained negative. The bond term premium is akin to the equity risk premium. Pronounced uncertainty about the US inflation outlook as well as elevated bond volatility warrant a higher bond term premium (Chart 4). … Which Will Push The US Dollar Higher… Rising US interest rate expectations will lead to a stronger greenback. Our US Dollar Liquidity Indicator points to continued firmness in the broad trade-weighted US dollar ( the latter is shown inverted in this chart) (Chart 5). Chart 5US Dollar Liquidity And The US Dollar Chart 4Inflation Uncertainty And High Bond Volitility Herald A Higher Term Premium   Our framework for the relationship between currencies and their interest rates is as follows: Scenario 1: When inflation is high or rising fast, the central bank is willing to hike rates and the economy can withstand higher borrowing costs, the currency will appreciate. Scenario 2: When inflation is high or rising fast and the central bank is unwilling to hike rates, the currency will depreciate. This is the case when the central bank falls behind the curve. Scenario 3: When the central bank is tightening but the economy cannot handle higher borrowing costs, the currency will depreciate. The US economy is presently able to handle higher interest rates. Hence, the US dollar is currently driven by the dynamics described in Scenario 1, i.e., rising interest rates will support the greenback. Chart 6US Household Finances Are Healthy Our rationale is that US interest rate sensitive sectors like housing and car sales have been restrained by supply shortages – not weak demand. In fact, there is large pent-up demand for both housing and autos and a reasonable rise in borrowing costs will not thwart this demand. Besides, US household debt and debt servicing costs have declined substantially in the past 10 years (Chart 6). US households are no longer highly indebted. This development – along with robust wage gains – will allow households to borrow more and service their debt. Finally, unlike in many other Anglo-Saxon countries, in the US it is long-term rates – rather than short ones – that matter for household debt servicing. Mortgages make up 70% of household debt in the US and the mortgage rate is tied to the 30-year bond yield. In many other advanced and emerging economies, mortgage rates are more influenced by the central bank policy rate than long-term bond yields. As a result, the US economy will be able to endure monetary tightening by the Fed better than other developed and emerging economies can handle rate hikes from their central banks. Specifically, mainstream EM economies (EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan) will slow markedly as and if their central banks hike rates further (Chart 7). There is, however, a caveat: Even though Main Street America will be able to withstand a reasonable amount of rate hikes, Wall Street might not be able ride out these rate hikes. The difference is the starting point – US equity valuations are very high. … And Will Herald A US Equity Correction And Sector Rotation The spike in US core inflation is likely to engender a negative correlation between US share prices and bond yields, as was the case in 1966. We first made this argument in last year’s Special Report titled A Paradigm Shift In The Stock-Bond Relationship (Chart 8). Chart 7Mainstream EM: Monetary Tightening Will Dampen Growth Chart 8S&P500 And Bond Yields Correlation Will Turn Negative   The current episode in the US is akin to the second half of the 1960s when US core inflation and bond yields rose after decades of lingering at very low levels. Starting in 1966, US share prices became negatively correlated with US Treasury yields (Chart 9 – bond yields are shown inverted). Going forward, the S&P 500 will often take its cue from US bond yields: stocks will rally when bond yields decline, and tumble when bond yields rise. Given that we expect US Treasury yields to rise in the coming months (10-year yields will move well above 2%), the S&P 500 is likely to correct. The key risk to this view is the massive amount of cash on the sidelines, and widespread investor willingness to buy any dip in US equities. The absolute level of US retail money market funds currently stands at a formidable $1 trillion (Chart 10, top panel). However, this just represents a mere 2% of the US equity market cap (Chart 10, bottom panel). Hence, if institutional investors begin selling stocks, retail investors might not be able to support the market. Chart 9Early 2020s = Late 1960s? Chart 10Cash on Sidelines: A Lot Or Not So Much? Chart 11EM Relative Equity Performance Is Correlated With The USD, Not Bond Yields Furthermore, rising US bond yields will cause US value stocks to outperform US growth stocks. Will EM stocks outperform US or DM ones as US bond yields rise? The top panel of Chart 11 illustrates that there has been no stable correlation between US bond yields and EM versus DM relative equity performance. Yet, there is a strong relationship between EM relative equity performance and the US dollar (Chart 11, bottom panel). If the broad trade-weighted US dollar rallies, EM stocks will underperform their DM counterparts (the greenback is shown inverted in the bottom panel of Chart 11). A sell-off in US stocks and bonds and the greenback’s rally will tighten US financial conditions considerably. The Fed is putting a lot of weight on financial conditions, especially when they are becoming restrictive. As US financial conditions tighten, the Fed will likely pivot, i.e., soften its hawkish stance. The Fed would likely argue that tight financial conditions will slow growth, which will in turn bring down inflation. Such a Fed pivot will potentially mark the end of a US dollar rally, enable American share prices to rise again, and EM stocks to start outperforming. However, we are not there yet. Bottom Line: For the time being, US core inflation will not drop anywhere close to the Fed’s target range. Hence, the Fed will continue tightening until something breaks. It will take a meaningful drop in the S&P500 (~20%) to make the Fed stop tightening. Commodity Prices Commodity prices have been caught between two opposing forces: US inflation and China’s slowdown. Worries about US inflation have made investors buy inflation hedges, and commodities are traditionally viewed as an inflation hedge. Yet, there is a caveat: Inflation is proliferating in the US but not in China. On the contrary, Chinese imports of key commodities contracted dramatically in H2 2021 (Chart 12). We are surprised that commodity prices have been so resilient despite shrinking Chinese commodity imports. Our sense is that commodity prices have been held up by two forces: strong global manufacturing activity and financial demand from investors. As for the green revolution, we believe it will be a major bullish force for select commodities in a couple of years. At the moment, however, it is not large enough to offset the slowdown in the Chinese economy. It might take investor concerns about US demand and/or a slowdown in global manufacturing to trigger a relapse in commodity prices. Rising US interest rates and a continued dollar rally will eventually result in a meaningful drawdown in commodity prices. Chart 13 demonstrates that the declines in the Swedish manufacturing PMI new orders-to-inventory ratio and the Swedish krona/Swiss franc cross rate point to downside risks in raw materials prices. Chart 12Chinese Imports Of Key Commodities Have Shrunk Chart 13A Red Flag For Commodities From Industrial Sweden   Bottom Line: Commodity prices have so far ignored China’s slowdown. However, the Fed’s tightening and the US dollar’s persistent strength amid the lack of recovery in the Chinese business cycle will eventually produce a drawdown in resource prices in the coming months. Investment Strategy For EM Chart 14EM Equities: No Profit Growth, No Bull Market EM share prices have been falling in absolute terms despite the strength in the S&P 500. The EM equity index will drop further due to the dismal EM profit outlook and the continued de-rating of Chinese TMT stocks. In absolute terms, the EM equity index is at the same level as it was in 2011 because EM EPS in USD has not expanded at all since 2011 (Chart 14). Investors are reluctant to pay high multiples for EM companies because they have produced zero earnings growth over the past 10 years. Besides, higher US bond yields and continued strength in the US dollar will lead to higher EM sovereign and corporate bond yields. EM non-TMT share prices typically wobble when EM US dollar borrowing costs rise (Chart 15). Chart 15Rising EM USD Borrowing Costs Are Bearish For EM Non-TMT Stocks We continue to recommend underweighting EM in a global equity portfolio. EM always underperforms DM when the greenback rallies. We maintain our short positions in a basket of EM currencies versus the US dollar. Rising US bond yields and a firm greenback will continue weighing on EM fixed income markets – both local currency and US dollar ones. Fixed-income investors should favor US corporate credit over EM corporate and sovereign credit, quality adjusted. In local rates, we are betting on yield curve inversion in Russia and Mexico, receiving rates in China and Malaysia and paying rates in the Czech Republic. For the full list of our fixed-income, currency and equity recommendations, please refer to the tables below. These are also available on our website. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Bank Credit Analyst

As 2021 draws to a close, we thank you for your ongoing readership and support. We wish you and your loved ones a happy holiday season and all the best for a healthy and prosperous 2022. Highlights Over the coming three months, the odds are high that the Omicron variant of COVID-19 will disrupt economic activity in advanced economies, but the magnitude of the disruption will be heavily determined by the variant’s capacity to produce severe illness. For now, we remain of the view that the pandemic will recede in importance over the course of the next year. Relative to the assessment that we published in our 2022 Outlook report, the Omicron variant of COVID-19 has modestly raised the odds of a stagflationary outcome next year. Our base case view of above-trend growth and above-target inflation remains the most likely scenario for 2022. We do not think that the actual risk of a recession has risen significantly since we published our annual outlook, but we can envision a scenario in which Fed tightening causes investors to become fearful of a recession. The true risk of a monetary policy-induced recession over the coming 12-18 months will only rise if long-dated inflation expectations break above the range that prevailed prior to the Global Financial Crisis. Beyond 2022, the main risk to financial markets is that investors raise their longer-term interest rate expectations closer to the trend rate of economic growth. This would not be bad news for real economic activity, but it would imply meaningfully lower prices for financial assets that have benefited from low interest rates. We continue to advise that investors position themselves in line with the investment recommendations that we presented in our Outlook report. Over the coming year, investors should watch for the following when deciding whether to reduce exposure to risky assets: a breakout in long-dated inflation expectations, a significant flattening in the yield curve, or a rise in 5-year, 5-year forward US Treasury yields above 2.5%. Feature Our recently published 2022 Outlook report laid out the main macroeconomic themes that we see driving markets next year, as well as our cyclical investment recommendations.1 In this month’s report, we discuss the most relevant risks to our base case view in more depth, and update our fixed-income view in the wake of the December FOMC meeting. The Near-Term Risks Chart I-1DM Policymakers Are Afraid That Omicron Will Overwhelm The Medical System Over the coming 0-3 months, the greatest risks to economic growth stem from the likely impact of the Omicron variant of COVID-19 on the medical system and the evolution of Europe’s energy crisis. News about the Omicron variant emerged just a few days prior to the publication of our annual outlook, and considerable uncertainty remains about its impact. Some early evidence suggests that the variant causes less severe disease, with a recent press release from South Africa’s largest private health insurance administrator suggesting that the risk of hospital admission was 29 percent lower for adults with the Omicron variant after adjusting for age, sex, underlying health conditions, and vaccine status. More recent studies from South Africa have suggested a much larger reduction in the severity of disease,2 but it is not yet clear whether these findings are applicable to advanced economies,given South Africa’s more recent vaccination campaign and higher proportion of a previously infected population. If Omicron turns out to result in 30 percent less hospitalizations, that only reduces the net impact on the medical system if the Omicron variant is no more than 1.5x as transmissible as the Delta variant. The sheer speed at which Omicron is spreading suggests it is far more contagious than this, the result in part to its ability to evade two-dose immunity. The potential for Omicron to quickly overwhelm available health system resources has alarmed authorities in several advanced economies, especially given that cases and hospitalizations have already trended higher in several countries even while Delta remained the dominant variant (Chart I-1). Additional restrictions on economic activity in the DM world appear to be likely over the coming weeks, and may be in effect until booster doses have been fully administered and/or Pfizer’s drug Paxlovid becomes widely available. For Europe, a worsening of the COVID situation has the potential to exacerbate the economic impact of the region’s ongoing energy crisis. Chart I-2 highlights that European natural gas prices have again exploded, reaching a new high that is fourteen times its pre-pandemic level. We noted in our Outlook report that European natural gas in storage is well below that of previous years, and Chart I-3 highlights that the gap in stored gas relative to previous years persists. This is occurring despite roughly average temperatures in central Europe over the past month (Chart I-4), underscoring that, barring atypically warmer temperatures, European natural gas prices are likely to remain elevated throughout the winter. Chart I-2Another Explosion In European Natural Gas Prices Chart I-5For Europe, COVID Is More Of A Problem Than Natural Gas Prices   For now, it appears that the rise in COVID cases is having a more pronounced effect on the European economy than the energy price situation. Chart I-5 highlights that the flash December euro area manufacturing PMI fell only modestly, and that Germany’s manufacturing PMI actually rose in December. By contrast, the euro area services PMI fell over two points, reflecting the toll that recent pandemic control measures have taken on non-goods producing activity. Over the coming three months, the odds are high that the Omicron variant will disrupt economic activity in advanced economies to some degree, but the magnitude of the disruption will be heavily determined by the variant’s capacity to produce severe illness. Investors will have more information on hand in a few weeks by which to judge the extent of this risk. We will provide an update to our own assessment in our February report. Risks Over The Next Year In our Outlook report, we assigned a 60% chance to an above-trend growth and above-target inflation scenario next year, a 30% chance to a “stagflation-lite” scenario of growth at or below potential and inflation well above target, and a 10% chance of a recession. We present below our assessment of the risk that one of the latter two scenarios occurs in 2022. The Risk Of “Stagflation-Lite” Chart I-6Aside From Europe's Energy Crisis, Supply-Side Constraints Are Slowly Easing The Omicron variant of COVID-19 has modestly raised the odds of a stagflationary outcome next year. Over the past few months, supply-side pressures have been modestly improving outside of Europe. Chart I-6 presents our new BCA Supply-Side Pressure Indicator, which measures the impact of supply-side restrictions across four categories: energy prices, shipping costs, the semiconductor shortage impact on automobile production, and labor availability. When we include all eleven components, the index has been trending higher of late, but trending flat-to-down after excluding European natural gas prices. While Omicron has the potential to reduce energy price pressure outside of Europe, it has the strong potential to cause a further increase in global shipping costs and postpone US labor market normalization. On the shipping cost front, we noted in our Outlook report that supply-side effects have been a significant driver of higher costs this year. The large rise in China/US shipping costs since late-June has been seemingly caused by the one-month closure of the Port of Yantian that began in late-May. While China has made enormous progress in vaccinating its population over the course of the year, and has prioritized the vaccination of workers in key industries, recent reports suggest that the Sinovac vaccine provides essentially no protection against contracting the Omicron variant of COVID-19. It is possible that Sinovac will offer protection against severe illness, but in terms of preventing transmission of the disease, Omicron has essentially returned China’s vaccination campaign back to square one. Chart I-7Further Price Increases May Seriously Slow Goods Spending That fact alone makes it almost certain that China will maintain its zero-tolerance COVID policy for most of 2022, which significantly raises the risk of additional factory and port shutdowns – and thus even higher shipping costs and imported goods prices. One optimistic point is that these shutdowns are more likely to occur in mainland China than in Taiwan Province or Malaysia, two key semiconductor exporters. This is because these two regions have distributed doses of Pfizer’s vaccine, and thus presumably have the ability to provide three-dose mRNA protection to workers in crucial exporting industries (should policymakers choose to do so). Still, US consumer goods prices would clearly be impacted by even higher shipping costs, which would likely have the combined effect of slowing growth and raising prices. Chart I-7 highlights that the recent sharp deterioration in US households’ willingness to buy durable goods has been closely linked to higher goods prices, arguing that goods spending may slow meaningfully if prices rise further alongside renewed weakness in services spending. Omicron’s contagiousness may also exacerbate the ongoing US labor shortage. The shortage has occurred because of a surge in the number of retirees, difficult working conditions in several industries, and increased childcare requirements during the pandemic. The increase in the number of retirees has not happened for structural reasons; it has been driven by a sharp slowdown in the number of older Americans shifting from “retired” to “in the labor force”, which has occurred because of health concerns. None of these factors are likely to improve meaningfully while Omicron is raging, suggesting that services prices are likely to remain elevated or accelerate further even if services spending falls anew. To conclude on this point, we estimate that the odds of a stagflation-lite scenario have risen to 35% (from 30%), and the odds of our base-case scenario of above-trend growth and above-target inflation have fallen to 55% (Chart I-8). Still, our base-case view remains the most probable outcome, given that we do not believe the odds of a recession next year have risen. The Risk Of Recession We do not think that the actual risk of a recession has risen significantly since we published our annual outlook, but we can envision a scenario in which Fed tightening causes investors to become fearful of a recession. Such a scenario would have a material impact on cyclical investment strategy, and thus warrants a discussion. Following the December FOMC meeting, BCA’s baseline expectation is that a first Fed hike will occur in June 2022 and that rate increases will proceed at a pace of 25 basis points per quarter through the end of the year. BCA’s house view on this question is now in line with the view of The Bank Credit Analyst service, which published in a September Special Report that the Fed could hit its maximum employment objective as early as next summer.3 The Fed’s shift implies that the 2-year yield should rise to 1.85%, and the 10-year yield to 2.35%, by the end of next year (Chart I-9).  Chart I-9A More Hawkish Fed Means A 2.35% 10-Year Yield Next Year We doubt that US monetary policy will become economically restrictive next year. If the Omicron variant of COVID-19 causes a serious slowdown in economic activity, the Fed will ramp down its expectations for rate hikes. And if the Fed meets our baseline expectations for hikes next year in the context of above-trend economic growth, we do not believe that a 2.35% 10-year Treasury yield will be, in any way, limiting for economic activity. However, investors do not agree with our view about the boundary between easy and tight monetary policy, and may begin to fear a recession in response to Fed tightening next year. We noted in our Outlook report that we believe the neutral rate of interest (“R-star”) is likely higher that investors believe, but the fact remains that the Fed and market participants have judged, with deep conviction, that the neutral rate remains very low relative to the potential growth rate of the economy. Chart I-10 presents the fair value path of the 2-year Treasury yield based on our expectations for the Fed funds rate, alongside the actual 10-year Treasury yield. The chart highlights that the 2/10 yield curve could flatten significantly or even invert in the second half of 2022 if long-maturity yields rise only modestly in response to Fed tightening, which could occur if investors focus on the view that the neutral rate of interest is low and that Fed rate hikes will not prove to be sustainable. Based on two different measures of the yield curve, fixed-income investors believe that the current economic expansion is already 50-60% complete (Chart I-11), implying a recession at some point in the first half of 2023. Chart I-10The US Yield Curve Could Invert Next Year If Long-Maturity Yields Rise Only Marginally Chart I-11More Than Half Of The Economic Expansion Has Already Occurred, According To The Yield Curve Chart I-12A Serious Flattening In The Yield Curve Could Unnerve Stocks If the yield curve were to flirt with inversion and investors began to price in the potential for a recession, it would cause significant financial market turmoil regardless of whether the risk of recession is real or not. Chart I-12 highlights that the S&P 500 fell 20% in late 2018 as the 2/10 yield curve flattened towards 20 basis points, in response to the economic impact of the China-US Trade War and the global impact of US tariffs on the auto industry. So it is possible that a “recessionary narrative” negatively impacts risky asset prices in the second half of 2022, even if an actual recession is ultimately avoided. Based on this, we would be much more inclined to reduce our recommended exposure to equities if the US 2/10 yield curve were to flatten below 30 basis points next year. In our view, the risk of a monetary policy-induced recession over the coming 12-18 months will only legitimately rise if long-dated inflation expectations break above the range that prevailed prior to the Global Financial Crisis. We noted in our Outlook report that this has not yet occurred for either household or market-based expectations, although it is a risk that cannot be ruled out. The odds of a breakout in long-dated inflation expectations will rise the longer that actual inflation remains elevated, and our inflation probability model suggests that core PCE inflation will remain well above 3% next year and potentially above 4% – although Chart I-13 highlights that the odds of the latter are falling. Chart I-13US Core Inflation Will Remain Well Above Target Next Year A dangerous breakout in inflation expectations would raise the risk of a recession because of the Fed’s awareness of the “sacrifice ratio”, a very important economic concept that has been mostly irrelevant for the past 25 years. The sacrifice ratio is an estimate of the amount of output or employment that must be given up in order to reduce inflation by one percentage point. Table I-1 highlights some academic estimates of the sacrifice ratio, which have typically varied between 2-4% in output terms. For comparison purposes, real GDP has typically fallen no more than 2% on a year-over-year basis during most post-war US recessions. Real GDP growth fell 4% year-over-year in 2009, highlighting that the cost of reducing the rate of inflation by 1 percentage point is effectively a severe recession. In his Senate testimony in late-November, Fed Chair Jay Powell noted that persistently high inflation threatens the economic recovery. He also implied that to reach its maximum employment goal, the Fed may need to act pre-emptively to tame inflation. This was implicit recognition of the sacrifice ratio, and should be seen as an expression of the Fed’s desire to avoid a scenario in which persistently high inflation causes inflation expectations to become unanchored (to the upside), as it would force the Fed to sacrifice economic activity in order to ensure price stability. By acting earlier to normalize monetary policy, the Fed hopes to keep inflation expectations well contained. Chart I-14Long-Dated Market-Based Inflation Expectations Are Not Out Of Control For now, we see no signs that the Fed will fail to keep inflation expectations from rising dangerously. Chart I-14 highlights that long-dated market expectations for inflation have been falling over the past two months, and are essentially at the same level that they were on average in 2018. Given this, we maintain the 10% odds of recession that we presented in our Outlook report, although investors will need to monitor inflation expectations closely over the coming year to judge whether the risks of a monetary policy-induced recession are indeed rising. Risks Beyond The Next Year Beyond 2022, the main risk to risky asset prices is probably not overly tight monetary policy. Instead, the risk is that investors will come to the conclusion that the Fed funds rate will ultimately end up rising above what the Fed is currently projecting, and that the economy will be capable of tolerating interest rates that are closer to the prevailing rate of economic growth. This would not be bad news for real economic activity, but it would imply meaningfully lower prices for financial assets that have benefited from low interest rates. Chart I-15US Stocks Would Suffer Significant Losses If Interest Rates Rise Towards Potential Growth Chart I-15 drives the point home by comparing the current S&P 500 forward P/E ratio to a “justified” P/E. Here, we calculate the justified P/E using the average ex-ante equity risk premium (ERP) since 1980, and real potential GDP growth as a stand-in for the real risk-free rate of interest. The chart highlights that US stocks would experience a 30% contraction in equity multiples should real long-maturity bond yields approach 2%. A decline in the ERP could potentially reduce losses for equity holders in a higher interest rate scenario, but it is very likely that the net effect would still be negative for stocks. We detailed in our Outlook report why we believe that the neutral rate of interest is higher than most acknowledge. We agree that R-star fell in the US for a time following the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), but we strongly question that it is as low as the Fed and investors believe. The neutral rate of interest fell during the first half of the last economic cycle because of a persistent period of household deleveraging and balance-sheet repair, which was a multi-year consequence of the financial crisis and the insufficient fiscal response to the 2008-09 recession. We highlighted in our Outlook report that US household balance sheets have been repaired, and that the household debt service ratio has fallen to mid-1960s levels. However, Chart I-16 highlights that even the corporate sector, which has leveraged itself significantly over the past decade, has seen its debt service ratio plummet. In a scenario in which long-maturity Treasury yields were to rise to 4%, we estimate that the debt service burden of the nonfinancial corporate sector would rise to its 70th-80th percentile historically. Chart I-16The US Corporate Sector Debt Service Burden Has Room To Rise That would be a meaningful increase from current levels, but it would not be unprecedented, and thus would not render a 4% 10-year Treasury yield to be economically unsustainable. In addition, we strongly suspect that corporations would reduce their interest burden in such a scenario by issuing equity to retire debt. That would lower firms’ debt burden and reduce the economic impact of higher interest rates, although it would be additionally negative for equity investors given that this would dilute earnings per share. We argued in our Outlook report that a shift in investor expectations about the neutral rate of interest is unlikely to occur before the Fed begins to normalize monetary policy. Ryan Swift, BCA’s US Bond Strategist, presented further evidence of this perspective in a Special Report earlier this week.4 Ryan highlighted results from a recent academic paper, which showed that the entire decline in the 10-year Treasury yield since 1990 has occurred during three-day windows centered around FOMC meetings (Chart I-17). Ryan argued that this suggests investors change their neutral rate expectations in response to Fed interest rate decisions, rather than in response to independent macroeconomic factors that are distinct from monetary policy action. This argues that a shift in neutral rate expectations is unlikely before the Fed begins to lift interest rates in the middle of the year, and probably not until the Fed has raised rates a few times. We are thus unlikely to recommend that investors reduce their equity exposure in response to this risk until 5-year, 5-year forward Treasury yields break above 2.5% (the Fed’s long-run Fed funds rate projection), which is 80 basis points above current levels (Chart I-18). Chart I-17Fed Rate Decisions Drive Long-Maturity Bond Yields Chart I-18We Will Consider Selling Stocks If Market-Based Neutral Rate Estimates Exceed 2.5%   Investment Conclusions We continue to advise that investors position themselves in line with the investment recommendations that we presented in our Outlook report. Over the following 12-months, we expect the following: Global stocks to outperform bonds Short-duration fixed-income positions to outperform long High-yield corporate bonds to outperform within fixed-income portfolios Value stocks to outperform growth Non-resource cyclicals to outperform defensives Small caps to outperform large A modest rise in commodity prices led by oil A decline in the US dollar However, our discussion of the risks to our views has highlighted three things for investors to monitor next year when deciding whether to reduce exposure to stocks (and risky assets more generally): A breakout in long-dated inflation expectations, as that would likely cause the Fed to raise interest rates more aggressively than it currently projects. A significant flattening in the yield curve, as that would indicate that investors ultimately expect existing Fed rate hike projections to prove recessionary. A rise in 5-year, 5-year forward US Treasury yields above 2.5%, as that would indicate that investors may be upwardly shifting their expectations for the neutral rate of interest. Over the shorter-term, our discussion also underscored that the Omicron variant will likely disrupt economic activity to some degree over the coming three months, and that the risks of a stagflation-lite scenario next year have modestly increased because of the likely maintenance of China’s zero-tolerance COVID policy. We continue to expect that the widespread rollout of booster doses, as well as the progressive availability of effective and safe antiviral drugs, will limit Omicron’s impact on economic activity to the first half of 2022, and that the pandemic will recede in importance next year on average in comparison to 2021. As noted above, this assessment will be monitored continually in response to the release of new information, and we will provide an update in our February report. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst December 23, 2021 Next Report: January 27, 2022 II. Stock Buybacks – Much Ado About Nothing Dear Client, This month’s Special Report is a guest piece by Doug Peta, BCA Research’s Chief US Investment Strategist. Doug’s report examines the impact of US stock buybacks using a median bottom-up approach, and presents a different perspective of the value vs. growth distribution of buybacks than we did in our October Section 2. I trust you will find his report interesting and insightful. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA The Bank Credit Analyst Elected officials’ antipathy for buybacks is unfounded, … : For the companies that are the primary drivers of buyback activity, returning cash to shareholders is more likely to have a positive impact on employment and investment than retaining it.  and the idea that they boost stock returns may be, as well, … : Over the last ten years, a cap-weighted bucket of large-cap stocks that most reduced their share counts underperformed the bucket that most increased their share counts by 2% annually.  especially within the Tech sector, which has most enthusiastically executed them: Despite the success of Apple, which has seen its market cap soar since embarking on a deliberate strategy to shrink its shares outstanding, a strategy buying Tech’s biggest net reducers and selling its biggest net issuers would have generated sizable negative alpha over the last ten years. The problem is the relative profile of net buyers and net issuers: In general, companies that consistently buy back their own stock are mature companies that cannot earn an accretive return by redeploying the capital their incumbent business generates. Net issuers, on the other hand, are often young companies seeking fresh capital to realize their abundant growth opportunities. The next year is likely to see a pickup of share buybacks nonetheless, … : Our US Equity Strategy service’s Cash Yield Prediction Model points to increased buyback activity in 2022. … as management teams are wedded to them and buying back stock is the best use of capital for the mature companies executing them: Better to return cash to shareholders than to enter new business lines beyond the company’s area of expertise or embark on dubious acquisitions, even in the face of a potential 1% surtax. In Capitol Hill’s current polarized state, stock buybacks are in select company with the tech giants and China as issues that unite solons on both sides of the aisle. They are also a hot-button issue for some investors, who see them as telltale signs of a market kept aloft by sleight of hand. Although we do not think they’re worth getting worked up over – they do not promote the misallocation of capital and they may not actually boost stock prices – they come up repeatedly in client discussions and are likely to remain a feature of the landscape even if they are eventually subjected to a modest federal surtax. We have therefore joined with the BCA Equity Analyzer team to pore over its bottom-up database for insights into the buyback phenomenon. After ranking nearly 600 stocks in our large-cap universe in order of their rolling 12-month percentage change in shares outstanding across the last ten years, we were surprised to discover that the companies that most reduced their share count underperformed the companies that most grew it. We were also surprised to find that Tech was by far the worst performer among the six sectors with negative net issuance. Ultimately, the performance story seemed to boil down to Growth stocks’ extended recent edge over Value stocks. We present the data, our interpretation of it, and some future investment implications in this Special Report. Buybacks’ Bad Rap From Capitol Hill to the White House, prominent Washington voices bemoan buybacks. In a February 2019 New York Times opinion piece,5 Senators Sanders (I-VT) and Schumer (D-NY) argued that equity buybacks divert resources from productive investment in the narrow interest of boosting share prices for the benefit of shareholders and corporate executives. To counter the increasing popularity of buybacks, they proposed legislation that would permit buybacks only after several preconditions for investing in workers and communities had been met. Echoing their concerns, the White House's framework for the Build Back Better bill included a 1% surcharge on stock buybacks, “which corporate executives too often use to enrich themselves rather than investing in workers and growing the economy.” Chart II-1The Smallest Companies Sell Stock; The Largest Buy It Back Buybacks’ opponents may mean well, but they seem to be missing an essential point: by and large, the companies that buy back their own stock lack enough attractive investment opportunities to absorb the cash their operations generate. Companies with more opportunities than cash don’t buy back stock; they issue it (and/or borrow) to get the capital to pursue them. The simple generalization that large, mature companies buy back shares while small, growing companies issue new ones is borne out by rolling 12-month percentage changes in shares outstanding by large-cap and small-cap companies (Chart II-1). On an equal-weighted basis, large-cap companies’ rolling share count was flat to modestly down for ten years before the pandemic drove net issuance. Adjusting for market cap, rolling net issuance has been uninterruptedly negative, shrinking by more than 2% per year, on average. The equally weighted small-cap population has been a net issuer to the tune of about 4% annually, with the biggest small-caps issuing even more, pushing the cap-weighted annual average to north of 6%. The bottom line is that large-cap companies in the aggregate have been modestly trimming their share counts, with the biggest companies retiring more than 2% of their shares each year, while small-cap companies are serial issuers, led by their largest (and presumably most bankable) constituents. We are investors serving investors, not policymakers, academics or editorial columnists charged with developing and evaluating public policy. Our mandate is bullish or bearish, not good or bad. We point out the flaws in the prevailing criticism of buybacks simply to make the point that buybacks are not an impediment to productive investment and that no one should therefore expect that productivity and income will rise if legislators or regulators restrict them. On the contrary, since we believe that buybacks represent an efficient allocation of capital, we would expect that successful attempts to limit them will hold back growth at the margin. The Buyback Calculus A company that buys back more of its shares than it issues reduces its share count. All else equal, a company with fewer shares outstanding will report greater earnings per share and a higher return on equity. Increased earnings per share (EPS) does not necessarily ensure a higher share price; if a company’s P/E multiple declines by more than EPS rises, its price will fall. Distributing retained earnings to shareholders reduces a company’s capital buffer against shocks and limits its ability to fund investment internally, but companies that embark on the most ambitious buyback campaigns likely face limited investment opportunities and have much more of a buffer than they could conceivably require. Revealed preferences suggest that management teams like buybacks. They have every interest in getting share prices higher to maximize the value of their own compensation, which typically contains an equity component that accounts for an increasing share of total compensation the more they rise in the company’s hierarchy. It is unclear, however, just how much their attachment to buybacks is founded on an expectation that buying back stock will boost its price. The opportunity to extend their tenure by pursuing a shareholder-friendly policy may well offer a stronger incentive. Do Buybacks Boost Share Prices? Returning cash to shareholders is widely perceived as good corporate governance. It increases the effective near-term yield on an equity investment and denies management the cash to pursue dubious expansion schemes or squander capital on lavish perquisites. It facilitates the reallocation of capital away from cash cows to more productive uses. Buybacks are squarely beneficial in theory, but are they good for investors in practice? (Please see the Box II-1 for a description of the methodology we followed to answer the empirical question.) Box II-1 Performance Calculation Methodology After separating stocks into large- and small-cap categories based on Standard & Poor’s market cap parameters for inclusion in the S&P 500 and the SmallCap 600 indexes, we ranked the constituents in each category in reverse order of their rolling 12-month percentage change in shares outstanding at the end of each month from 2011 through 2021. We then placed the top three deciles (the biggest reducers of their share counts) into the High Buybacks bucket and the bottom three deciles (the biggest net issuers) into the Low Buybacks bucket. We used the buckets to backtest a zero-net-exposure strategy of buying the stocks in the High bucket with the proceeds from shorting the stocks in the Low bucket, calling it the High-Minus-Low (“HML”) strategy. We computed two sets of HML results for the large-cap and small-cap universes. The first populated the buckets without regard for sector representation (“sector-agnostic”) and the second populated the buckets in line with the sector composition of the S&P 500 and SmallCap 600 Indexes (“sector-neutral”). We also track equal-weighted and cap-weighted versions of each HML bucket to gain a sense of performance differences between constituents by size. The experience of the last ten years fails to support the widely held view that stock buybacks boost share prices. Following a zero-net-exposure strategy of owning the top three deciles of large-cap companies ranked by the rolling 12-month percentage reduction of shares outstanding and shorting the bottom three deciles generated a modest positive annual return above 1% (Chart II-2). Small caps merely broke even, largely because their biggest share reducers sharply underperformed in Year 1 of the pandemic. On a cap-weighted basis, however, the large-cap strategy generated a negative annual return a little over 1% during the period, indicating that the largest companies pursuing buyback programs lagged their net issuer counterparts. For small caps, the cap-weighted strategy also lagged the equal-weighted strategy, albeit by a smaller margin. On a sector-neutral basis, the large-cap HML strategy roundly disappointed. The equal-weighted version was never able to do much more than break even, slipping into the red when COVID arrived, while the cap-weighted version continuously lagged it, shedding about 1.5% annually (Chart II-3). Though it was hit hard by the pandemic, the equal-weighted small-cap HML strategy managed to generate about 1% annually, and boasted a 3.5% annualized return for the eight years through 2019. Chart II-2Buybacks May Help A Company's Stock Price At The Margin ... Chart II-3... But They Are Not An Exploitable Factor   Drilling down to the sector level offers some additional insights. While changes in shares outstanding vary across large-cap sectors, with six sectors reducing their shares outstanding and five expanding them, every small-cap sector has been a net issuer in every single year, ex-Discretionaries and Industrials in 2019 (Chart II-4). Relative sector capital needs are largely consistent regardless of market cap, however, with REITs, which distribute all their income to preserve their tax-free status, unable to expand without raising cash in the capital markets, and Utilities, Energy and traditional Telecom Services being capital-intensive industries (Table II-1). Many Tech niches are capital-light, and established Industrials and Consumer businesses often throw off cash. There is less large- and small-cap commonality in HML relative sector performance than in relative sector issuance. Away from Real Estate, Tech and Discretionaries, small-cap HML sector strategies generated aggregate positive returns, led by Communication Services and Energy (Chart II-5). For the large caps, most HML sector strategies produced negative alpha, though the four winners and the one modest loser (Financials) are among the six sectors that have net retired shares outstanding since 2012. Tech is the conspicuous exception, with its HML strategy yielding annualized losses exceeding 3%, contrasting with the sector’s enthusiastic buyback embrace. The Corporate Life Cycle Surprising as they may be on their face, negative cap-weighted ten-year HML returns do not mean that buybacks are counterproductive. We simply think they illustrate that net issuance activity follows from a company’s position in the corporate life cycle (Figure II-1). Investors have prized growth in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, and the companies with the best growth prospects are often younger companies just beginning to tap their addressable markets. They have a long pathway of market share capture ahead of them and need to raise capital to begin traveling it. Many of these strong growers populate the Low basket, especially in the Tech sector. Companies that return cash to their owners via share repurchases are often more mature. Their operations are comfortably profitable and generate more than enough cash to sustain them. They have already captured all the market share they’re likely to gain in their primary business and may not have an outlet for its proceeds in a space in which they have a plausible competitive advantage. Lacking a clear path to bettering the returns from their main operations, they have been steadily accumulating cash for a long time. Through the lens of the Boston Consulting Group’s (BCG) growth share matrix,6 a successful business in the Maturity stage of the business life cycle is known as a Cash Cow. Cash Cows have gained considerable market share in their industry, affording them a competitive advantage based on scale, brand and experience, but little scope for growth because they have saturated a market that is itself mature (Figure II-2). BCG advises management teams with a portfolio of business lines to milk Cash Cows for capital to reinvest in high-share, high-growth-potential Stars or low-share, high-growth-potential Question Marks that could be developed into Stars. In the public markets, a mature large-cap company that retains its excess capital impedes its owners’ ability to redeploy that capital to faster growing investments, subverting the overall economy’s ability to redirect capital to its best uses. Walmart, Twentieth-Century Growth Darling Chart II-6From Young Turk To Respected Elder Walmart fits the business life cycle framework to a T and has evolved into a textbook Cash Cow. It is a dominant player that executed its initial strategy so well that it has maxed out its share in the declining/stagnating brick-and-mortar retail industry. Its international attempts to replicate its domestic success have uniformly failed to gain traction, and it currently operates in fewer major countries than it's exited. Given Walmart’s star-crossed international experience and the dismal history of large corporate combinations, returning cash may be the optimal use of shareholder capital. Walmart began life as a public company in fiscal 1971 squarely in the Growth phase. It was profitable from the start and grew annual revenues by at least 25% for every one of its first 23 years of public ownership (Chart II-6, top panel). It was a modest issuer of shares during its Growth phase, conducting just one secondary common stock offering 12 years after its IPO and otherwise limiting growth in shares outstanding to acquisitions, management incentive awards and debt and preferred stock conversions. Once its revenue growth slipped into the low double-digits in the late nineties, it began retiring its shares at a deliberate pace (Table II-2). That retirement inaugurated a ramping up of Walmart’s annual payout ratio (Chart II-6, bottom panel) and cash yield (dividend yield plus buyback yield), underlining its transition from Growth to Maturity. Walmart’s 2010 admission into the S&P 500 Pure Value Index marked its ripening into full maturity, and it has been a Pure Value fixture since 2013. Today’s stolid icon is a far cry from the ambitious disruptor on display in its 1980 Annual Report: Subsequent to year end, your Company’s directors authorized [a one-third] increase in the annual dividend[.] This continues your Company’s approach of distributing a portion of profits to our shareholders and utilizing the balance to fund our aggressive expansion program. [T]he decade of the ’70’s … has been a tremendous growth period for your Company. In January 1970, we … had 32 stores …, comprising less than a million square feet of retail space. In the next ten years, we added 258 … stores, … constructed and opened three new distribution facilities, and increased our retail space to 12.6 million square feet. During that same period of time, we increased our sales and earnings at an annual compounded rate well in excess of 40 percent. Reflecting upon the progress we have made in the ‘70’s makes it apparent that there is even more opportunity in the ‘80’s for your Company, and we are better positioned to maximize our opportunities … than ever before. The Exception That Proves The Rule Apple has shined so far in the twenty-first century much like Walmart did in the latter stages of the twentieth, growing its revenues and net income at compound annual rates exceeding 20% and 25%, respectively. Unlike Walmart, however, Apple hasn’t required a steady stream of capital to grow. While Walmart had to plow its earnings right back into the business to fund the acquisition and buildout of property to create stores, warehouses and distribution centers, Apple has simply had to make incremental improvements to its music players, phones and tablets while shoring up the moats around its virtual app and music marketplaces. As a result, cash and retained earnings began silting up on Apple’s balance sheet, lying fallow in short-term marketable securities and crimping a range of return metrics. Beginning in its 2013 fiscal year, Apple embarked on a lengthy strategy of returning that cash to shareholders, buying back stock at a rate that has allowed it to reduce its shares outstanding by 37.5% in the space of nine years (Table II-3). It has reduced its retained earnings by more than $90 billion over that span and is on course to wipe them out completely in the fiscal year ending next September. Equity issuance in the form of incentive compensation augments Apple’s capital by about $5 billion per year, but if it continues to distribute more than 100% of its annual earnings in the form of dividends and repurchases, it could wipe out the rest of its recorded equity capital as well. Does this mean Apple is in danger of sliding into insolvency? Not in the least. The value of its assets dramatically exceeds the value of its liabilities, as evidenced by its nearly $3 trillion market cap and the top AAA credit rating Moody’s awarded it this week. Its reported book value is artificially suppressed by generally accepted accounting principles’ inability to value organically developed intellectual property (IP). Apple’s book value and that of other companies that generate similar IP, or benefit from internally generated moats, are dramatically undervalued. Takeaways For now, Apple is an anomaly when it comes to aggressively returning cash to shareholders while it is still in the Growth stage of its life cycle. Returning cash is typically the province of mature companies with steady operations that are unlikely to grow. It is generally good for the economy when those companies return excess cash to shareholders, freeing it up for more productive uses. If lawmakers or regulators manage to restrict the flow of capital from cash-cow companies to potential stars, we should expect activity to slow at the margin, not quicken. The experience of the last ten years suggests that companies that shrink their share counts do not outperform their counterparts that expand them. The trading strategy of shorting the biggest net share issuers to purchase the biggest net share reducers has produced negative returns. It is unclear if shareholders of companies who cannot redeploy their internally generated capital to augment the returns from their primary operations would be better served if their manager-agents retained the capital, though we suspect they would not. It seems inevitable that manager-agents with access to too much capital will eventually get into mischief. If buying back stock represents good corporate stewardship at mature companies, their shareholders should someday be rewarded for it. Given that the companies most suited to buying back stock tend to fit in the Value style box, the zero-net-exposure HML strategy may continue to accrue losses. Apple remains an outlier among Growth companies as an avid buyer of its stock; much more common are the S&P 500 Life and Multi-Line Insurer sub-industry groups, without which the S&P 500 Pure Value Index would have a hard time reaching a quorum (Table II-4). Their constituents have assiduously bought back their stock over the last ten years, albeit to no relative avail (Chart II-7). However, they should be better positioned once Value returns to favor and rising interest rates make investing their cash flow a more attractive proposition. Chart II-7... But No One Else Seems To Want To   Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist III. Indicators And Reference Charts BCA’s equity indicators highlight that the “easy” money from expectations of an eventual end to the pandemic have already been made. Our technical, valuation, and sentiment indicators remain very extended, highlighting that investors should expect positive but modest returns from stocks over the coming 6-12 months. Our monetary indicator has retreated below the boom/bust line, although this mostly reflects the use of producer prices to deflate money growth. In nominal terms, the supply of money continues to grow. Still, the retreat in the indicator over the past year highlights that the monetary policy stance is likely to move in a tighter direction over the coming year, which is in line with the Fed’s recent hawkish shift. Forward equity earnings are pricing in a substantial further rise in earnings per share. Net earnings revisions and net positive earnings surprises are rolling over, but there is no meaningful sign of waning forward earnings momentum. Bottom-up analyst earning expectations remain too high, but stocks are likely to be supported by robust revenue growth over the coming year. Within a global equity portfolio, we continue to recommend that investors position for the underperformance of financial assets that are negatively correlated with long-maturity government bond yields. The US 10-Year Treasury Yield remains well below the fair value implied by a mid-2022 rate hike scenario, underscoring that a move higher over the coming year is quite likely. Commodity prices remain elevated, and our composite technical indicator highlights that they remain overbought. An eventual slowdown in US goods spending, coupled with eventual supply-chain normalization and the absence of a significant reflationary impulse from Chinese policy, could weigh on commodity prices at some point over the coming 6 months. We expect stronger metals prices in the back half of 2022. US and global LEIs remain very elevated but have started to roll over. Our global LEI diffusion index has declined very significantly, but this likely reflects the outsized impact of a few emerging market countries (whose vaccination progress is still lagging). Still-strong leading and coincident indicators underscore that the global demand for goods is robust, and that output is below pre-pandemic levels in most economies because of very weak services spending. The latter will recover significantly at some point over the coming year, as the severity of the pandemic wanes. EQUITIES: Chart III-1US Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3US Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4US Stock Market Breadth Chart III-5US Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6US Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9US Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Chart III-11Selected US Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield ComponentsChart III-13US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-16US Dollar And PPP Chart III-17US Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18US Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-28US And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29US Macro Snapshot Chart III-30US Growth Outlook Chart III-31US Cyclical Spending Chart III-32US Labor Market Chart III-33US Consumption Chart III-34US Housing Chart III-35US Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-36US Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Footnotes 1  Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "OUTLOOK 2022: Peak Inflation – Or Just Getting Started?", dated December 1, 2021, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 2   Early assessment of the clinical severity of the SARS-CoV-2 Omicron variant in South Africa by Wolter et al., medRxiv preprint, December 21, 2021. 3  Please see The Bank Credit Analyst “The Return To Maximum Employment: It May Be Faster Than You Think”, dated August 26, 2021, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 4  Please see US Bond Strategy “The Fed In 2022”, dated December 21, 2021, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 5   Opinion | Schumer and Sanders: Limit Corporate Stock Buybacks - The New York Times (nytimes.com) Accessed December 17, 2021. 6   https://www.bcg.com/about/overview/our-history/growth-share-matrix Accessed December 19, 2021. EQUITIES:FIXED INCOME:CURRENCIES:COMMODITIES:ECONOMY:

Dear client, This is our final report for this year. Clients who missed our FX key views report last week can access the link here. We thank you for your continued readership, and wish you happy and healthy holidays. Kind regards, Chester Highlights We were offside on the dollar this year. Our 94-95 ceiling for the DXY was punched in November (currently 96). More importantly, the dollar is the strongest performing G10 currency this year, which we did not anticipate. That said, both the Norges Bank and the Bank of England hiked rates today. This reinforces our conviction that the Fed will stay behind the curve. Our trades still managed to deliver alpha. Our batting average (percentage of wins) was 64%. Our worst performing trade was to go long silver in July this year and go short USD/JPY in May. This proved premature as the dollar extended its rally, following a hawkish shift by the Federal Reserve. Our best trades were being opportunistically long the Scandinavian currencies, short the gold/silver ratio and short EUR/GBP. More importantly, swimming against the tide, we benefited from respecting our stop losses, and not overstaying our welcome in profitable trades. Our current view is that the dollar has some more near-term upside. Our target for the DXY is 98 over the next few months or so, but we expect a reversal after. For the moment, we are playing three themes in the FX market – policy convergence between central banks (long EUR/GBP, AUD/NZD and short USD/JPY), a rise in FX volatility (long CHF/NZD), and forthcoming green shoots in China (long AUD/USD). That said, we will maintain tight stops on all these trades, given the landscape remains fraught with uncertainty. Feature The dollar is in a perfect storm, characterized by rising inflation that is prompting the Federal Reserve to turn more hawkish, but also raising the possibility that it kills the US recovery. The US 10/2 Treasury curve slope has flattened to 79 bps, and the 30/2 Treasury slope has collapsed to 120 bps (Chart 1A). Historically, this pattern of curve flattening has been symptomatic of a brewing recession and further gains in the dollar (Chart 1B). Chart 1AThe Dollar And The Yield Curve Chart 1BThe Dollar And The Yield Curve Two-year yields have shot up in the US, relative to other G10 countries. This is a phenomenon that has been pretty consistent throughout the year with sub-zero interest rate countries (euro area, Japan, Switzerland, Chart 2A) but is becoming even more broad based. Two-year yields are accelerating in the US versus countries such as Canada, New Zealand and Norway, where their central banks have already ended QE and/or are raising interest rates. It is also interesting that their currencies have depreciated more this year than what will be implied by nominal yield differentials (Chart 2B). Chart 2ARising Short-Term Rates In The US Chart 2BRising Short-Term Rates In The US The Federal Reserve’s own estimates suggest that a 10% increase in the dollar will shave US real growth by 50 bps the following year, an additional 20 bps the year after. This is occurring when China is easing monetary policy, which will likely support growth outside the US. Commodity currencies such as the AUD, NZD and NOK are very sensitive to subtle shifts in Chinese growth (Chart 3). If financial conditions tighten in the US while easing elsewhere, it pretty much ensures that growth will rotate next year from the US to other countries that have seen their currencies weaken (Chart 4). Chart 3Commodity Currencies Weighed Down By The China Slowdown Chart 4The US Dollar And Relative ##br##Growth This year, our bias was that the Fed will lag the inflation curve, relative to other central banks, and this will weaken the dollar. This thesis hinged on two critical observations. First, real rates in the US remained very low as the Fed was lagging other central banks in tightening policy. Almost all central banks, with the exception of the Bank of Japan and the European Central Bank, have already ended QE. Many have also hiked interest rates (Chart 5).  Second, and related, inflation overshot in the US relative to other countries (Chart 6). Where we went wrong was not anticipating that the market would price in a more credible Fed, especially against other G10 central banks. Chart 5Worldwide Monetary Normalization Weighs On The Dollar Chart 6Surging US Inflation Also Bearish For The Dollar In the near term, we think the dollar continues to do well, but we are not betting on an overshoot. Longer term, the themes suggested in our outlook should play out, including a weaker dollar. In the next few sections, we review some of our big losses this year, as well as our winners. Finally, in April 2020, we designed a rules-based trading model to see if, over time, currencies could be traded purely mechanically. That model was also offside this year, shorting the dollar 9 out of 12 months. That said, over time, a model grounded in the fundamental basis that has defined the BCA approach provided alpha (Chart 7). According to the model, investors should be long most G10 currencies versus the dollar, except the Japanese yen and the New Zealand dollar (Chart 8A and 8B). Chart 7Our USD Model Takes A Long-Term Approach Chart 8AOur Model Is USD Bearish Chart 8BOur Model Is USD Bearish   Overall Trade Performance For 2021 Chart 9 highlights the timeline of closed trades in 2021, alongside performance. Our trades still managed to deliver alpha. Our batting average (percentage of wins) was 64%. The cumulative return this year was 37%, the mean return was 1.1%, and the median return was 1.3%. Our worst performing trade was to go long silver in July this year and go short USD/JPY in May. Our long silver trade was by far the worst decision. Excluding this trade, our cumulative returns this year would have been 50.6%, with a mean return of 1.6%, and a median return of 1.4%. We implemented this trade after the hawkish shift by the Federal Reserve, but it proved premature as the dollar extended its rally. Short USD/JPY We were long the yen against the dollar for the entire second half of 2020, and opportunistically long in the spring and summer of 2021. Real rate differentials versus the US supported the yen. Equally important was the yen’s hedging benefit among our other trades at the time, most of which were pro-growth. Finally, the yen was also cheap. Going long in June was particularly interesting. First, we believed that the dollar rally would be short lived, a view that was offside for 2021. We also observed that a nation’s currency tended to outperform as it hosted the Olympic Games, leading to our belief that the yen would benefit from the Tokyo Summer Games (Chart 10).  In the end, the two-year yield differential between the US and Japan was the most important driver for the yen. We remain long, but with a stop loss at our latest entry point of 114.40.   Long Petrocurrencies (CAD, NOK, MXN, RUB And COP) Versus The Euro Chart 11Commodity Currencies Still Have Upside Our Commodity Strategists have been bullish oil since the bottom in 2020, a call that has been prescient. As a derivative, we went long a petrocurrency basket against the euro for most of the second half of 2020. We took profits on that trade when our trailing stop was triggered, but the returns were mostly from the carry. Towards the end of October 2021, we once again went long the basket, given the divergence between currency performance and surging oil prices (Chart 11). However, we were stopped out a month later as the dollar started to rally on the back of an increasingly hawkish Fed. Overall, our rational for the trade played out, but the meagre gains were because we were swimming against the tide of a strong dollar. Short EUR/GBP We sold this pair in September of 2020 mainly based on the belief that stalled UK/EU trade talks instilled too much pessimism in the market, leading to an undervalued pound against the euro. The UK data that came out during that time were also relatively strong compared to both the US and the euro area. We closed the trade for a sizeable profit. Short CAD/NOK Chart 12The CAD/NOK Still Has Downside Our main rationale for this trade rested on the differences in geographies for these oil sources, amidst a bullish oil environment. While both of these petrocurrencies strengthened, Canadian oil’s lower grade and higher cost of transportation would subject the loonie to underperformance against the NOK. CAD/NOK is also correlated to EUR/USD because of economic ties, and so a bet on a stronger euro (driven by stronger economic performance outside the US) was also a bet on a lower CAD/NOK (Chart 12). Our view turned out to be right.   Long EUR/CHF Chart 13EUR/CHF And The German Bund Yield We went long EUR/CHF in November 2020 and took profits in May 2021. At the time, CHF had appreciated by 1.2% in a week, opening an interesting gap between EUR/CHF and USD/CHF. This suggested that either the franc was too high versus the euro, or the euro was too high versus the dollar. The overall rationale behind the trade was right. The SNB maintained a dovish stance with a close focus on the exchange rate. Going forward, rising yields on the back of an economic recovery will support EUR/CHF (Chart 13). EUR/CHF is also underpinned by cheap valuations. We remain long the cross. Long CAD/NZD And AUD/NZD Our bias on NZD for most of the 2021 has been negative at the crosses. This was based on two driving factors. First, according to our models, the kiwi is the most expensive G10 currency after the dollar. Second, we did not believe the Reserve Bank of New Zealand could credibly hike interest rates ahead of other G10 countries. New Zealand is an island geographically but not economically. As such, we have been short NZD at the crosses. Other factors add to this high-conviction view. First, the New Zealand stock market is the most defensive in the G10, while Canadian and Australian bourses are heavy in cyclical stocks. Should value start to outperform growth, this will favor the CAD/NZD and AUD/NZD cross. Second, in the commodity space, our bias is that energy and metals will fare better than agriculture, boosting loonie/aussie relative terms of trade. We remain long AUD/NZD, and made modest gains when we got stopped out of our previous position in April. Long Silver Relative To Gold Chart 14Gold/Silver Tracks The Dollar We shorted the the gold/silver ratio four times throughout the year based on the view that global ex-US growth was poised to recover amid very accommodative policy. As such, industrial precious metals would be well supported. The gold/silver ratio is also a play on the dollar (Chart 14). Our first two attempts earlier in the spring to catch the drawdown in the gold/silver ratio both profited handsomely, registering 6.25% and 8.45% returns respectively. However, since June, the dollar has strenghthend, which has eroded the anti-fiat appeal of silver. Long Scandinavian Currencies We were long NOK and SEK for most of 2021. We were bullish on the NOK as the Norges Bank is leading the pack in raising interest rates, as we witnessed today. Indeed, for the first half of the year, the return on our Scandinavian basket was driven primarily by the NOK against both the dollar and the euro. We respected our trailing stop loss on this trade, and will reinitiate in the near future. Short AUD/MXN Chart 15AUD/MXN Still Richly Valued Short AUD/MXN was a play on a slowdown in China. A falling credit impulse in China, and  a short-term recovery in the US economy relative to the rest of the world, argued for an AUD/MXN short. Further, on a real effective exchange rate basis, AUD/MXN was richly valued (Chart 15). Our first attempt to trade the pair was unsuccessful. Once our stop loss was triggered, we reinitiated the trade and made a net profit. Long CHF/NZD We went long this pair as both a bet on rising currency volatility, but also as a hedge to our portfolio of trades, which were pivoted towards growth and recovery. Our view was right. The pair did strengthen for much of the early part of the year leading up to the end of August. We exited for a minscule profit, but reinitiated, and are now sitting on 3.98% gains. Long EUR/USD The euro has been the toughest call this year, because the ECB has been surprisingly steady on its path to keep interest rates low. In July, our limit buy on EUR/USD was triggered at 1.18. Even though a dollar rally was a major risk, we argued adjustment in the weight of the shelter component in the euro area CPI basket will boost the European CPI relative to the US. This proved premature and we obeyed our stop loss.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Kate Sun Research Analyst kate.sun@bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Strategic View Tactical Holdings (0-6 months) Forecast Summary